THE TUPAMAROS
THE UNMENTIONABLES

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By

MAJOR CARLOS WILSON

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TO

ANA MARIA CAPRILLIES
who, with the passing of time, has become a
People's Political Hero

BOW YUK LAM
who, with the passing of time, shall become a
People's Political Hero

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FOREWORD

To begin this book with a lengthy introduction would be to serve an injustice on the Tupamaros, for they believe not in words or rhetoric, but rather in action. Therefore, I shall make the introduction only long enough to serve the purpose of introducing the Tupamaros: who they are, what they believe in, and why they are in existence. Then I shall let the Tupamaros speak for themselves, based on reports from their actions to the words they have written for this book.

The Tupamaros are an unique and a highly successful urban guerrilla force, a force that is presently ripping away the very foundation of Uruguay's power structure. The Tupamaros are unique because urban guerrilla warfare itself is unique. Due to its new and unique character, many guerrilla leaders believe urban guerrilla warfare impossible. The Tupamaros, also known as the MLN — Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional or National Liberation Movement — is daily proving the impossible possible.

Aside from Cuba, this group is proving to be the best organized and most effective armed socialist challenge to capitalist government in the Western Hemisphere. Its ten-year plus existence and its solidly-based ideology and urban guerrilla practice, its imaginative tactics, its impenetrable cell organization, and its daily growing popular support offer a most serious threat to continued U.S. domination of Latin American nations. This is directly true through the Tupamaros possible and near political and economic takeover in Uruguay; indirectly true through the example set for all Americas.

Their example has already been widely copied, from the urban guerrilla groups from Brazil to Venezuela, from West Germany to the Weathermen in the heartland of the Americas, the United States. That style, that example, will soon be one of a people's political and economic revolutionary victory.

The Tupamaros have broken style with the established Latin American Left organizations, whether Left labor unions, Socialist or Communist parties. This is because of the contradiction between these groups' revolutionary rhetoric on the one hand and their parliamentary participation and notorious, bureaucratic and self-serving conservatism on the other; all are based on rhetoric with a lack of of action.

For years, Major Che Guevara, Premier Fidel Castro, and Regis Debray have been exposing this contradiction, delegitimizing the old Left, and advancing a serious, armed new Left, a new Left that replaces rhetoric with action. The Tupamaros are continuing this struggle with an example to be copied.

Berkeley
26 July 13 MAJOR CARLOS WILSON

INTRODUCTION

The guerrilla group that possibly takes most of the world's attention alongside the Al-Fatah Palestinian guerrillas, the Tupamaros are almost completely unknown outside the region of the Rio de la Plata and Cuba. It is logical in part that this be the case, given that even inside the Oriental Republic of Uruguay where they operate, the government makes superhuman efforts to hide their activities.

The well-informed world citizen might know two or three elementary facts about the Tupamaros: they have realized a series of spectacular blows against which the repressive forces of Uruguay have been able to do little; they have in check the whole police department, together with the Uruguayan Army. But their objectives, the reason for their battle, are kept in the dark. Lately, non-Uruguayan newspapers have printed the strangest opinions about the motives and the importance of the Tupamaro movement. There are those who think that it constitutes a sort of Robin Hood group that steals from the wealthy to give to the poor; there are also those who believe that it is a group dedicated to planting terrorism right and left for the sake of terror itself; and finally others yet think that it is simply a group of guerrillas with no transcendence whatsoever beyond its frontiers.

Amid so much misinformation and confusion, it is important to write this report, to try and explain the antecedents, the motives, and the consequences of this organization of activists, more so, because I understand that Latin America especially cannot ignore them because they are not simply terrorists, and their plans are not limited simply to a small state.

The Tupamaros have clarified their goals again and again in their communiques: to take guerrilla warfare to its last consequences in Uruguay and Latin America against capitalist exploitation (especially that which comes from the United States) and the eventual establishment of unified socialist states in all of Hispanic America.

But questions persist: Why urban guerrilla warfare? Why Uruguay, which once called itself the Switzerland of South America? How can they survive despite tremendous pressure from the police? Are these men heroes or assassins? I think I have responded to these questions objectively, but do not demand total objectivity of me. Who can allow himself the luxury of being totally objective when the freedom of millions of human beings is at stake?

I have tried to clarify the aims of the Uruguayan Communist Party, which is the same as all Communist parties of South America, and whose confrontation with the Tupamaros is inevitable. Is the discrepancy between the Communist Party and the Tupamaros only a question of strategy, or has the Communist Party become so bureaucratic that it is incapable of revolution?

The fighting in Uruguay has not ended and I am no prophet; I cannot assure that the Tupamaros will take over the power in the years to come. I only know one thing: history is irreversible; the oppressors of today will be exterminated to the last man. The people fatalistically make justice in spite of the imperialists who are contemplating their own deaths with each new popular insurrection. The Tupamaros may be defeated, but "Tupamarism" has been born as a new fighting strategy; it is taking shape and growing in South America and will continue to give headaches to the regional oligarchies. The South American governments, unconditional servants of Washington, may come through as winners in the battle against "Castroism," the revolutionary battle style of Cuba. Will they be able to destroy the urban guerrilla?

I.

PROLOGUE

We do not know what will happen, but as a prologue the Tupamaros give an answer to the contradictions of Latin America with a new strategy: the urban guerrilla.

Latin America has become for us "new generation" people, our principal problem, our main source of anguish and our only goal. Our first step has been to free ourselves as much as possible from the national demagogue in order to enter and discover the world outside, a world that lives in deep contradictions. It opened for us the possibilities of fundamental information and knowledge despite the obstacles that national boundaries pose for its inhabitants; men supposedly "free and with rights" but slaves of the commercial publicity and colonialism of the imperialists who are trying by all means to prevent men from taking their position as rational animals. These inhabitants instead remain consuming animals, developing a four-legged posture so that they may never see the faces of those who have made every effort to turn them into inferior animals.

This rhetoric obeys the needs to denounce something that, while evident to some, remains a mystery to the masses: slavery, a brand of bondage perfected with the advance of science to more subtle and graver forms. Yesterday's slavery bound men with handcuffs and submitted them to tortures which would quickly render them useless. In our day, the necessity to produce over and over demands that men be more active in order to be exploited more thoroughly, so that their products will enrich more and quicker those who have the means of production. Thus, the inequity of man will allow to make happier the "chosen few."

In the last decade on our continent new methods of fighting have been devised against the national governments. The most significant has been the Cuban Revolution, generated and realized by something that came to be known simply as "guerrillas." The main characteristic of Cuban guerrilla tactics was the formation of small bands of armed men living in the deepest parts of the sierras and intermittently appearing in cities and towns of lesser importance, thus maintaining a climate of insecurity and becoming at the beginning a source of trouble for the establishment in power. Che Guevara died in Bolivia where he attempted to utilize the same tactics as in the Cuban mountains and failed. This made some people start to think. Some said, in mechanical fashion, that "no objective or subjective conditions existed for the revolution," others said that Che was an idealist, and yet others went so far as to say that personal troubles with Castro took him to an impossible adventure. The truth of the matter is that a deep and thorough knowledge of the real conditions that each country affords — anywhere in the world — is necessary and indispensable to determine what attitudes and practical realizations must be followed in accordance with the regional characteristics of the scene.

The Tupamaros have ventured to establish the urban guerrilla and up to now it has worked. Why is it working?

Even if our intention is not to appear as regionalists — an attitude we flatly deny — it is necessary to accept that this function depends fundamentally upon the special characteristics that Uruguay presents. These characteristics are not necessarily a Uruguayan legacy and almost certainly can present themselves in other countries of South America. But the important thing is that because of its durability, the organization of Tupamaros (MLN) answers to the national conditions of Uruguay. It doesn't matter to what point our tactics are correct, the fundamental has been given.

The confrontation with the state, in a country traditionally pacifist, prosperous and with great democratic traditions, has raised the hair of the national bourgeoisie in Latin America, producing as a reaction the use of all its persuasive informational resources in order to misconstruct the facts. It is not willing to allow the repetition of the Cuban experience. But the problem has become more complex. Elections have been realized in Chile and Allende, a Marxist candidate, has won. This is more than the American oligarchies can bear and now we find ourselves faced with great questions. Is it really true that Latin America will launch its independence, an independence different from that of colonial times; an independence made by many men and few heroes, and thus achieve a mental transformation that will hopefully yield a new America, with new structures, with new forms of production and different forms of relationships?

We Americans must formulate a concrete reality and think less in the existence of Miamis and Swiss banks and relatives in Australia. The world has shrunk more and more and now we must learn to live and to discover how to live; we must not commit suicide but rather go out into the street and plant for ourselves the problem of life and not of mere subsistence. The cards have been laid in Guatemala, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere.

II.

A MODO DE PRESENTACION

Montevideo
Dear Friend "X,"

You have asked of me a very difficult task. Difficult because to write about Uruguay anywhere in the world may be done by anyone but from Uruguay itself it is not so easy. Nevertheless, the task of speaking about my country pleases me, especially when I know how interested you are in knowing about any reference to this bit of pauper America.

Your question, "How is it possible that Uruguay, the perfect country of South America, has reached a revolutionary stage?" has puzzled me greatly. You have asked me this, but I know (if it were any other way, you would disillusion me) that you also think the visionary ideal is to think that Utopias are possible in Latin America. Uruguay has never been perfect or anything of the sort. It has never ceased to be Latin American, despite the trouble that its leaders went through to Europeanize it. The famous slogan of "the Switzerland of South America" is purely an Uruguayan fabrication, invented for precisely that end: to ostracize it from the whole of America, to make it appear as a rare case. Uruguay went through a reformative era which was the fruit of a certain economic prosperity that allowed its government to create a fictitious atmosphere of social welfare that kept us mesmerized for a long time. But it never ceased to be a dictatorship of class and when the time of prosperity passed, "Socialism" ended and the people were forced to bear the burden of the crisis.

This crisis arrived and with its onset all the shadows of bourgeois liberalism disappeared. "Rodo" was substituted with the newsman who from his radio station or newspaper yelled vehemently for the installation of the death penalty; the peaceful politician of yesterday no longer speaks of dialogue, he has disappeared and in his place is a policeman, machine gun in hand. The dream has ended and it is always sad to awaken when the dream has been beautiful.

To speak about Uruguay today is to speak of the Tupamaros, without doubt the most important guerrilla organization of the whole continent. (Stated without any chauvinistic purpose.) The Tupamaro strategy has immersed the Uruguayan police in the most absolute confusion and has instilled in police of other countries the great fear that something similar may happen to them.

You should not think that it is easy to sit down at a table and talk about the MLN (Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) if you live here. The word "Tupamaro" alone has been declared "national disaster" in the whole land. To say it in an autobus, for instance, may cause you to become an unwilling guest of the police for several months. So you may imagine I am running a certain risk when fifteen thousand soldiers dedicate all their efforts in the streets to breaking into every home in their desperation to find anything, anything that will allow them to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the peaceful citizen, loving and suckled of law and order.

But it will be a worthwhile effort if with it we are able to clear the many doubts and misconceptions that exist about the movement that for better or worse is fighting a terrible repression. Montevideo, the Beach City, is today converted into a giant garrison, witness to this repression and the fighting.

One thing I ask of you, and that is that you use a code name instead of my own. The reason is obvious.

Strong embraces for your family and one more for you from your friend,

X.

III.

ARTIGAS: A PRECEDENT OF THE SOCIALIST STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA

"The cause of the people cannot admit the least delay."
—**José Artigas**
(1764–1850)

The fight for freedom in the Republic of Uruguay in 1811–1820 cannot be compared to any of the others which took place during that period in the Spanish colonies of America, because more than warfare filled with spectacular happenings, it was a struggle of social character. It was a confrontation of social classes: the impoverished peasants, called "gauchos," on the one side and the Creole oligarchy on the other. The situation clearly manifested the humiliation done to the "gauchaje" by the representatives of the Spanish crown.

The hero of this struggle was José Artigas, a poor Creole, whose revolutionary ideals (37 years before Marx's Communist Manifesto was made public) moved and terrified the "Riverplate" society that formed the privileged class. Artigas wished for social and economic changes in the fields occupied by the gauchos, who had no choice but to move from the lands of one owner to those of another as they were exploited by the Creole landowners. Artigas was to become the leader of the peasants, who backed and followed him unconditionally all through the struggle for the liberation of Uruguay. Artigas was originally under orders of the anti-Spanish government of Buenos Aires. When the government withdrew his authority, the gauchaje burned their own huts and taking only their families along, followed Artigas out of Uruguay toward the border of Argentina.

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The Uruguayan revolution was a popular revolution as opposed to those taking place in the rest of the continent at that time. These revolutions were taking effect under the command of generals with troops who fought other troops; the government forces against those who rebelled. In contrast, in Uruguay it was the whole people, temperamental and without military discipline, who faced the opposing forces, casting aside the disadvantages of lack of arms and organization of a heterogeneous group of people who had never fought before and only knew of injustice and oppression. It was against these injustices and humiliations that Artigas fought and gave out the solutions he thought more convenient for the peasant problem in particular and for Uruguayans in general.

The reforms postulated by Artigas and his many manifestos and meetings have not yet been achieved by the Uruguayan people. He called for agrarian reform through which the property of foreigners and exploiters would be taken from them and given to the peasants who worked the land. Artigas wanted the land parceled out in small lots and to make the land non-transferable, to avoid the accumulation of "latifundo" or large estates by one owner. This reform would create another reform: the elimination of a social caste of powerful landowners and the gaucho would not be a landless peasant any longer but would have the dignity of living on the land he worked himself. In Artigas' day, such an agrarian reform would encompass the whole national economy as there was no other type of production than the rudimentary cultivation of land and the raising of cattle.

But the ideals of José Artigas were not to be realized. They clashed with the interests of the ruling classes of Buenos Aires and Montevideo then, as they do today. These oligarchies fought Artigas until they were able to expel him from the country and today they continue to fight such reforms in order to maintain a state in which they are the only beneficiaries. Artigas was called a thief and assassin, there was a price on his head, and his capture was the object of an important reward.

Modern Uruguayan historians seek to emphasize Artigas' part in the struggle for independence, in order to conceal in the shadows of oblivion his political and social idealism and great personal statemanship. But his ideas appear as condemnations on the walls of the Uruguayan Facilities:
"No tengo mas enemigos que losque se oponen a la publica felicidad."
"I have no other enemies than those who oppose public happiness."
"La cuestion es solo entre la libertad y el depotismo."
"The question is only that between liberty and depotism."
"No vendo el rico patrimonio de los Orientales al bajo precio de la necesidad."
"I do not sell the rich patrimony of the Orientals at the lowly price of necessity."
"Con libertad ni ofendo no temo."
"With liberty I do not offend, nor do I fear."

These slogans have been taken as standards in the revolutionary struggle. The battle for reinstatement of the thinking of Artigas in Uruguay continues to be revolutionary and is still a source of fear among the "bad foreigners and even worse Americans," as Artigas branded them.

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Alisky
p 14
urugua
River [illegible]

IV.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SETTING

Uruguay is a miniature nation situated between two giants, Argentina and Brazil. The country is composed of 72,172 square miles and has three million inhabitants. This is roughly the size and population of the state of Washington. The country derives its name from the Rio Uruguay. The word means "the river of shellfish," being taken from the ancient Guarani-Indian *urugua,* which is a species of mussel, called *caracol del agua* in Spanish.

Uruguay has always been known as the "buffer country" because it first served as a frontier between the Spanish and Portuguese empires and later between Argentina and Brazil. This tiny nation is truly an urban one with over one-third of the population living in the capital city of Montevideo. More than one-third of the nation's working class is employed by the government.

The nation has no natural resources. There are no jungles. The highest peak is not more than 2,000 feet above sea level or about the same altitude as the top of New York's Empire State Building. Eighty-five per cent of Uruguay's land area is devoted to livestock raising (twenty-three million sheep and ten million cows). Nine-and-six-tenths per cent of the nation's area is devoted to agriculture; 3.5 per cent to forests and the remaining 1.9 per cent is unproductive. The chief products are naturally enough: wool, meat, hides, corn, wheat, citrus fruits, rice, oats, and linseed. Uruguay also has a sizeable national debt, $500 million, most of which is owed to the United States.

Of the three million inhabitants, no Uruguayan is to be found without some measure of foreign blood. The "true-blooded" Uruguayans, the Indians, were murdered by the Conquistadors. Today, over half of the population are direct descendants of Basque, French, German, and Italian immigrants. This European population mixture gave Uruguay a different atmosphere than its Latin neighbors.

The nation of Republica Oriental del Uruguay came into being with an 1828 treaty; not an act of kindness in the seeing of new nations being formed, but rather an unofficial surrender to a "revolution." The revolt, under the leadership of Juan Antonia Lavalleja, was started in April, 1825, with only thirty-three patriots, the "immortal thirty-three." Gaining the popular support of the people, these thirty-three guerrillas moved Uruguay to independence in three years.

The next seventy-five years of government for the newly emerged nation were trying ones. Twenty-five governments came into existence from 1830 to 1903. Of these twenty-five, nine were forced out of power, two ended by assassinations, and one by grave injury, ten resisted more or less successfully one or more revolutions, while only three were free of serious disturbances.

While these struggles were occurring, another struggle was taking place in the life of a young reformer for greater political prominence. He was José Batlle y Ordoner. Batlle was born in 1856, and soon became a political journalist, founding his own newspaper, *El Dia,* in 1886. In his columns he diagnosed Uruguay's political ills and proposed political remedies.

Soon afterward he became the leader of the Colorado Party and was elected President in 1903. At the end of his term in 1907, Batlle moved to Switerland to observe and study that nation's form of economics and politics. When he returned to Uruguay in 1911, he was elected

President for his second term, from 1911 to 1915. His second term is certainly worthy of mention and any book on Uruguayan politics not mentioning President Batlle is incomplete.

During his second term, President Batlle transformed the political structure of Uruguay to a very near replica of the Swiss economic and political structure, giving Uruguay its nickname, "Little Switzerland." This transformation played a major role in the economic and political structure that can still be seen today. New political leaders and constitutions came and went after President Batlle, but they all paid tribute to Batlle by at least copying some of his basic ideas.

When he assumed office in 1911, Batlle entered the political battle arena. But the President was accustomed to such an atmosphere after many years of daily street agitation, in-fights between the press, and finally having actually survived a full term as President under such conditions. To President Batlle, the office was a tool, a means, and not an end. He used this official power only as an instrument for putting his ideas to work. Those ideas were socialistic, identifying the government with the needs of the working class.

Batlle wasted no time in putting his ideas into a workable form. He also wasted no time in identifying with the working class, as can be seen from the tone of the speech he gave to the workers during the general strike of 1911. In that speech he said that if it were not for the fact of his high office, he would not only be among the strikers but in fact with them. He told the strikers to take a firm stand for their rights and to develop their positions into a workable, lasting form. He stated he would assist with the latter.

And assist he did. The people were ready for a new era and President Batlle delivered. Almost without delay the new government began instituting the Swiss form of socialism by nationalization of the insurance companies, the electric and power companies, the tobacco and liquor industries, and by the creation of state-owned banks and railroads. He brought the government closer into line with the needs of the people by instituting a six-day work week composed of an eight-hour work day, pension and retirement rights guaranteed under the law, workmen's compensation, indemnification for discharged employees, and other related workers rights. He separated church from state and completely reformed the educational institutions in line with this church-state divorcement. He pushed through legislation allowing women the right to sue their husbands for divorce and laws providing protection for illegitimate children. The abolition of capital punishment was instituted and bullfights were banned.

President Batlle also promoted an attempt toward participation of all political parties based on honest elections. He argued that political parties must make themselves worthy of popular support, not by frauds or threats, but instead by behaving democratically in the interests of the people. He declared that there was an enormous gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" and the duty of the state was to close that gap. He believed that once that gap was closed, the state had fulfilled its function, that the power of the government was then truly in the hands of the people. It is impossible to say whether President Batlle saw the withering away of the state at that point, for his public or private speeches never revealed his thoughts in this matter, but one could reason that he saw the possibility of that vision. In several of his speeches, both private and public, he did mention that the office of the presidency would no longer be needed when the power of that office was equally divided among the people.

In the foreign field, President Batlle argued violently against foreign ownership of land, industry and public services. He believed that such foreign investments would lead to the downfall of Uruguayan political, as well as economic, independence. He was confident in the ability of a "people's state" to replace the foreign capitalists and their seeping economic control. (And, as will be seen, President Batlle's contention that foreign investment was leading Uruguay down the path of no return toward economic and political dependence on foreign investors did indeed come true.)

President Batlle's ideas, called insane by his political opponents and unheard of in neighboring Latin American nations, soon became more than mere dreams or empty election promises. But in implementing these ideas, a tremendous force of bureaucrats was created, a force that was to return to haunt the new government. Today, well over one-third of the nation's working force is employed by the government.

Left completely neglected in the midst of this overdue reform movement, though, were the rural areas and their population. The nation was experiencing a shift to the urban areas or the beginning of the birth of an urban state. The countryside was stripped, left naked and alone. This naked countryside was also later to return to haunt the government.

Given the opportunity, President Batlle most probably could have dealt with, and satisfactorily provided for, these two haunting factors. Time did not allow him the opportunity, and his successors refused any attempts to institute reforms in those two areas.

President Batlle's reform movements produced fruitful results. The government, for the very first time, became stable. Nowhere was there talk or threat of revolution. The people began to gain more voice in the newly stable political areas. In the economic area, the currency became strong and stable as exported meat and wool reached their highest prices. There was no militarism. Uruguay became the envy of its neighbors.

Slowly, however, the tiny nation began to feel the weight of the growing bureaucracy and the neglected countryside. President Batlle died in 1929, and the growth of the bureaucracy reached a point where it virtually swallowed the government. Foreign investments began to creep in and soon the giant bureaucratic machine concentrated the bulk of its efforts on the international market while neglecting internal affairs.

As a result, government deficits increased alarmingly as did unemployment, public health care lost large amounts of government funding, pensions were paid late, meat exports fell in both value and volume, inflation rose, and the countryside remained neglected. In short, internal affairs took on a very low priority rating as determined by the giant self-serving political machine.

In 1930, a sharp economic depression set in. In 1933, the President, Gabriel Terra, declared the root of the economic problems was directly tied to what he termed a "restricting Constitution." He believed that he needed stronger powers to undertake economic reforms but the Constitution barred these strong executive powers. When his proposed new powers were denied, Terra responded by carrying out a coup d'etat in March, 1933.

President Terra immediately dissolved the Council and the legislature and began governing by decree. In 1934, President Terra forced through a new Constitution, under which the National Council of Administration was abolished, transferring its powers to the Executive Office. In that same year, Terra was unconstitutionally re-elected. After his re-election, he continued to govern by decree until the end of his second term, in 1938. Terra did not use his newly-obtained "Constitutional" Executive powers to check inflation and correct the economic situation, but rather to serve self-interests. The economic situation became unbearable for the people, but the political corrections open to them through the vote and the Constitution were diluted to the extent that such actions were all but impossible. The economic and political situation was not to improve at the end of Terra's term in 1938, as he was succeeded by his brother-in-law, General Alfredo Baldomir, who closely followed the Terra example.

In fact, General Baldomir was even more successful than Terra in removing political power from the hands of the people. The general did all in his power to obstruct political and economic reforms proposed through legislation. When Batlle's party, the Colorado Party, severed relations with the Axis Powers in January, 1942, the General became enraged. In defiance of the Constitution, he then postponed the February elections of 1942, replaced three members of the Cabinet with three of his own handpicked supporters, and completely dismissed the General Assembly.

The General next proposed yet another new Constitution while the economic situation grew worse and the people saw more and more of their political power being taken from their hands. The people were fast reaching a point of not being able to tolerate both the economic and the political situation. The General was quick to recognize this unrest and permitted the holding of elections in November, 1942. Included in that election, however, were Constitutional amendments. In order to increase the chances of having the new Constitution approved, large sections of the new Constitution were in line with José Batlle's original reform measures. Due to these measures being included, the vote was in favor of the new Constitution and in a very small but real sense, the government was slowly beginning to return to the control of the people.

Some of the more important Batlle reforms are worthy of mention. The more important social and individual guarantees included are as follows:

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1. Labor will receive special protection of the state. Every individual of the state, without prejudice to his liberty, has the duty of applying his physical and/or mental energy in such manner as to redound to the general welfare.

2. Social security laws will assure all workers adequate financial protection in cases of accident, illness or forced unemployment. The organization of trade unions are to be assisted by law.

3. The state will assist those who cannot afford adequate medical attention. Primary education is to be compulsory but free.

4. The death penalty is not to exist in Uruguay. Prisons are to be institutions for re-education rather than for punishment.

5. Arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests are to be forbidden. Freedom of movement is to be assured by law.

6. The spoken and written word is inviolable.

7. Equality of treatment is to be assured to all religions.

8. The Constitution may be amended only after the proposed amendements have been submitted to and approved by the people.

Constitutional amendments became another lively issue in July, 1951, and a new Constitution was passed by a close vote in December, 1951. This new Constitution still contained Batlle's philosophy in addition to the introduction and approval of a number of safeguards against authority abuse. On the surface, these safeguards appeared as reasonable and good, but in-depth examination revealed that the safeguards in fact were designed to block reform legislation by the introduction and narrow appeal of a complicated legislative process. This entanglement of the legislative network was to block reform measures introduced through the legislative bodies but still allowed vast Executive powers. Again, the political powers were being moved further from the hands of the people.

The 1958 elections witnessed the internal economic and political situation in one of its worst states. The international price of meat and wool dropped sharply. The election results saw Batlle's party, the one party which might have corrected the situation (although it appeared unlikely from the past party record) defeated at the polls after ninety-three years in power. One political fact was to be proven. The new political party was not to serve as an answer but was in fact to drive the nation into yet further economic and political repressions and difficulties.

As the new government was being sworn in, the nation was hard hit with a flood. Over one-third of the country was completely flooded, with large losses of cattle, sheep and crops. Again the international price of meat and wool dropped. The currency became in serious doubt. The new political party and its leaders broke one of Batlle's golden rules by asking for financial assistance from the United States. Batlle had stated that the introduction of foreign capital would lead to foreign control and the downfall of Uruguay. His belief was soon to be proven correct.

The United States, eager for another foothold in Latin America, responded with massive financial assistance. In 1950, Uruguay became part of the International Monetary Fund and became more and more indebted to the United States, directly by U.S. loans and indirectly through the International Monetary Fund. As a result of U.S. assistance, in terms of loans and "economic advisement," wages were frozen, inflation and unemployment increased and the peso was devalued. The new government requested still additional U.S. financial and economic assistance/advisement and received it. Uruguay was no longer a new U.S. Latin American foothold but a soon-to-be raped bedpartner.

In 1967, when inflation was 136 per cent, a military general, Gestido, became President. He died that same year, and his Vice-President, Pacheco Areco, became the new President.

The new President was an obscure and inept bureaucrat before taking office. Once in office, he still continued to function as a bureaucrat, increasing dependency on the United States. The bureaucratic ghost had now returned to haunt the people of Uruguay. Under the leadership of Pacheco and U.S. economic advisement, the unemployment and inflation continued to rise until the economy collapsed. Pacheco's response was the suspension of civil rights.

The workers, especially those in the neglected countryside, could tolerate no more. The second ghost was soon to begin haunting the government. In June, 1962, the poorest of the nation, the sugar cane workers, marched on the capital demanding agrarian reforms. Pacheco answered their demands with police bullets. Led by a law student, Raul Sendic, these two thousand families returned to the cane fields with a feeling of total helplessness. All, that is, but Raul Sendic.

In July, 1963, twelve rifles were stolen from a New Helvetic rifle club. It was reported that Sendic led the operation. The police became worried after losing track of Sendic and his group, and offered a deal to Sendic via the press. If he would surrender himself and the rifles, he would receive a fair trial as a political criminal rather than face trial as just a common criminal. They never received a reply and the whole affair was soon forgotten as the group remained inactive. But this marked the birth of the Tupamaros.

In December of the same year, however, Sendic and his group surfaced once again. Ten youths stole a truck full of Christmas foods, complete with turkeys and wine. The foodstuffs were distributed among the poor in Montevideo. This time the group identified themselves as the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros derived their name from an Inca Indian chief, Tupac Amaro. The Inca chief was drawn and quartered in a public plaza by the Spaniards after leading an unsuccessful 1780 rebellion in Peru.

The "Christmas Robin Hoods" followed the Christmas raid by commando-like raids directed against government warehouses. Only this time they took guns, grenades and dynamite instead of turkeys and wines. The police, at the time, had no clues as to what group was responsible for the raids. Under pressure from the United States to break relations with Cuba, Pacheco linked the raids to Cuban agents. He was eager to please the U.S. and place blame on anyone but himself and his corrupt government. Cuba was not surprised shortly thereafter when Pacheco did break relations with Cuba although the Cuban government had no knowledge of the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros responded by attacking those responsible for the diplomatic breaks, the United States. United States business interests based in Uruguay were bombed and U.S. diplomatic automobiles were burned. In 1965 and 1966, the Tupamaros attacked several armories, building up their arms supplies, and "borrowed" several police uniforms. Their next raids were carried out in the form of bank robberies. It is interesting to note that the Tupamaros held true to their philosophy of not attacking the people during these raids. Not a single soldier or policeman suffered an injury during the commando raids, nor did a civilian during the commando bank holdups.

During these raids, the Tupamaros did not identify themselves as the responsible group, and the police had no hard evidence linking the Tupamaros to the raids; but one clue led the police to (correctly) identify the Tupamaros as the group behind the commando raids. That one clue was, in the words of the police, "the group's perfect organization and their human touch."

This "perfect organization group" became so evasive and active that in 1967, President Pacheco Areco himself asked the United States for assistance in capturing the Tupamaros. The concerned U.S. was hoping for that opportunity.

C.I.A. and F.B.I. agents previously on stand-by were immediately dispatched to Uruguay and large numbers of Uruguayan policemen were sent to the United States for "special" training.

Pacheco used the situation as an excuse to further his political oppression. He banned six political parties, closed down the opposition press, and placed many opposition party members in jail. These actions did not discourage the Tupamaros from additional acts. In support of a general bank workers' strike, the Mario Robaina Mendez Commando Unit of the Tupamaros kidnapped Pacheco's closest friend, Pereira Reverbel, who had gained the title of the most hated man in Uruguay. Helpless, Pacheco gave in to the strikers' demands, and once the strike agreement was reached, Reverbel was released alive and unharmed except for several unhealthy pounds he had gained during his captivity. A joke then became commonplace in the streets among the poor: "Attention, Tupamaros, kidnap me!"

If any one single act can be attributed to the beginning of popular support for the Tupamaros, it must certainly have been in the kidnapping of Reverbel. Likewise, it was probably also the single act that led Pacheco to declare war on the Tupamaros. I believe that the kidnapping was something much more than a mere event leading to Pacheco's declaration of war. It was a challenge; immediate events were to prove that Pacheco and his regime were incapable of coping with the Tupamaros and their newly gained massive popular support. It also proved that the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. were children in comparison to the Tupamaros. During the kidnapping, over half of the police force stationed in Montevideo (3,000 agents), under C.I.A. and F.B.I. leadership, were not able to uncover a single clue although Reverbel was held only a few blocks from the scene of the kidnapping for five days.

During the kidnapping, Pacheco was near madness in his repressive orders. He placed troops on the University campus and ordered "special" police units to search the "subversive grottoes" from top to bottom for clues. The police search left a trail of destruction leading to a student killed by the police, Liber Arce.

After Reverbel was released, the Tupamaros further exposed the corrupt government by publishing documents they had liberated from the archives of banks and finance companies. The press releases exposed tax evasion, massive fraud and corruption reaching to the highest level of government — fraud, corruption and tax evasion, as the documents showed, that had the full blessings of the United States. The people could tolerate no more. The Tupamaros now had full support of the working class.

Due to this exposure, most newspapers, of course, were closed. Repressive laws were enacted by Pacheco in the "interests of national security." Political prisoners were raped and tortured in the hope of gaining clues.

The press became censored to the effect that the government had first to approve each single word before news could be released to the public. The government still forbids the use of seven words: cell, commando, extremist, ideological delinquent, political delinquent, subversive, and terrorist. Above all, the word Tupamaro is forbidden. The government has declared that the Tupamaros can only be referred to in the press by such names as criminals, prisoners, scabs, and the like. Frightened by the new laws and afraid of being closed by using a wrong word in referring to the Tupamaros, the press now refers to that group as "the unmentionables."

President Pacheco continued his oppressive laws without avail to the point to where he realized that he was totally helpless against the Tupamaros and their massive support. The C.I.A. and F.B.I. were proving to be of no assistance and in a desperate attempt to cope with the situation, Pacheco suggested a pact. But neither the Tupamaros nor the people were or are interested in partial agreements for their demands.

The United States was not happy with President Pacheco offering a pact and he was defeated "at the polls" in November, 1971. The new President, Juan M. Bordaberry, was sworn in on March 1, 1972. Judging from his orders to retain the state of emergency, followed by mass arrests of 1500 "suspects" soon after being sworn in, it appears that the new President is interested in continuing U.S.–Uruguayan relationships based on internal repression. The Tupamaros are continuing their struggle.

V

A COUNTRY IN CRISIS AS SEEN BY A TUPAMARO

Uruguay is a small South American country whose economy is based on the riches given it by nature. Until the first part of the 1950's, this country could live from its own meat and wool production due to the great international conflicts that allowed Uruguay to supply the warring nations. But once the Korean War finished, the Uruguayan economy entered a period of recession: the countries which previously bought meat now found no need to do so since they could now produce it themselves. The Uruguayan labor laws, then the most advanced in Latin America, became economically unfeasible for a country that had no foreign credits coming in. The social classes were well-defined also: on one side a minority of big capitalists who controlled (and continue to do so) the banks and had the majority of the land; and on the other, a great number of proletarians and small land owners; and last, a strong middle class, mostly composed of bureaucrats and members of the passive pensioner class. But, increasingly, the number of small and middle-size land owners decreased, for the big land owners were slowly obtaining all the land, forcing the peasants to migrate to the cities. This slow peasant exodus originated two phenomena. First, the countryside was left practically unpopulated; thus, Uruguay is now a country with one of the smallest rural populations in the world. Second, the impoverished peasants came to form part of the "lumpen" since their unemployment rate was almost absolute. They constructed their rudimentary dwellings on the periphery of the city. These cavedwellings or *cantegriles* are miserable cities where the victims of unemployment live. This phenomenon is not exclusively Uruguayan; there are also the *favelas* of Brazil, the *villas miseria* of Argentina, *barriadas* in Peru, *poblaciones callampa* in Chile, and *ranchitos* in Venezuela. In Uruguay, however, the growth has been faster and the conditions are probably worse. With a total population of less than three million people, Uruguay has over 250,000 unemployed who live in these belts of misery.

The country the politicians proudly proclaimed as the "Switzerland of South America" because of its stability and prosperity, has become faster and faster a myth, belonging to another age, as Uruguay became more cognizant of the capriciousness of those in power. The Uruguayan peso was devalued from 2.50 to 250.00 for one dollar in less than ten years and the prices of stable items rose exorbitantly. There are recent cases where prices have been raised twice in one day for items of basic necessity.

The greatest burden of this crisis was on the simple laborers and factory workers: those with the least economic resources whose salaries could never keep pace with the rising cost of living. The workers began to strike more and more often to force the capitalists to give them more money. Strikes were so frequent that newspapers carried a section entitled "Strikes of the Day," where an account of the site, motive, and length of each strike was listed together with a specific list of motives causing the group to strike. Bakeries, banks, newspapers, railroads, mail services, the sick — everyone would strike. On occasion these strikes could last for weeks or months. The only group that never went on strike was the football players — the best-paid people in Uruguay. The epitome was reached when the President of the National Government Council, Alberto Heber, went on strike as a protest against the tremendous number of strikes sweeping the nation.

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The government, trying to shed responsibility, fomented division among labor. When they faced workers, they pointed the finger at the peasants as being responsible for the crisis, and equally would blame workers when talking to the peasants. The group being blamed at a given moment was branded "vendors of their country," saboteurs, or stronger names such as those coined by a critic nicknamed "Whiplash" who rose to President of the Republic; he accused the workers of being "sold to the gold from Moscow."

Inflation would not rescind, popular discontent became stronger, the bourgeois feared a Cuban-style socialist revolution and sought a strong government to put down the power of the unions and uphold their interests. This class is so simple-minded that it believes that history can be reversed, that a crisis can be completely forgotten — the hard-won victories of the workers turned back by the force of the "machete" with the same ease as their lives may be ended.

The Presidential elections of 1966 arrived during this atmosphere of fear and upheaval. The 1966 elections were not only to elect a new government; fear of subversion caused the politicians to draft a new constitutional letter which changed completely the form of government. The National Council, a chamber which was composed of nine men from two of the majority political parties and which could only make resolutions if it had a majority vote, was eliminated and the government returned to the presidential system which gives its head almost dictatorial qualities in some respects. This was called the "Orange Reform" because it was the synthesis of two other amendments, one a whitewash and the other red, that were presented by the most reactionary sectors of the traditional parties. The "Orange Reform" was not made known to most Uruguayans until the day after elections when it was published in all the papers. Nevertheless, its victory was absolute and overwhelming. The merchants, bureaucrats, and bourgeoisie were so tired of social and economic instability they would vote for anything with the appearance of a strong government and needed reforms.

Along with the new Constitution, General Oscar Gestido, a retired military man, was elected President for a five-year term. A coalition of the fearful and the law-and-order advocates was formed around the General's personal image. The mere fact that Gestido was an ex-military man was his best propaganda tool. Gestido was not a general like so many other generals polluting Latin America; he was exactly what the bourgeois needed to exert their plans: on the one hand, strong, energetic and severe enough to prevail over the unions, and on the other hand, sufficiently democratic that he would not be carried away by personal ambitions of power.

As his Vice-President of the Republic, Gestido chose Jorge Pacheco Areco, an ex-boxer, ex-newspaperman and bad politician who in a previous election had run for a post in the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives) and obtained less than one hundred votes — in spite of having a large number of relatives in his favor.

General Gestido took over on March 1, 1967, amidst the hopes of the bourgeois that this man and the spanking new Constitution would put an end to the crisis that threatened to endanger their interests. But after three months, these same people were convinced that he was not strong enough to control the situation: the monetary crisis increased, inflation continued to grow, and the unions kept going on strike as the only means to get an increase in their wages. In a word: nothing was changed. It was not that Gestido was a weak man, but that he had no wish to escape to the anti-democratic solutions which were given to him by the constitutional letter. Indeed he was weak in health and the demands and adversities of the Presidency took their toll. Gestido died on the morning of December 6, 1967. An hour after the death of Gestido, Jorge Pacheco took over as the new President, a young man, unknown, who during his tenure as Vice-President tended only to social matters. Scion of an old family, don Jorge was never known for anything special. Like most Uruguayans, he was an average sportsman, had been the one-time director of the newspaper, *El Dia* (The Day), and was an average bureaucrat as well. Once sworn into office, however, he wasted no time in forming the image of himself that he wanted to create: that of the "strong man." On December 6, the same day that General Gestido died and Pacheco assumed office, he began creating this new image by instituting actions that were clearly in violation of all Uruguayan democratic laws and traditions.

On that day, and in one day, the new President closed down two newspapers and declared three political parties unlawful. The two newspapers were *Epoca* (Epoch), a paper of leftist tendencies but at the same time also one of the largest circulation newspapers in Montevideo, and *El Sol* (The Sun), the official newspaper of the Socialist Party.

The outlawed political parties were the Socialist Party, an almost traditionalist party in Uruguay; the Oriental Revolutionary Movement, in coalition with the Uruguayan Communist Party; and the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation. This move by Pacheco would have tremendous repercussions in the future, because first, the orders were totally unconstitutional and second, members of these parties suddenly found themselves branded by the government as "outlaws." Some were later to become Tupamaros.

This, of course, was but a low-keyed beginning of what was to follow. Later events are well-known history. The plights of the workers and peasants were answered by troops, their labor organizations were disbanded; student demonstrations were dispersed by bullets; economic conditions became worse as inflation rose, as did unemployment; political oppressions became more and more unbearable; foreign control steadily increased; and finally, the man behind the new "strong man" image was replaced by a tyrant seeking higher heights of the strong man image backed by U.S. support.

Perhaps one other event should be elaborated upon, an event that produced a slogan that now lives in the hearts and minds of all Uruguayans. That event was the invasion of the University of the Republic by the police and the Army, upon the personal orders of Pacheco, at the urging of U.S. "advisors." Placing troops on a university campus may be a small event in other nations, but in Uruguay it was a near crime by the government. Since the second decade of this century, the University has had the most absolute immunity; there were pacts that guaranteed the total autonomy of the University, its students, and its faculty. Above all, it was a civic tradition that the government would never interfere with the business of the University. This tradition had always been respected, even by the dictators.

Pacheco broke this tradition. Upon his orders, police searched all University buildings for "war arsenals" while troops were placed on the University grounds. The police found stones (new classrooms were being constructed) and Coke bottles. The government labelled these as weapons.

This force of repression brought with it the logical, expected reaction of the students. Daily confrontations between students and police took place at the University and later in the streets of Montevideo. It was, of course, a one-sided battle; on the one side, the police were armed with tear gas and newly-imported American guns, and on the other side, students were armed with stones, marbles and pent-up frustrations.

On August 13, 1968, the first victim fell: Liber Arce, a young veterinary student. His death shook Uruguay from head to toe. On the afternoon of his funeral, over half a million Uruguayans accompanied the remains of the student from the University to the cemetery; walking that distance of several miles, slowly and imposingly, in the rain.

Many thoughts were on the minds of the marchers, but one specific thought flashed through the minds of many. That thought was a phrase written by one of the Riverplate theoreticians, Argentinian José Ingenieros, in 1920. That phrase was to become the slogan of all the youth of his time: "Youth without rebellion is precocious servilism."

That night, throughout all streets in the nation, the following slogan was written on walls: *"Liberarse es la consigna.* That slogan now lives in every Uruguayan: "To liberate one's self is the consignment," or the better translation, "To liberate one's self is the assignment."

VI.

TUPAMARO PHILOSOPHY

To describe fully the horrendous economic and political situation in Uruguay, followed by a detailed listing of Tupamaro "response raids," would be as shocking as it would be exciting. However, such descriptions would be far from complete in developing an insight into the Tupamaro philosophy. The Tupamaros do not act from hatred or frustration caused by the economic and political oppressions. While many individuals may argue that "vengeance raids" would be both a proper and a justified response to the sad living conditions, such is not the motivation underlying Tupamaro philosophy or actions.

The Tupamaros are instead motivated by a deep, burning desire not to enjoy that which already exists but rather to create that which does not yet exist. The price to be paid for such a creation is high, yet the Tupamaros daily continue to pay these costs with their blood and suffering, without hesitation, complaint or aspirations of personal reward.

To describe what the elements of the Tupamaro philosophy are is as difficult to describe as what it is that the Tupamaros desire to create. The elements are humble. To define the characteristics of a single humble man is a most difficult task. To define the philosophical elements of a humble society is a near impossible one. The definition and application of the characteristics of the word "humble" is but a single element of that society which is yet to be created. It may begin to appear that this creation is as impossible to realize as is the understanding of the Tupamaro philosophy. Neither is the case, for the Tupamaros are not adventurists. They are real people in a real world. Their dreams and adventuristic ideas are balanced by the realities of the real oppressions in which they must live. Yet, if no one attempted the fulfillment of their dreams, little progress would be realized.

One of the ways in which these dreams and attempts to fulfill them can be examined is by the examination of the more important Tupamaro communiques and all operations. Such examinations will reveal the basic elements of Tupamaro philosophy and how the organization adheres to its own principles.

When Pereira Reverbel was kidnapped, a communique addressed to the government was left in his home. In this communique, the Tupamaros listed the principal anti-popular measures being instituted by Uruguay's Executive Power and the citizens' outrage to these measures. The note concluded by stating:

> We warn the repressive forces that:
>
> 1. By Mr. Pereira Reverbel being in our hands, he guarantees the physical security of our comrades and all who are persecuted.
>
> 2. Mr. Reverbel's physical safety and security will depend solely on the conduct of the repressive forces and fascist groups at their service. We will be most vigilant of the methods they employ.
>
> 3. The search for Mr. Reverbel will jeopardize his safety and security.
>
> 4. Mr. Reverbel will be released unharmed when the group leaders feel it opportune and only if the requisites for release are honored.

The philosophy behind this communique, as well as its importance is that the oppressed were now speaking aloud, shouting aloud, their demands for an end to the U.S.-based oppression. The people were no longer willing to suffer this oppression silently. In fact, as demonstrated by this event, they were now ready to put an end to it. The oppressed were beginning to realize fully that the ability of the oppressor to oppress is no more than the limits of toleration of the oppressed.

The humanity of the philosophy shines through the affair: the demands were in the interests of the people; Reverbel was released unharmed, even though the government broke the terms of the agreement by launching a maddening "search and destroy" operation. This operation left one innocent student dead and several others with painful injuries. The Tupamaros remained true to their word and philosophy.*

The kidnapping of Reverbel was the people's way of serving notice to the ruling class, a notice that the ruling class could no longer hope for the privilege of immunity, or, as stated in a Tupamaro communique:

> No one will be immune, and popular justice will know how to pass judgment, by the appropriate channels and forms. The moth-eaten "Switzerland of Americas" has ceased being the exception frequently pointed out in the context of a continent shaken by oppression and, consequently, by popular violence and revolutionary struggle. In the last analysis, and contrary to the opinion of many, even in this country it is possible to counter with direct actions the repression of the ruling sectors. This same repression shows itself to be impotent in the face of a revolutionary organization, such as the Tupamaros, that proves itself to be conscious of the difficult demands called for by the praxis of national liberation.

While the Tupamaros refused to use violence in the Reverbel kidnappings, their philosophy demands the realization of the need for violence, in something more than warnings in a communique, but in a realistic manner, when the time is right and directed against the correct target. In regard to violence, a Tupamaro communique, issued in reference to a National Workers Convention that ended in the unplanned exchange of gunfire between police and workers, clarifies the Tupamaro philosophy on this point. This document also clarifies statements referring to the "armed branches" of legal political organizations. Part of the communique states:

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*Reference is made to the first kidnapping of Reverbel. Mr. Reverbel was kidnapped a second time and held prisoner for nearly a year, again being released unharmed, although the government again broke the terms of the agreement, leaving a trail of death and destruction in the year-long search for the head of the state power and telephone company. Another good example of the Tupamaros remaining true to their philosophy was in August, 1972, when one Tupamaro was shot to death and another wounded after they refused to exchange gunfire in an attempt to kidnap Reverbel for the third time. They feared the exchange of gunfire might harm Reverbel.

> No party complies with the revolutionary principles it expounds if it doesn't seriously prepare for the armed struggle at all levels within the party. It can in no other way achieve maximum efficiency in confronting reaction at each stage of development. This loss of efficiency can result in a fatal error or the loss of a revolutionary opportunity. If small armed party groups are not aimed toward a specific objective, such groups can become an unfortunate political maneuver.

Such armed branches must have defined objectives, as determined by the group, and such activities must be directed by responsible leadership. In reference to this point, a Tupamaro communique lists the following as guidelines for the leadership of respective armed branches.

> The activity of armed branches must be directed solely against the class enemy, against the bourgeois apparatus and its agents. The leadership of an armed apparatus must meet the following basic requirements before it can begin to comply with its specific objections:
>
> 1. The leadership must be consistent in defining its objectives and principles. It must demonstrate with deeds its adherence to the principle of the armed struggle. The leadership must stress the importance of the armed struggle by providing the necessary material means for its preparation and by leading the actions through actual participation.
>
> 2. The leadership must be responsible for the physical safety of its respective cell members by offering the necessary conditions of security and discretion so that the members can carry out their illegal tasks without unnecessary risks.
>
> 3. The leadership must take care in developing what will prove to be a correct line, and adhere to that party line, so that the movement will develop the possibilities of becoming the leadership of the proletarian masses.

The building of the popular support must begin as soon as possible for the full-scale revolution cannot hope to succeed without a broad base of mass popular support. The MLN stresses the importance of such support and realizes that deeds are proving to be the most effective tool in building it. The armed missions are proving to be the most visible deed.

By using these armed missions as a tool in building mass support, the MLN has removed the need for such actions to be used exclusively for technical purposes. This allows the leadership greater freedom in selecting missions, for the motives are not technical but are instead revolutionary in spirit. More important, however, is the fact that revolutionary motives, rather than purely technical ones, removed the presupposed divorce between the political leadership and the armed leadership of the revolutionary organization. They are one and the same. Due to the fact that there is no leadership division needed for the specific tasks, whether the task be political or an armed action, the Tupamaros have been able to construct an organization that has become an organic revolutionary body in itself.

The implementation of these principles has led the Tupamaros to a stage where their revolutionary organization is totally free of dependency on the existing leftist parties in Uruguay. This stage of development has put the MLN in a position where the organization can grow with pure philosophical principles, rather than diluting its revolutionary principles by a need to bargain with other leftist groups.

The philosophy of the MLN is to refuse any bargain that would, in the slightest degree, deny any just demand set forth by the people of Uruguay. This is a principle of the MLN that other leftist groups of Uruguay learned in 1964, when the Tupamaros formed their own armed branches after efforts to coordination with other militant groups came to an end, owing to tactical and strategic discrepancies. This is not to state that the MLN regards itself as the only "pure" revolutionary organization or the only leftist group following the "correct" party principles. Nothing could be further from the truth, for the MLN has recognized other leftist organizations for what they are: part of the people with the interests of the whole of the people at heart. This is no more and no less than who and what the Tupamaros are, but there is a basic difference.

That difference lies in the fact that the Tupamaros will put the interests of the whole of the people before any other interest. Their philosophy dictates that no lessening of a people's demand will be allowed under any circumstances. As they state, "There will be a country for everyone or there will not be a country for anyone." MLN support for another leftist organization may be lent from time to time, but the Tupamaros cannot borrow support; no dependency or need to repay favors can be allowed. While this may seem like a hard line or an impossible task to fulfill, it has become one of the prime reasons for the massive popular support of the MLN and additional proof that the Tupamaros can make the impossible possible.

It may also seem improbable that the Tupamaros can build an effective armed branch when the birth of such an armed branch began with a few students stealing rifles from a gun club. The armed actions of the MLN cells speak for itself; again the Tupamaros are making the impossible possible. Still, the question remains, can such a small armed group, even with massive popular support, begin and win an armed revolution? In answering this question, one has but to remember that Premier Castro and Major Guevara began their revolution with less. But can the Tupamaros equal the feat?

The Tupamaros have already proven that their organization is capable of overcoming the tragic experience of baptism by fire and remaining in a condition that does not

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endanger the organization's existence after such baptism. Such a test and its results occurred in December, 1966. These events were later to become known as the "baptism by fire."

In the early part of that December, several Tupamaros were engaged in the task of transferring materials from one underground locale to another newer locale when an accidental exchange of gunfire took place between cell members and the police. In that exchange, Maria Robaina, a Tupamaro, was killed. In addition to the MLN losing a valuable comrade, the organization also lost most of the materials being transferred, both propaganda material and weapons. Later that same month new crossfire between Tupamaros and the police resulted in the loss of another valuable Tupamaro comrade, Carlos Florea. Some materials were also lost in those police raids.

As tragic as the events were, they proved to be a qualitative leap forward for the Tupamaros. The organization proved that it was truly a revolutionary organization and one that could effectively deal with the police, suffer losses, and still be able to function normally. The MLN had proven itself in the baptism of fire.

A year later, the Tupamaros again proved themselves capable of remaining intact after such clashes, as well as to prove themselves true to their principles (not attacking the people), when another clash occurred at a beach resort near Montevideo. During this clash, the MLN also showed that they were capable of using their minds as well as their guns, when all cell members escaped from a spectacular police dragnet even though a cell member was wounded. The organization lost no comrades or materials during this clash.

True to their philosophy, the group took time, at the risk of losing their own lives, to give medical attention to a civilian guard wounded in the shooting. The Tupamaros stressed the importance of remaining true to their philosophy of not attacking the people, first by their deeds during the clash, and second by the means of an open letter sent to the newspaper *Epoca* a few days after the clash.

In the letter, the MLN explained the circumstances surrounding the clash and clarified its objectives and intentions of not attacking police agents if they do not participate in repressive activities. To date, the organization has kept its word; agents have been fired upon only after they have first fired at cell members. The "death list" was compiled and published only after, and from, a fair hearing of the People's Tribunal.

These are not isolated incidents. In 1968, minutes before President Pacheco was to deliver a state address on a radio-TV station, the station was bombed by cell members. There were no injuries. The "close minute" timing was not a missed attempt on the life of the President, for the Tupamaros would never consider such an action, but it was rather designed to deny the President sufficient time to deliver his message from another network.

Later that same year, cell members simultaneously bombed Industry and Commerce Minister Peirano Facios' home, the stock exchange where he worked, and the Banco Mercantil which he owned, all without injury. On December 13, seven Montevideo buildings were bombed, including the homes of two bank directors and two banks. Again there were no injuries to innocent persons.

The year 1969 saw many Tupamaro weapon raids, bank robberies and strike and riot organizations. Again, the innocents suffered no injuries. On New Year's Day, 1970, the Tupamaros were successful in recovering arms that had been seized from their cells by the police. Six cell members acted the role of being drunk merry-makers when they recovered the arms from the Old Court House in Montevideo. Still there were no injuries.

These examples are not given to leave the impression that cell members refuse to use violence; that only missions that insure no bodily contact will be undertaken. The Tupamaros have used and will use violence but only in self-defense or for the protection of innocent third parties. But the examples are given to illustrate the point that the organization religiously followed its own principles and remains loyal to its own philosophy. The people are never to be harmed; the Tupamaros are the people, and the people are Tupamaros. The examples also point to the obvious: cunning is as much a revolutionary tool as is the gun.

There is no limit to revolutionary progress that can be obtained by a cunning cell. In February, 1970, the Tupamaros robbed a leading finance company of its numerous accounting books, as well as several thousand dollars. The books were next turned over to the press and courts to expose the illegal and fraudulent operations of the firm. These accounting records directly implicated several cabinet ministers and other high ranking members of the political, banking, and industrial circles who were involved in illegal financial dealings.

Later that same month, the Tupamaros enacted a raid that can only be described as one that would put the "mission impossible" team to shame. Cell members successfully robbed the Punta del Esta Casino of over a quarter of a million dollars. They later returned the exact amount of money that was to go to the workers for salaries and tips.

In April, the Tupamaros successfully stole a safe containing a quarter of a million dollars worth of gold in another daring raid. Soon thereafter, the organization executed one of their most elaborate and cunning raids; one that was highly successful and executed without a shot being fired.

A Navy garrison had been infiltrated by the MLN (one of the guards joined the Tupamaros). While the guard was on watch at the garrison, he let two automobiles inside the complex. One was a police car with Tupamaros disguised as police officers, who were in apparent arrest of the occupants of the second car. The second car was occupied by two cell members posing as students without proper papers. Once inside, the cell members quickly and quietly overpowered the other guards.

Twenty other Tupamaros were then let inside the post and the entire group then proceeded to lock the doors on the sleeping officers and sailors. Once done with this, the group next loaded a garrison truck with grenades, guns, and ammunition and then drove away, leaving behind a locked sleeping force of sailors who were not to discover the raid until late the next morning.

The MLN is also sensitive to the international movement as illustrated by raids conducted in Pando on the second anniversary of the death of Major Che Guevara. On that day, forty Tupamaros entered the city of Pando disguised as members of a funeral cortege. Once inside the city, the group executed a carefully planned raid that resulted in the destruction of a police station, a fire station, the telephone exchange, and four banks, all within the period of ten minutes. A half million dollars was also netted for the guerrillas during the mission. On International Women's Day of the same month, thirteen MLN women were freed by fellow comrades from the prison in which the women were being held captive. One of the MLN women prisoners was a Catholic nun.

On June 20, one day before Nelson Rockefeller was scheduled to appear in Montevideo as part of Nixon's 1969 fact-finding tour, guards in the garage-basement of the General Motors Montevideo administration building were overpowered by two Tupamaros. The Tupamaros then ordered all workers to be evacuated from the building while the cell members sprayed the basement with gasoline from the gas pumps located there. After the evacuation of the workers was completed, the Tupamaro group set fire to the building, costing General Motors one million dollars in damages and the government considerable embarrassment.

At the same time, other MLN members were also busy in the Rockefeller welcome. A radio station was taken over and strikes and demonstrations followed next. Unable to cope with the Tupamaros, the government responded in its usual fashion. Secondary schools and universities were temporarily shut down and strict censorship of all news media was put into effect.

Perhaps another good example of the Tupamaros' feeling for the international movement is expressed in a note issued after cell members bombed a Bayer Aspirin plant. The note stated, "The Yankee assassin's intervention in Vietnam must be answered by the union of all oppressed people. The common enemy must be crushed. Bayer, a Nazi enterprise, provides gas for the gringo's intervention. Viva Vietnam! Viva la Revolution!"

The Tupamaro philosophy contains the natural understanding that an act of oppression against one is an act of oppression against all. And that the act of revolution by one is an act of revolution for all. Major Guevara gave light to this principle when he stated that his revolutionary acts were not only conducted for the interests of the oppressed in Cuba, but for all oppressed peoples everywhere.

The United States also shares a belief in this principle. In order to protect U.S. business interests, more than one Latin American country has had its fair share of U.S. police training complete with liberal supplies of riot equipment and U.S. control. Due to this stepped-up U.S. intervention in Uruguay the people of Uruguay are experiencing a new high in previously unknown repressions.

One of the persons principally responsible for the institution of these brutal repressions was an American, Dan Mitrione. If any one person could be singled out as being the individual most responsible in putting a strain on the loyalty of the Tupamaros to their principles, it would be Dan Mitrione.

Mr. Mitrione, a former chief of police in Richmond, Indiana, was sent to Uruguay in 1965 by the U.S. Agency for International Development. His A.I.D. credentials fooled no one. Mr. Mitrione was a well-known C.I.A. agent whose face was well-known to guerrillas throughout most of the Latin American nations long before the C.I.A. sent him to Uruguay.

He was quick to gain control in directing the Uruguayan police in how to deal with the Tupamaros. His advice resulted in cell members being shot to death while they were in the act of surrendering with their hands up. Those who were taken prisoner were tortured and women prisoners were raped as well as otherwise tortured. Many innocent persons were tortured and in many instances killed, while being held suspect. His thirst for brutality reached such a height that the former chief of police in Montevideo, Alejandro Otero, was fired from his position in 1968 when he told Mitrione that he could no longer comply with Mitrione's sophisticated and brutal methods of police torture. Inspector Otero later told Brazilian journalists of torture methods utilized under the orders of Mitrione that left some of the most hardened journalists with tears in their eyes.

A congressional investigating committee heard from prisoners of their treatment ordered by Mitrione. One metal worker told the committee how he was beaten, burned, and electrically shocked. Gasps could be heard from committee members when the worker recalled first how his hands were crushed, and later how his testicles were very slowly crushed.

The horrors continued, however, as the ruling class answered these charges by giving Dan Mitrione and Secret Police Chief Hector Moran Charquero unquestioned authority to deal with the Tupamaros with any methods at their disposal. Constitutional and civil rights were suspended in many parts, house-to-house searches were allowed during any hours without warrants, and hundreds of suspects were jailed.

The Tupamaros, the people, could tolerate no more. A definition of who the "people" were had to be made. The Tupamaros made this definition clear in a communique of the people, issued to the police in the summer of 1970.

The essence of the declaration stated,

> Our struggle is against the oligarchy and not against the police and army. We have arrived at the firm conclusion that we are not able to overthrow this liberty-killing regime without systematically attacking its defenses: the police and armed forces which sustain and carry out government policy. Therefore, we are offering a fifteen-day suspension of activities, hoping that your members will think over and understand what their true patriotic duty is, since indications already exist that they are doing just this. This last phrase refers to actions already taken by some police officers of principled insubordination and refusal to act against the Tupamaros or the real interests of the people. When MLN activity resumes, all those still with the police and armed forces will have, by choice, defined themselves as serving the power structure and will be dealt with as such.

The definition was made. The Tupamaros have to date remained true to the definition. Those police and army officials who have aligned themselves with the interests of the people are treated as one of the people. Those who have aligned their interests with those of the power structure are treated as being part of that structure. People's Tribunals were held and the people's decisions were enforced.

Secret Police Chief Hector Moran Charquero was machine-gunned to death in 1970. That August, the C.I.A.

agent Dan Mitrione was kidnapped by the MLN and held for exchange of political prisoners. When the government refused the exchange, the American agent was tried before a People's Tribunal, found guilty of crimes against the people, and executed in accordance with the sentence imposed by the people.

The Tupamaro philosophy of understanding and compassion was not lost in new definition. Their humanitarian principle showed clearly when the judge, who was responsible for convicting most of the imprisoned Tupamaros, was released unharmed after being kidnapped by the MLN.

According to their own documents and their actions, the theoretical concepts on which the Tupamaros base their philosophical principles can best be summed up in these terms: "As Ernesto Che Guevara correctly stated, an organization need not wait until all objective and subjective conditions exist in order to carry forward the revolution: the armed struggle (the foco) can create them." (Contrary to the view of many, the Tupamaros believe that their revolution cannot wait for the perfect set of objective and subjective factors; indeed this moment will never arrive unless this situation is created by the foco.)

The Tupamaros have stated that the fundamental principle of the MLN is: "Revolutionary action in itself, the very fact of being armed, prepared, equipped, the process of violating bourgeois legality, generates revolutionary awareness, organization, and conditions." This statement of principle establishes a fundamental difference between the MLN and the other Uruguayan leftist organizations (and many leftist organizations elsewhere).

The Tupamaros view the other Uruguayan leftist organizations in these terms: "The majority appear to have more confidence in manifests, in issuing theoretical statements referring to the revolution, to prepare revolutionary militants and revolutionary conditions, without understanding that it is basically revolutionary action that precipitates revolutionary situations." In carrying forth their beliefs along these lines, the Tupamaros rely on the existence of an armed group prepared to carry out revolutionary actions.

Their belief in this principle is stated thus:

> If there is no adequately prepared group, the revolutionary situations are wasted or not taken revolutionary advantage of to the expected extent. Unfortunate events such as the Bogota uprising are the result. The armed group gives the struggle efficiency, cohesion, and guides it to the desired destiny. The armed group can contribute to creating the desired revolutionary conditions, or, as Major Raul Castro said, [the armed group] can be the little motor that starts the big motor of the revolution. The armed group creates or is constructive in the creation of the subjective conditions for the revolution. This fact is true from the very moment that it begins to prepare itself, but above all, from the moment that it begins to act.

Another real issue in this philosophical area is whether or not there should be a firm unity among revolutionary forces before any armed group begins the struggle. In dealing with this issue the Tupamaros have stated:

> We do not, in fact cannot, wait for unity among revolutionary forces. This moment may never arrive by its own accord. But once engaged in the struggle, the forces that call themselves revolutionary are obliged to choose between supporting the armed revolution or disappearing. In Cuba, the Popular Socialist Party chose to support a struggle that it had neither initiated nor led, and in so choosing it survived. But Prio Socarras, who called himself Batista's primary opponent, did not support the struggle, and he did not survive.

The Tupamaros also express the belief that an armed struggle is instrumental in awakening the masses. As the Tupamaros state, "Because the people are really dissatisfied with the injustice of the regime, the choice is made much easier. The people want a change and must choose between the improbable and remote changes offered by declarations, manifests, or parliamentary action or the direct path opened by an armed group and its revolutionary action."

In regarding the relationship between the creation of the party of the masses and the armed struggle, the Tupamaros have stated:

> Without considering as a lost effort that which is exerted in creating a Party or Movement of the masses prior to starting the armed struggle, we must recognize that the armed struggle accelerates and precipitates the mass movement. And we don't just have Cuba as an example. There is also the example of the Party of the masses in China which was created during the course of the armed struggle. In other words, the rigid formula expounded by certain theoreticians, "create the Party first and undertake the Revolution later," has known more historical exceptions than examples. At this point in history, no one can argue against the premise that an armed group, no matter how small, has greater possibilities of successfully converting itself into a great, popular army than a group that limits itself to issuing revolutionary positions.

In forming this philosophical position, the MLN has not suggested that its belief in the need for armed, groups implies or negates the political considerations and needs for that struggle. The position in regard to the political considerations is quite clear, as evidenced by the statement:

> A revolutionary movement needs a platform, documents, and like factors, but these factors should not lead to confusion. It is not only polished principles and programs that make revolution. The basic principles of a Socialist Revolution exist and are experienced in countries like Cuba. Nothing more need be said. It is sufficient to adhere to those principles letting facts point the way to the insurrectional path to achieve their application.

It is interesting to note that even though the Tupamaros occasionally resort to proclamations or documents, the nature of such is self-defining. A good example is the chapters of conversations with the Tupamaros. The very structure in the form of a dialogue neither allows nor demands theoretical density or a brilliant exposition, but, on the contrary, demands clarity and pragmatic simplicity precisely expressed in the statements.

If one word is used to sum up Tupamaro philosophy, that single word would have to be *involvement*. The Tupamaros, in following their own principles, cannot stand idly by and wait for the Revolution. Instead the MLN shares in an international belief that every revolutionary group has but one duty: to prepare to carry out the Revolution. As Premier Fidel Castro has stated, "With the Party or without the Party."

The Revolution cannot wait. The Tupamaros will not wait.

VII.

A STRATEGY OF REALITY

In order for the Tupamaros to express their philosophical principles in the form of an armed revolutionary struggle, it is obvious that a need for a strategy exists. The MLN does not view this necessity as a "lovely object for reflection" but the organization does recognize the need for a strategy as a real necessity. The Tupamaros have put aside the theoretical glitter rewarded to a highly polished and sophisticated thesis in favor of an earnest approach to the hard realities of the praxis.

Being realitsts, the Tupamaros have also declined to set forth an inflexible detailed strategy to be utilized in the Revolution. Instead, the organization has outlined some general strategic lines, detailed and specific enough to function properly, but at the same time flexible enough to function subject to modifications that necessarily occur with the changes of circumstances.

As stated by the Tupamaros, "We have general strategic lines, but ones that are themselves subject to modifications called for with the changes of circumstances. That means general strategic lines to be followed only for the year, month, or day in which they are issued and remain valid. This is necessary because the strategy is formed on the basis or real, basic facts, and reality changes, independently of our will."

In dealing with these "real, basic facts," some of the prime considerations in the early stages of Tupamaro strategy planning were questions surrounding the issue of the armed struggle. Sharp debates broke out within all factions of the Uruguayan left. Heated sessions were held

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on such questions as: should there in fact be preparation for an armed struggle? If so, what should its assigned priority rating be in relationship to the overall strategy? These and many other questions were similar to those raised by Regis Debray in his *Revolution within the Revolution?*

Certain left-wing circles are of the opinion that the theses presented by Debray ostensibly coincide with the theoretical and strategical formulations of the Tupamaros. Perhaps this is true in part, but it is interesting to note that in the same theses Debray describes Uruguay as an exception in some of his conclusions.

For example, in the second of his "future effects," Debray states, "There can be no defined vanguard without armed struggle. When there is no armed struggle, in a place with favorable conditions for it, then the political vanguard still does not exist. This is not the case of Uruguay, for example, where there are no immediate prospects of armed struggle and where there is a strong and combative mass movement." These statements have, of course, been referred to time and time again in the heated discussions. I believe that the extent to which its meaning has been taken is far beyond that which Debray intended. And, of course, opinions are subject to change with the changes of circumstances.

However, in examining Debray's statement, if it is admitted on the one hand that there are no immediate conditions for an armed struggle in Uruguay, then the distinction appears to be unnecessary, considering that the exception was established in the conclusion itself, ("in a place with favorable conditions for it"). On the other hand, Debray attributes Uruguay with a "strong and combative mass movement" but does not identify this unanimously recognized fact with the existence of a political vanguard.

The MLN itself recognized such theoretical disquisitions as being ineffectual. Without resoundingly denying or confirming the thesis that Uruguay has conditions for armed struggle and without describing themselves as a vanguard, the organization basically maintains the inevitability of an armed confrontation and the necessity of preparing for it.

According to their documents, "A revolutionary movement must prepare itself for the armed struggle at any stage, even when conditions for the armed struggle do not exist. This is necessary for at least two reasons. First, an armed leftist movement may be attacked by repression at any phase of its development and it must be prepared to defend its very existence. Second, if each and every militant is not inculcated from the beginning with the thinking of a fighter, what we shall create will be something different: we will become a mere movement in support of a Revolution for others to carry out as an example, but not as a revolutionary movement in itself."

This should not be interpreted as an underestimation of other revolutionary activity or as a call for "militarism" at any cost. The MLN recognizes the extreme importance of people's support. Better stated, the Tupamaros are the people and the "militarism" is but another form of the people's expression in the Revolution.

As stated by the Tupamaros, "Work among the masses that leads the people to adopt revolutionary positions is also important. What the militant, even the one who leads the masses, must be aware of is that when the armed struggle gets under way, he cannot stay home and await the results. He must therefore prepare himself, even though his present work is in another field. This will, moreover, give authority, authenticity, and serious sincerity to his present revolutionary instruction."

At present, the activity of a militant in that field is determined by specific objectives. Perhaps one fair interpretation of these objectives is that every militant is equally proficient in the other areas of the revolutionary struggle, and in turn, revolutionaries involved in other areas of the revolutionary struggle are equally proficient in the armed struggle. In brief, there is no division of tasks in the struggle. Every militant is as much a part of the political vanguard as a member of the political vanguard is a part of the armed struggle. They are one and the same. The Tupamaros have made their position in regard to this issue clear in a document outlining the specific objectives.

The organization states,

> If we are discussing a militant who works within a union or a mass movement, he must try to create an atmosphere, organize a group within the union or the entire union in support of the activity of the armed group and he must make the preparations for incorporation in the group. Theoretical and practical development, recruiting, will be the main concrete tasks under such circumstances. Moreover, he must provide information about the armed struggle. Whenever possible, he must make the union more radical, guide it to more consequent stages in the class struggle.

These Tupamaro points of strategy coincide with the major conclusions arrived at during the First O.L.A.S. Conference. At that Conference it became clear that although armed struggle is the fundamental path, it is just as necessary to use other forms of struggle, as long as they are subordinate to or are used with the objective of helping or developing that which is considered primary.

In dealing with reality, the Tupamaros have developed a conviction that "a combatant cannot be improvised." Due to the firm belief in this conviction, the Tupamaros seriously stress the importance of the need for a revolutionary movement, and each of its members, to prepare for the armed struggle at each stage of its development.

This conviction and its results, is the major element that differentiates the MLN from the other Uruguayan leftist organizations. The Tupamaros are in a singular vanguard position in the armed revolutionary struggle. This fact is true due to the reality of the Tupamaros being the only organization, owing to their armed preparation, capable of effectively countering the reactionary violence of the regime forces with revolutionary violence.

The MLN expresses this concept in the following manner:

> The armed struggle is a technical phenomenon that as such requires technical knowledge, training, practice, materials, and combat psychology. Improvisation in this field is paid for heavily in lives and defeats. The spontaneousness favored by those who refer vaguely to "the revolution that the people, or the masses, will carry out" is but a purposeful waste of time, or to depend on improvisation precisely at the culminating stage of the class struggle. Every vanguard movement, in order to maintain its very nature at the culminating point of the struggle, must participate in that struggle and must know how to guide popular violence against oppression in such a way that it suffers the least possible losses.

The value of both the armed apparatus and the political apparatus is clearly recognized by the MLN. While it may appear that the MLN places more value on one than the other, such is not the case. Instead, the Tupamaros reject the idea that the two should be separated and that one can fully function for a determined period of time absent from the other. The Tupamaros firmly maintain the concept that there is the need for each and every individual involved in the struggle to participate in an interrelated political and military manner.

This concept has been stated precisely and in a realistic manner when MLN leaders stated,

> An armed apparatus must be part of a political apparatus of the masses at a given stage of the revolutionary process, and in the event that such an apparatus does not exist, they should contribute to creating it. This does not mean that it is an obligation, within the present structure of the left, to join one of the already existing groups or to form a new one. This is tantamount to perpetuating the mosaic or adding to it. We must fight the now widespread narrow concept that Party means a headquarters, meetings, a newspaper, or positions on everything around it; against the conformist

practice of waiting until the other leftist parties disappear before their verbal tricks, and that their bases and the people in general will one day join one's ranks. This is what has been happening for the last sixty years in Uruguay and you can see the result. We must base ourselves on reality. We must recognize that there are authentic revolutionaries in all leftist parties, and many more that are not even organized. Take these elements and groups where they are to be found and unite them. That is a task for the left in general, for the time when sectarianism will be a thing of the past; this is something that does not depend on us. But as long as this does not happen, the Revolution cannot stand by and wait.

Still, in dealing with reality, the question must be asked: Does Uruguay have conditions favorable to, or conditions that will allow, a successful armed struggle? During the O.L.A.S. Conference, this very question became a focal point in a stormhead of controversy. A paragraph of a certain Cuban delegation's report, a document which did not have official weight, became the focal point of discussion during these debates.

The paragraph stated, "Today, to speak of guerrilla warfare in Chile or in Uruguay is as misleading and absurd as to deny this possibility in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, or Peru."

Chilean and Uruguayan observers were quick to point out the fact that this "exception" referred only to guerrilla warfare itself, but not to armed struggle in its different forms. In his closing speech at the O.L.A.S. Conference Premier Castro himself referred to this very observation.

He went on to further state, "Some have presented theses that are even more radical than the Cuban position: that we Cubans believe that in certain countries there are no conditions for armed struggle, but this is not so. We are not going to get angry. We prefer to make a mistake in making the revolution. We hope that nobody makes a mistake! But whoever really wants to fight will never have discrepancies with us."

Some of the very conclusions of the Conference in regard to this issue read,

> It is not enough that a political force proclaim itself as the vanguard in anything. The condition of being the vanguard is the result of a decision to struggle and of leading and carrying forward revolutionary action to the final consequences. That is, to destroy the power of the oligarchy and the domination of imperialism and open the way to a socialist revolution. In the final analysis, the vanguards will be those who show and develop the true roads to revolution. The revolution is a dynamic, complex, and violent phenomenon. In the long run, the struggle itself will select the most capable men and bring them to the fore.

The actual fact is that for a long period of time, Uruguay appeared to be the ideal example of the "exception," especially one nation in a continent that was pushing closer toward armed struggle. The prime concern of the traditional left-wing sectors in Uruguay was the existence of the "strong and combative mass movement." The end result produced the belief that "the party of the masses" was the only ideal way to carry the revolution forward. Indeed, such belief became the fundamental objective of these sectors.

While this belief appeared to be, without question, the correct line to follow during certain times, it was, on the other hand, inadequate before dynamic realities at other times. As the Tupamaros had stated, these dynamic realities are subject to change and these "changes, [occurring] independently of our will" demand a strategy of reality.

Based on the context of history, one of the prime realities and virtues of the MLN has been its sure predictions of political situations of the future. Long before the political regime in Uruguay took the final steps in becoming a dictatorship, long before the coup d'etat in Brazil, and long before the armed U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Tupamaros had warned that Uruguay, indeed Latin America in general, would not escape the reality of a common destiny of revolutionay violence.

In the midst of this period of history, while other left-wing organizations exclusively concerned themselves in the preservation of the hard-won concessions of the mass movement, all MLN members began preparing themselves for the armed struggle. The Tupamaros did not disdain the objectives or efforts of other leftist organizations; there were no deepening divisions between the MLN and other left-wing organizations; the Tupamaros did not proclaim themselves as the bearers of truth; but instead they began building a strategy based on reality as they saw political realities of the future. History proved their political visions of the future correct. Their platform was to meet and pass the acid test of time and historical realities occurring "independently of their will."

At this point in history, the fact that the struggle already exists in Uruguay and is taking the road of armed violence cannot be denied. In questioning MLN members as to where this armed struggle is leading and in what forms it appears, the generalized opinion among MLN members in reply is that the "armed struggle thinks with its own head." This thinking reflects the reality that the revolutionary road in Uruguay will also have to pass through the period of armed struggle.

It cannot be denied that the country's own peculiarities isolate this struggle from the tactical formulations existing in the majority of Latin American countries: that of rural guerrilla warfare. While rural guerrilla warfare is an obvious impossibility for the Tupamaros, this is not reason enough for the organization not to act. MLN members are not choosing the area of operations that may be most suitable or comfortable for them. They are not selecting the only method of operations that they know, either. What they are doing is acting according to an evaluation of a national reality that goes beyond statistical realities. It must not be forgotten that many MLN leaders of today were yesterday caneworkers from the rural areas. Reality, not preference, dominates MLN strategy.

In planning a strategy based on reality, the Tupamaros have taken great pains to ensure that reality is the order of the day, from the most important detail down to the smallest task, although the MLN views all details and tasks as being of equal revolutionary importance.

These points are clearly shown by a MLN document that states,

> Some think that we are doing a revolutionary task only when we are training for combat or when we enter some action, but all tasks that support a strategic plan are equally important for the revolution. He who purchases the material necessary for a base of operations, he who collects funds, he who lends his automobile for a mobilization, he who lends his house, is running as great a risk, and sometimes a greater one, than the commando group in action. It should be kept in mind that most revolutionaries spend most of their time in these small practical things without which there is no revolution. A strategy for revolution depends partly on the conditions we can create with our efforts, guided by a plan for the taking of power, as well as not losing sight of the reality around us.

In forming a strategy, the choice between the reality or probabilities was an easy choice for the Tupamaros. They chose reality. Likewise the choice for the masses is equally becoming easier; the MLN has gained mass popular support for its realities, "exception" or not.

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VIII.

URBAN CELL FORMATION AND OPERATIONS

There has been a lasting debate as to whether or not urban guerrilla warfare can be effective in terms of a successful overthrow of an established government. Opinions of guerrilla leaders vary.

However, it must be remembered that urban guerrilla warfare is not a recent invention. Urban actions have a history as old as the term "urban" itself. The only newness lies in the naming of the guerrilla group. The successes or failures of the groups have a variance as wide as the name of the groups. Some groups have been called resistance fighters while others have been called terrorists.

Che Guevara once said that while trying not to sound sympathetic to the U.S. government, urban guerrilla warfare in the United States is impossible. At the time he made the statement, I will agree. Major Guevara, however, left his mind open, as always, as to the possibility in other nations. His opinion concerning successful urban warfare in the United States could also change with the time, place and events.

One fact is certain. Urban guerrillas must use a different style, different tactics than those used by their cousins, the rural guerrilla. Urban guerrilla leaders have been quick to recognize this truth and have responded with cell formations that are proving to be highly successful.

One of the great figures in this area, besides Major Sendic of the Tupamaros, is Major Marighella of the Brazilian revolutionary movement. His style, as that of the Tupamaros, has been widely copied by urban guerrillas in a great number of urbanized nations. Part of this chapter has been "borrowed" from Major Marighella's guerrilla tactics and operations style. I wish to give him full credit and appreciation for that fact while wishing him and his guerrillas the victory I am sure will be theirs.

It will take a victory to end the debate. True, the urban guerrilla groups in several nations have been highly successful in their operations. Yet, I still talk with guerrilla leaders who persist in the belief that such warfare will only lead to failure. But these leaders have been mistaken in the past. Five years ago, who would have believed it possible that a Marxist government could come into power through the ballot? Chile proved that impossibility possible. An urban warfare victory will likewise prove another impossibility possible. It shall happen.

I believe in such a victory. I see the urban warfare actions as being the "little motor" of revolution that will start the "big motor" of revolution as Major Raul Castro likes to describe the stages of revolutionary progress. That engine of revolution is about to change gears in Uruguay. The Tupamaros have been successful in utilizing urban actions as that little motor which has brought the people of Uruguay to the stage of belief that a victory of the big motor of revolution is now possible. Gears are soon to be shifted in other nations utilizing urban warfare principles.

These principles will appear to be extremely elementary, and they are. But one must first learn to crawl before one learns to walk. To overlook a single one of these principles will lead to a sure failure. However, if these same principles are expanded upon and adapted for the individual circumstance, they can equally lead to success.

Even in the United States where urban warfare seems most unlikely, the Weathermen adapted these guidelines into a measurable form of success. Bernardine Dohrn, and other political guerrillas of the Weathermen, adopted their cell system from that used by the Tupamaros.

Their success, as in the case of other urban guerrilla groups, should not be measured in terms of actual dollar damage only. That is a mistake found in American thinking. Instead, their success should be measured in the fact that the F.B.I. cannot effectively combat the group. And in terms of the vanguard morale they have provided for the American movement.

A recent meeting held in the U.S. headed by Associate Deputy Attorney General Donald Santarelli and William Sullivan, former assistant director of the F.B.I. in internal security, attended by about 100 internal security experts in urban warfare, attests to the success of urban warfare by all urban groups, from the Tupamaros to the Weathermen. What then are those principles that the Tupamaros have learned and used so well?

Before launching into urban guerrilla actions, one must first understand the seriousness of the commitment. The period of conspiracies will be over. Future actions, beyond the conspiracy level, will be but the first step in a revolutionary war. It won't be a quick war but as typical of all guerrilla tactics and operations, the actions will have one unmistakeable characteristic, that of a slow and protracted struggle.

This slow struggle should not be a reason to postpone actions until a quick victory is ensured, for that moment will never arrive. The "little motor" must be started. Instead, however, the fact of a slow struggle should be turned into an advantage. That is, there is no rush, no deadline to meet. The first principle a guerrilla must learn, and use to her or his advantage, is that of patience. One objective of guerrilla actions is to demoralize and exhaust enemy forces. The Tupamaros have learned this principle well and have driven their enemy to a near state of utter despair.

The Tupamaros have also learned that a careful examination of the enemy and its forces is helpful, or as Lenin stated, "Know your enemy." The enemy's strengths, weaknesses and attitudes must be studied and understood. Once understood, predictions concerning the enemy's actions or ractions can be successfully predicted and capitalized upon. For example, a distinct determination can be made concerning which forces are friendly or unfriendly, how those forces behave and which directions they will take when revolutionary actions have begun.

Political parties and clubs, as well as individuals, should be included in this examination. Urban guerrilla warfare especially must have the support of the people. Their attitudes, their likes and dislikes must be fully understood or the movement is sure to fail. Of course, it is well understood that the police and military forces are the prime enemy, for these forces are the government's most basic but most concrete support, and in a sense, guarantee of power. Only the most benevolent dictatorship could hope to maintain power without these forces.

A distinction must be made, however, between prime enemy and prime target, for there is a clear difference. The prime enemy or chief opponents are the government and its supporting servants, the police and military forces. But they are not the chief targets, for people are not targets and must never be attacked. Institutions are, and must feel the full fury of the attack.

The Tupamaros have been so humane in their raids, that a sure clue to their actions are humane signs. The police call such the "human touch." For example, a hold-up man stopped to assist a lady who fainted during a recent bank robbery in Uruguay. Due to the "human touch" displayed by the hold-up group, the police immediately named the Tupamaros as the responsible group. (They were correct.)

Another factor to be considered, and one that the Tupamaros have daily to deal with, is outside assistance or forces. The United States has been very free with its assistance, both in terms of loans and "technical" assistance, i.e., C.I.A. and A.I.D. technical assistance, to Uruguay. The loans, of course, only serve to further impoverish Uruguay due to the attached U.S. strings.

I am sure that if it were possible, the United States would send at least American "advisor" forces into Uruguay. This is certainly not a new role for the U.S. Special Forces or a new role for the U.S. in Latin America. The present impossibility lies only in the fact that there is nowhere to invade. This picture will completely change after the revolution and is presently being given the most serious consideration by the Tupamaros. The U.S. could easily launch such an attack, not getting its own hands dirty, by supporting Brazil to do the actual invading. The only obstacle lying between such a U.S.-supported invasion and actual invasion is the Organization of American States.

From its past record, one can easily see that is a small obstacle which the U.S. can easily push aside. Major Guevara was correct when he renamed the O.A.S. the "U.S. Latin American Foreign Service Department." But that is a problem to be dealt with if, and when, the time comes and the Tupamaros are making such plans.

It is not difficult to understand the reasons why the United States can assert such strong influences on the government of Uruguay. (Or the O.A.S. for that matter.) The fact is that the ruling class of Uruguay is no more than a docile instrument of the U.S. ruling class. Therefore, the Uruguayan ruling class cannot help but to serve U.S. interests. They are dependent upon U.S. financial assistance and in return must identify ideologically with the American establishment, following the policy set down by the Pentagon, or else suffer the loss of American loans. This influence is exerted in the foreign affairs field as well, again requiring subservience to the United States. With the exception of the Latin American socialist camps, this is also true of each of the Latin American nations. The sum total of these U.S. subservient Latin American nations equals a U.S.-controlled O.A.S. And if you are foolish enough not to believe in recorded history, then remember that the largest Latin American landowners are North Americans.

These well-known facts have not stopped the "running of the little motor," nor should it. The U.S. is a very easily understood government and the actions of its ruling class are highly predictable. Once carefully examined and understood, urban cells can be built around this giant with successful actions being undertaken. The success of Weathermen actions, in the belly of this giant, attest to that fact.

By carefully examining the Uruguayan government, the Tupamaros have been able to determine the following characteristics of that government. First, the Uruguayan state is a giant bureaucratic machine in a tiny nation. One-third of the population is dependent upon the state for its employment. The ruling class has transformed that giant machine into a military-police instrument for its own benefit. The military, since April, 1972, has assumed the role of the police in internal affairs. In fact, the police were totally frustrated by the guerrillas and surrendered their jurisdiction to the armed forces. This transformation has been an interesting one, for the net result has been that of the military having supreme authority over the police, the jails, and the courts. The state has been turned into an enormous military-police establishment whose sole purpose is to serve the ruling-class interests. In practice, this has meant hunting down the Tupamaros.

And hunt they have. In the months of April, May, and June, 1972, the military went into a near frenzy in their manhunts. During those three months, over 1200 suspects were arrested and thirty killed in the streets. The military, during the same period, reported raids on over fifty hideouts, arsenals and people's prisons. They also claimed discovery of a fully equipped underground hospital. They further claimed the capture of many lists of the names, addresses, and contributions of Uruguayan supporters. Most of the reported military-police victories were false and made only to show that the military machine was capable of dealing with the Tupamaros. The Tupamaros do not keep lists, such as those reported captured, so that part of the "victory," as was the most of it, was completely false.

By additional information, the Tupamaros have also discovered that the major state economic decisions have passed into American hands. Most of the state enterprises have been sold out to foreign capital and the few that remain will soon be turned over to the military. The largest foreign capital holder is the United States. Again the very real possibility of foreign (U.S. or Brazilian) invasion exists.

It follows then, that it will only be a short matter of time until the centers of political decision are transferred to the military. It is not fanciful to imagine the executive power being entrusted to one of the military. The result would be a total military state binding the parliament and political parties to its orders or else suffering the punishment consequences. The same rule would equally apply to the people. The key government jobs are already nearly subservient to the military. Another Brazilian-like military government could well be in the making. The Tupamaros are well aware of this fact, and the consequences if materialized, and are taking preventive steps.

Part of urban cell formation and operations lies in understanding the objectives of urban guerrillas or the formation of same. In the case of the Tupamaros, the obvious chief objective is the destruction or overthrow of the present government and the institution of their own government. The overthrow of a government is always a legitimate and necessary goal so long as the existing government is iniquitous and of advantage to a corrupted ruling class. Such is the situation in Uruguay.

The most effective means, if not the sole means, for the Tupamaros to achieve their legitimate objective, is revolutionary war. Revolutionary war is truly the only legitimate war and is the best form of organized violence of a people against their enemies. The Tupamaros use urban guerrilla warfare as the concrete manifestation of their revolutionary war. But it must be remembered that urban guerrilla warfare which will lead into revolutionary war, must be tightly and well organized from beginning to end and from top to bottom. Mass action, as attractive as it may be to a new urban guerrilla, must be avoided during early urban guerrilla actions. It has proven to be ineffective against the systematic use of firepower by the enemy. Small actions from small individual cells have proven the opposite. Mass actions, then, must wait until the revolutionary machine is set to change gears from urban guerrilla actions to that of open revolutionary war.

Small cells or groups are also effective in expropriation raids. Expropriation raids are no more than armed operations intended *only* to finance the various stages of revolutionary progress. The raids can be large or small expropriations, as well as marginal ones. These operations inevitably resemble that of criminal acts but there is a distinct difference between the two. Criminal acts are directed against the people. Revolutionaries never expropriate the working class, nor violate their property or interests. Members of the working class are never assassinated or threatened. Instead, revolutionaries limit themselves to expropriating funds from the ruling class and seizing the weapons of their servants.

This is not to say, however, that such actions should not have the appearance of being executed by criminals. Such is certainly allowable. This strategem will mask the revolutionary's trail, adding to the confusion of the reaction, and granting valuable time. Attacks upon the people though, are never allowed.

Small cells are also highly effective for acts of revolutionary terrorism and sabotage. Care must be taken that such revolutionary acts never kill or create fear in the working class. Revolutionary terrorist acts must be defined only as a means to combat the terrorism which the ruling class daily practices against the people. It is a revolutionary tool that must be used. As Mao Tse-Tung has stated, "In order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun." Care must be taken that such acts are directed only against the ruling class: those holding the gun. Do not fall into the trap of believing that terrorism and sabotage will lead to the seizure of power. It will not. But it is effective for its purpose.

Its sole purpose is to demoralize the enemy; to lessen their capacity for repression by interrupting their communications, damaging their property and showing that they are not the "all-powerful" to be feared. Revolutionary terrorism is also the guerrilla's response to the terrorism the people daily receive from the hands of the ruling class servants. It is repayment for the people being harassed in the streets, having their homes invaded in the early morning hours, for seeing suspects being tortured, raped, and murdered during police questioning.

Those revolutionaries who practice terrorism and sabotage should follow the example set by the Tupamaros. Their first step was the building of a proper infrastructure for the accomplishment of their mission. They divide their work, with all becoming capable of manufacturing homemade destructive devices. Plans are made being careful of "the need to know." Plans are never discussed with anyone who is not to take part in the action. Those who do take part are told only that which pertains to their part of the mission. Nothing is written. Maps are never drawn unless absolutely necessary and immediately destroyed after their usefulness has ended. Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the terrorists are never written under any circumstance.

The most effective weapon to be used by the terrorist cell is that of its own initiative. This initiative serves several purposes. It keeps all terrorist cells in a state of permanent activity, which in turn causes the enemy greater damage and a larger expenditure of time, forces and expense in search of the cell members. It also creates a greater amount of fear in the ruling class as they never know the time, place, target, or manner of the next attack. All the ruling class can be certain of is that another act of terrorism is certain and soon. Each terrorist cell must take the fullest advantage of their greatest weapon. When one terrorist cell attacks, all other cells, from their own initiative, must also attack, but only executing a well planned terrorist act. When this occurs, and occurs often enough, the enemy becomes completely frustrated. This is evidenced by the recent resignation of the head of police in Uruguay. He stated that he could no longer effectively combat the Tupamaros. His resignation was followed by the resignation of the police power to the military.

Whatever act is to be executed, in whatever manner, one thing must first be guaranteed. No operation, whether it is to be executed by terrorism, cunning, or the simultaneous use of both, should ever be put into action unless there is assurance of complete success. Any measure less is not only justification not to act but, in fact, a demand not to. Urban guerrillas must also remain extremely mobile in their attacks as well as their own cell locations. They must never dedicate themselves to defending a fixed position or limiting their attacks to specific territories or targets. Their method of attack must always remain in the ambush and the surprise attack.

Both ambush and surprise attack offer numerous advantages. First, they avoid patterns, and it is always well to attack an unprepared enemy. This affords economy of guerrillas in terms of numbers and the preservation of guerrilla cadre. The enemy remains under constant fear of attack, which gives the guerrilla the advantage of combating a nervous, confused opponent.

Arms caches, like cells, should be completely decentralized. The deposits should be small ones and again no one should be allowed to know more than what is necessary. If the cells do not have the resources or avenues to purchase arms, then the arms should be captured. These raids must be silent operations conducted very discreetly. The ruling class controls the press, and such raids, not discreetly conducted, will afford the enemy-controlled press an opportunity to alarm the working class, causing unjustified fear. The raids do not have to be large ones. The capturing or the buying of a single weapon advances the movement. All revolutionary actions must advance from the very simple at the beginnnig to the very complex.

In the actual organization of the urban guerrilla cell, several basic but important tactical principles must be utilized. A leader must be chosen. She or he must be chosen by objective criteria only. Mere appearance or other forms of subjective criteria are of no importance. Whoever is chosen for command must be a model in guerrilla actions. No prospective members should ever be allowed membership until every detail is known about their past, including their revolutionary origins and present stage of awareness. Precautions should be instituted to avoid infiltration. If an agent is discovered, the possibility then exists of a hostage in exchange for the release of political prisoners. This is a widely-used Tupamaro tactic and a successful one.

The new guerrillas must be taught to realize that they face a dangerous, deadly enemy. The revolution is not a stage for a show to the gallery. Caution is a must. Cell members must never keep records of names, addresses, telephone numbers, maps, sketches, points of contact, plans, itineraries, or any other information that could prove deadly if captured. In short, revolutionaries must work from memory.

All new guerrillas must participate in some form of action. The new guerrilla can only learn how to wage successful guerrilla warfare through active participation. These principles and methods of action are only mastered through the exercise of actions. No professions or human activities can be learned only through books or rehearsals while ignoring real experience. Urban guerrilla warfare is certainly not the exception.

Care should be taken not to invite too many people when holding meetings. This, of course, only serves to attract attention, alerting the enemy. And if raided, of course, less damage will be inflicted on the movement by fewer deaths or captures. The possibility of a raid is an ever-present threat, but one that can be dealt with. The meeting site should be carefully chosen for guerrilla warfare actions if raided. A predetermined plan to repel a surprise raid should be rehearsed with all cell members attending the meeting having a part in the execution of the escape plan.

When the membership of one cell becomes too numerous, the cell must divide itself. Efforts must be made to prevent individual cell members from knowing the identities of other cell members. Code names or numbers are one possibility. Likewise, each cell member should know only what concerns her and him. This principle equally applies to arms caches.

Simple operations should be undertaken in the beginning, advancing to the more complex in stages built from success. In short, guerrilla operations must progress from the simple to the complex.

When any guerrilla action is undertaken, its sole objective is to attack the interests of the ruling class. For that reason, guerrillas must never attack the working class or damage their interests. Violence should be used only against informers and those serving the enemy and his interests.

In the initial phase, guerrilla operations are spread out. This is the phase of distribution of the revolutionary forces causing the enemy forces to disperse in order to cope with the situation, while causing destruction on a broader front. This distribution of guerrillas is also the most economical usage of limited forces, reducing the possibilities of large-scale deaths, injuries, or captures. In this phase, it is essential to never fight on a single front. Strategical and tactical operations should be undertaken simultaneously or alternating between the two. These types of maneuvers grant the tactical guerrilla the freedom that she or he needs, not binding them to strict rules, allowing freedom to attack and retreat, hit and run, and occupy and withdraw.

A single front is an eventual requirement in the struggle, but becomes possible for the revolutionaries only when or after active firepower and numbers are formed. The growth and strengthening of revolutionary firepower must be a permanent activity of the movement. It is what will bring the partisan forces of armed struggle together. The single front will then be the product of firepower in action.

In the initial phase, however, when one revolutionary cell or group goes into action, other revolutionary cells must also go into action from their own initiative. This will leave the enemy disoriented, perplexed, and guessing as to which group to concentrate on.

The enemy must never be challenged. If the enemy challenges the movement, it must pretend it is dead. The enemy must only be answered when the movement is sure of its own strength and success. The enemy must never be given any clues or knowledge as to the strength of the revolutionaries. This knowledge should always be left open to the enemy's imagination in great uncertainty.

Guerrillas must never limit themselves to carrying out only a single type of action. When the enemy suspects one type of action, based on knowledge from the previous one, guerrillas must shift to another type of action. When the enemy believes the guerrillas will turn up at one place, they must appear at another. When the enemy believes the guerrillas are far away, they must be close by. When he believes guerrillas to be close by, they must be far away. When the enemy is on the alert, he must be left alone. When the enemy is unprepared, he must be surprised with an attack. When the enemy is enraged, the guerrillas must be calm. When the enemy is calm and relaxed, he must be attacked.

When the road is clear, guerrilla forces must advance. If guerrilla forces encounter an obstacle, they must surround it. If the obstacle is insurmountable, actions must desist. For that reason, there must never be combat on open ground. Guerrilla forces cannot be exposed to enemy blows or worn out.

Whenever operations are undertaken, more firepower than needed must be taken. Guerrilla superiority is then obvious and may avoid fire-fights and wasting ammunition. If the enemy can be beaten by astuteness, then the guerrilla must do so, not wasting firepower. Firepower can be conserved for more difficult moments.

Whenever a large-scale operation or a series of smaller ones has been completed, a balancing of efforts must be undertaken through a period of rest. This time can be used for planning the next move.

Great care must also be used in planning the retreat. The retreat can often be more important than the battle itself. Guerrillas must never accidentally leave the least trail after any action. If a trail or clue is left, intensive effort must be made to erase the error as the consequences can be deadly. A series of false trails should be a consideration.

The "circle within a circle" is also an effective guerrilla tactic, but should only be attempted if numbers, circumstances and precision timing allow. In this tactic, if a guerrilla or a cell of guerrillas is surrounded by the enemy (first circle), then other guerrillas can respond by encircling the enemy forces, completing the second circle or "circle within a circle." The objective is to paralyze the enemy, harass him, take his weapons, and to facilitate the escape of the "captured" guerrillas. The need for great caution, sufficient numbers and precision timing from rehearsal is obvious. Guerrillas must not use this tactic too often or become relaxed in their thinking from the power granted through this tactic. A "triple circle" is the defensive measure.

If a guerrilla-comrade fails to make a contact point, the affected guerrillas must avoid making a search for her or him unless preplanned. That guerrilla must be assumed dead or captured. A search that is not preplanned could result in additional arrests of the rescuers. Suicide for the captured guerrillas must be a consideration if their knowledge is too great (another good reason for "the need to know"). If the rescue does not materialize in the first thirty hours, then that is the time for such considerations, for few can avoid torture beyond thirty hours. The first thirty hours, or as soon as possible after capture, is the best time to attempt escape or rescue. The enemy least expects such actions at that time and early escape places the escaped guerrilla closer to the home cell. A plan for re-contact must have been predetermined to avoid arrests from "allowed escapes."

When guerrillas come into possession of monies from expropriations, a good rule is to not distribute the monies among the people. If the monies are distributed, the masses may gain the false impression that money is a substitute for struggle for power and that liberation depends only upon the guerrillas. Such distribution can only be considered as paternalistic while engendering illusions among the masses and separating them from the reality of struggle versus exploitation. Instead, the monies are to be used for weapons, ammunitions and other guerrilla-needed supplies.

Some defeats are to be expected. When a defeat is suffered, guerrillas must remain calm and not act irresponsibly through unplanned acts of vengeance. The guerrillas must first put the cells in order, mend their wounds and then carefully plan vengeance acts, but ones that are guaranteed to be successful. One defeat is not repayment for another defeat, but success over defeat is a tribute of vengeance.

In any master plan of the cell, several basic methods must be included in the preplanning stage. Correct information based on proper observation, investigation, exploration or reconnoitering the terrain and circumstances must be considered. There must also be proper selection of personnel, their substitutes, and firepower. The action must have perfect timing learned by rehearsal. This rehearsal must include not only rehearsal of the attack itself, but rehearsal of cover fire, retreat and rescue.

All of these principles are a must for any cell composition. To ignore a single one is to guarantee failure. To be weak in a single one is to weaken the chances of success while strengthening the chances of failure. To include all is not a guarantee of success but is a firm building block from which to expound and expand. All of these principles are found in the composition of successful Tupamaro cells; cells that gained knowledge of the principles from the blood of their comrades.

The greatest single principle is that of involvement. Revolution can never be possible without those who dare to struggle, dare to win!

IX.

WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE MLN

The shortness of this chapter is not intended to give the impression that the role of women in the revolution is a small role, an unimportant role, or that their contribution has been so small that a few pages will serve as a detailed covering of such revolutionary contributions. Such a belief would be a pure lie.

The chapter is short for a practical reason: there is no need to elaborate on the obvious; there is no difference between the revolutionary roles of women and men. Such roles are one and the same. It follows, then, that the contributions are equal; if not, then there is no revolution.

This is the case in Uruguay; without revolutionary contributions by women, there would be no MLN, and without the MLN, there would be no revolution. This fact also holds true for all revolutionary movements wherever found. Again, a revolution without women, whether in Latin America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, or whereever the case may be, is not a revolution; indeed it is no more than a movement by males that is doomed to die before it is born.

The Tupamaros have long recognized that the greatest single obstacle to the Revolution is not opposition by the ruling class but is rather women not realizing and utilizing to the fullest their revolutionary potential. This truth and recognition equally applies to any nation or revolutionary situation.

The Tupamaros, however, realize that in order to win the Revolution, revolutionary awareness of role contribution must be awakened in women and men alike. This is being done from top to bottom, from the largest task to the simplest chore; all roles, tasks, and chores are shared equally by women and men; there is no "work" division, no revolutionary "assignments" given to people according to sex. Such would be unthinkable and intolerable to the MLN.

The Tupamaros have also tried to create this awareness internationally. The largest single "jail break" in Uruguay occurred in the women's jail on International Women's Day. This brief mention of the women's role has been made only for the benefit of readers (women and men alike) in those nations that still harbor the false belief that there are differences of revolutionary contributions.

The Tupamaros have little time to study the reasons for such a belief and less patience for those, women and men alike, who cling to such a false belief.

There are no differences between revolutionaries of the MLN. A Tupamaro is a Tupamaro.

X.

A CRITIQUE OF THE URUGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The Uruguayan Communist Party, the same as its Latin American counterparts, has recently entered an electoral stage, leaving behind, at least for the moment, all revolutionary activities that characterized it since its onset. This new strategy has taken them to victory in the Chilean polls, but in those countries where the electoral route offers few possibilities of winning, it results in a decidedly anti-revolutionary tactic. It is unnecessary to say that there are not words enough to criticize the inactivity of the CP in those countries where the army has taken over, implanting bloody dictatorships. In Uruguay, the electoral route has not been depleted yet and the Uruguayan Communists contend that so long as it is possible to vote in a particular country, it means that the time for open battle has not yet come; but there will undoubtedly be a moment when the reactionary state will not be able to stay on top with popular support and will be forced to turn a coup as the only way to keep power. Reach that moment — argues a Communist — and the Party will come out to the streets and with the union of all other revolutionaries (workers and peasants) will take over. And that moment, he continues, is not far away, for the state, due to its internal contradictions, becomes more and more reactionary minute by minute. This repression is unleashed on the backs of the popular classes that little by little — having the CP as a guide — go on taking conscience of their historical situation and thus it turns them into a revolutionary mass. Each day, the confrontation between this mass and the oppressive state will become more and more difficult for the latter, until it will be forced purely by the question of survival to effect the necessary coup d'état.

The function for a communist would be, in this fashion, to stimulate the conscience of the greatest possible number of people and have the patience to wait until the state itself develops its own contradictions. To intend to take power before this occurrence, according to the communist, would be an adventure, and great is the distaste that communists have for adventures. In 1957, *El Popular,* the official organ of the CP in Uruguay, used this adjective to define Fidel Castro and then had no other choice but to recognize its error before the directors of the Cuban Communist Party.

The Tupamaros up to now have not made any verbal critiques against the CP; but each action of the Tupamaros is a tremendous critique itself. The communists, on the other hand, have made many criticisms of the MLN. Each Tupamaro action, I repeat, is an explicit critique of the CP, but these actions are answered by the CP with words: "We are not quiet nor are we anti-revolutionaries. . . . We also have our dead to grieve. . . . We prefer to be thought of as inactive before falling into adventurism." Tupamaros and Communists are in accord on one point: until all the conditions are given, it is not possible to take power; but while the latter wait for them to be given, the former fight to cause them. That is to say, for example, if a wave of terrorism begins, the conditions of the "repressive state" are caused to surface in a much shorter time than if one waits for the slow development of the contradictions. Actions are the process which accelerates revolutionary conditions. To remain quietly waiting for it to come by itself is foolish.

All the Occidental Communist Parties and other CPs in Latin America (with the exception of Cuba, of course)

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support an overwhelming verbal critique of other leftist groups (Maoists, Trotskyites, Anarchists, Socialists, etc.). All seem to coincide on one point: each day the CP becomes more of a collaborator with the system. "It is immoral," I heard an Uruguayan anarchist say once, "that the Bolsheviks fight so desperately to get an increase of salary for the workers, when they know that the additional bit of money they are to receive will make them more akin to the system." The Communists have their own strategy and don't mind being hurt by words: but the Tupamaro critique does bother them deeply, because by their deeds, the Tupamaros are no longer a vanguard movement. Before podiums the CP may say they are the only Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, but the people know perfectly well that those who put their lives on the line are the true revolutionaries. The CP is conscious of that fact and that they no longer are the precursors of the revolutionary movement. When the people take power, the CP will not be chosen by the people to represent them.

In order to give an exact idea of the differences between the CP and the MLN, the following positions on the same movement will serve to illustrate. The MLN acts. The Communists uphold such acts as nefarious; the only accomplishment will be that of reaction. The reaction of the state will fall upon those who have nothing to do with the situation. To the contrary, the Tupamaros find such reaction to be valid when it falls upon third parties; because the MLN believes it immoral to find persons who say they "have nothing to do with the situation," despite the events around them. After being roughnecked by reaction they may not be able to repeat that, and this is the one way of creating consciousness; it is brought about by deeds and not by empty words.

To the problem of whether "to vote or not to vote," the Tupamaro position is that guns cannot be taken to the polls, and the propaganda media are in the hands of one class. The media lie to the people as they wish. The elections are nothing more than a fraud. The popular classes, without protection from propaganda, will always be controlled by the powerful. That being as it is, the position for a revolutionary is to try to prevent, by any means available, this lie from continuing, not to take part in this lie in order to be able to combat it from the outside. The position of the CP is different: they go to elections, but make it clear that elections are not their end, but are a means for developing consciousness. Of course an objective observer could state that this means is given too much importance. It appears that the point is to raise the consciousness of the majority of the people; in that case, the means has become the end. The truth is that in dealing with the CP of Latin America, one doesn't know if they seek to fool, or if they are self-fooled, convincing themselves that they despise the bourgeois elections, or if they really believe they will gain power through elections.

In Uruguay, they had a whole apparatus: three representatives, one senator, a radio station, a newspaper, a magazine, the Workers Central (CTN), and several student associations. Those political positions and the propaganda media were considered by them to be means, that is, something reached for the moment, but not to be sacrificed. They could at least have organized a general strike as a form of expression against the powerful repression with all that means, but nothing of that sort happened: the CP had not seen or heard anything. They didn't want to run the risk of the radio and newspapers being closed. The communists told us that very little would be obtained by that, that it is better to wait and sacrifice the means for something more valuable . . ., but well it may be that our sin is impatience. However, not all the Communists share the CP position of denial of the Tupamaros: I have spoken with many who admire the MLN and know of others who are being sought by the police for open support of the MLN. It may not be too adventurous to ask if that denial is only from the leaders of the CP after they see their prestige go down day by day. It would be of course a very poor Leninist-Marxist position to be jealous of another revolutionary organization, but on occasion, the titles and the names are too precious, and it is hard to recognize that someone else is doing a better thing.

The great error of the CP in Latin America is the total absence of self-criticism; it is easy to be wrong, and a dialectical mind must always be ready to develop a criticism that may eliminate this error. Lack of that criticism is the greatest error of the CP of Uruguay, at least in the decision of great theoreticians and every militant.

XI.

CONFESSIONS OF A DEATH SQUAD MEMBER

On Thursday, February 24, 1972, a commando unit of the MLN arrested Nelson Bardesio, a member of the Combined Forces, who was charged with, among other crimes, being a member of the Death Squad. In the People's Jail he was questioned about his activities in the Death Squad. As a result of his confessions before the People's Tribunal, the following facts became clear:

1. The murder of Hector Castagnetto was ordered by the Death Squad.

Castagnetto was arrested on the corner of Ave. Italia and Propios by two officers of the fifth division of the Department of Intelligence and Information. From there he was taken to the neighborhood of the Hotel Carresco; after that he was taken to an abandoned house on the street that joins the race car track to that of Ave. Italia in El Pinar. That evening he was transferred to a house on Araucana Street where he was held until the following night. Then he was handed over to Marine Captain Jorge Nelson Nader Curbelo, who took him to the harbor where he was murdered and his corpse thrown into the river.

The following people took part in the arrest, torture, and murder of Castagnetto in a direct way:

The two officers of Department 5, referred to above, who haven't yet been identified.

Vice-Constable Delega of Department 5.

Inspector Pedro Fleitas of the Statistics and Information Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior.

Policeman Nelson Bardesio.

Angel Pedro Crosas Cuevas, a Paraguayan who had "special functions" in the Ministry of the Interior and who was in direct contact with the then Undersecretary and former interventionist in the school system and founder of JUP, Armando Acosta y Lara.

Jorge Nelson Nader Curbelo, member of the group of "Alferez Campora" and present military advisor in the Ministry of the Interior.

Inspector Victor Castiglioni, present director of the Department of Intelligence and Information.

2. Armed attacks with explosives were ordered by the Death Squad.

Nelson Bardesio confessed to having taken part in five Death Squad attacks using explosives and in the organization of a sixth attack that was not carried through. The details are as follows:

Dr. Arturo Dubra's home was ordered attacked by the Death Squad using explosives. The Captain of the Navy, Ernesto Moto Benvenutos' car was used in the attack with his knowledge.

Dr. Alejandro Artucio's home was bombed by orders of the Death Squad. Bardesio, Alberto Sosa Gonzales, and Estanislao Lamenza took part in this action. (Gonzales and Lamenza are officers in the Ministry of the Interior.) A car was supplied by the Chief of Police for the attack.

Dr. Maria Esther Gilio's home was raided and bombed by the Death Squad's orders. Herman Silveria Techera and Oscar Rodao took part in this action. (Techera and Rodao are also officers in the Ministry of the Interior.)

Dr. Alejandro Artucio's home was bombed as a result of the same orders. Bardesio, Alberto Sosa, Herman Silveria Techera, Oscar Rodao and the constable, Campos Hermida, took part in the attack. The Chief of Police supplied the automobile used in the bombing attack.

Dr. Liberoff's home was also bombed upon order of the Death Squad. Bardesio, Rodao, and Silveria Techera took part in the Death Squad bombing raid.

An attack was planned against Dr. Alba Dell'Acqua's home by the Death Squad, but it was not carried out.

The explosives used in those attacks were provided by the State Information Service (SIDE-Argentina) through Dr. Carlos Piran. Piran is Undersecretary and Secretary to the President's office, Undersecretary to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and an advisor to Jorge Pacheco Areco. In exchange for these explosives from Argentina, Piran was to plan an attack against Major Pablo Vicente, an Argentine living in Uruguay.

The orders to plan and execute these attacks were given to Bardesio by Colonel Walter Machado, military advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, directly through Inspector Pedro Fleitas. The orders originated from Minister De Brum Carvajal and Undersecretary Colonel Vigorito.

These facts were known by Inspector Jorge Grau Saint Laurent. (Inspector Laurent is the Director of the Statistics and Information Bureau.) Another Inspector, Victor Castiglioni, also had knowledge of the Death Squad's ordered bombings.

Colonel Walter Machado had the role of forbidding surveillance at the time and in the places in which the attacks were to be carried out. (Colonel Machado heads the radio center for the Chief of Police in Montevideo.)

3. The murder of Manuel Ramo Filippini was ordered by the Death Squad.

Vice-Constable Delega took an active part in this murder. Washington Grignoli, an officer of Department 6 of Intelligence also admitted to having taken part in the murder of Filippini.

4. The Death Squad has full governmental approval as evidenced by its membership and high officials' support.

The first meeting was arranged by the Paraguayan Angel Pedro Crosas Cuevas and was held in the photographic workshop (Sichel) which was rented by Bardesio. Besides Cronas, the following people were present: Victor Castiglioni, Constables Campos Hermida, Macchi, Washington Grignoli, and Miguel Sofia. This meeting was held due to the urging of Armando Acosta y Lara and it was here that the Squadron was organized.

Besides this group, the following groups were also present:

D.A.M., built up by General Juan Pedro Rivas. The leaflets used in their attacks were printed in the Civil Defense office.

A group of the Republican Guard, created by Carlos Piran. The group painted the homes of Tupamaro militants who were in jail.

A group headed by Captain Pedro Antonio Mato composed of people from S.I.D.

A group commanded by Navy Captain Mario Risso, providing links between the Navy and the Chief of Police. (Captain Risso has since fled to Spain.)

Juventud Uruguaya de Pia. Weapons for this group were obtained from the Chief of Police through Miguel Sofia, a close friend of Acosta y Lara and principal assistant of Crosas.

Foreign intervention.

Besides intervention by the Information Service it should be pointed out that both officials of Depatment 5 who are directly involved in the murder of Castagnetto took courses for these operations in Brazil. These courses were arranged in Brazil through Constable Campos Hermida, who was following the orders of Armando Acosta y Lara.

The Intelligence and Information Service was created by instruction received from the C.I.A. Its operations were directly supervised by C.I.A. agent William Cantrell. (Bardesio collaborated with this U.S. agent.)

For cover, this C.I.A. agent had an advisory position at the AID office. His payments were made from private funds. He was in direct contact with the American Embassy.

The U.S. Embassy is in secret contact with the Chief of Police through the official Raul La Paz, Chief of the Archive of Intelligence, who operates under Inspector Victor Castiglioni.

Evidence of these facts (documents, taped telephone conversations, pictures, signed confessions by Nelson Bardesio, and other undisputable pieces of evidence) were given to the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Hector Gutierrez Ruiz, by the Tupamaros, shortly after Bardesio confessed his role in the Death Squad and collaboration with the C.I.A.

The Tupamaros also gave legal copies of this evidence to the following people and organizations:

Members of the Legislature: Wilson Ferreria Aldunate, Amilcar Vasconcellos, Enrique Rodriguez, Homero Farina, Juan Pablo Terra, Celmar Michelini, Angel Rath.

Doctors Carlos H. Dubra and Fernando Ballardo Bengoa.

The organization of C.N.T. and F.E.U.U.

The central directive council of the University of the Republic.

The Curia of Montevideo.

Captain Omar Murdoch, General Liber Seregni, Mons. Carlos Partelli.

The national and foreign press.

The Tupamaros also issued a statement along with the evidence that read, Today, we can also state that in the murder of Ibero Gutierrez, Captain Jorge Nelson Nader Cubelo and Inspector Pedro Fleitas took part.

The MLN will continue to search and to report on these matters. Again, the people, by means of the revolutionary

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organizations, have been the only ones ready to point out these crimes which, theoretically, should be investigated by other institutions. These institutions now have the evidence and hence the possibility of proving that they are able to carry out revolutionary justice. We will wait but we don't have many hopes.

We have proved in an irrefutable way that the Death Squad is not acting in the shadows but it is acting from within the Ministry of the Interior and the Combined Forces Command. It has names and surnames and wears (or rather dirties) the uniform of the Armed Forces.

All those that serve the present regime are involved in these crimes, and they are not accomplices in an allegorical way but, as we have seen, in a very concrete way.

Those who most loudly defend the fatherland, who shout about "foreign ideas," all those are the servile slaves and in order to carry out their crimes against the people and the country, obtain support from not just one, but at least three foreign countries.

We call on all the patriotic forces to diffuse to the maximum the information we have supplied along with this leaflet. The national consciousness should become aware of the existence of these dirty things in order to sweep them away forever.

We are offering the judges, prosecutors, ministers of the court, and parliamentarians the opportunity to put questions to Nelson Bardesio. The only conditions we ask are the following:

1. The moral authority to visit the People's Jail as a visitor,
2. Some measures to grant us at least a minimum of safety.

The statement concluded with the judgments of the People's Tribunal.

People's Tribunal Judgments

The following persons have been tried by the People's Tribunal and found guilty of crimes against the people. They have been sentenced to death. All revolutionaries are urged to carry out these sentences whenever, wherever, and however possible:

Officer Oscar Delega (alias El Gordo), Death Squad organizer, C. Corrales #3079 (executed April 1972).

Navy Captain Jorge Nelson Nader Curbelo (alias El Negro), Alejandro Gallinal #2064.

Inspector Pedro Fleitas, address unknown.

Miguel Sofia (alias José), Nicolas Herrera Cerrito #4076.

Colonel of the Air Force, Walter Machado, Lieja #6610.

Angel Pedro Crosas Cuevas, address unknown.

Armando Acosta y Lara, Death Squad organizer, San Jose Entre Vasquez y Medanos (executed April 1972).

Campos Hermida, Avda. Brazil #2597.

Inspector Victor Castiglioni, Acevedo Dias 1134 Bis.

We recommend the capture and questioning (or any possible information) on the following persons:

Washington Grignoli, Tomas Gomez #3710.

Raul La Paz, address unknown.

Army Captain Pedro Antonio Mato, Colorado y Br. Artigas.

Marine Captain Ernesto Moto Benvenuto (alias Tito), Torres Garcia St., Ciudad de las Piedras (executed April 1972 — Death Squad organizer).

Marine Captain Mario Humberto R. Pedranzini (alias El Flaco), Zapucay y Centenario.

Oscar Rodao, Pension de Gaboto y Lavalleja.

Brigadier Danilo Sena, Panamericano Block #4, Apt. 1608.

Alberto Quinalvar Sosa Gonzalez (alias El Flaco), Helvecia y Cabari.

Sergeant Getulio Walter Werner Chaparro, (alias El Buey), address unknown.

Estanislao Lamenza, address unknown.

Herman Silveria Techera, address unknown.

General Juan Pedro Rivas, Colonia #1884.

Colonel Vigorito, address unknown.
Dr. Santiago De Brum Carvasal, address unknown.
Dr. Carlos Piran, address unknown.
Inspector Jorge Grau Saint Laurent, address unknown.
Captain of the Argentine Army, Nieto Moreno.

It was to be some time until any official responded favorably to the Tupamaros' offer of allowing face-to-face talks with Bardesio. Many shocking events were to transpire before the first meeting was to occur.

The first such event came on April 15, 1972, when an Uruguayan Senator of long standing and high respect read a set of documents into his country's official congressional record. The documents that Senator Enrique Erro read were transcripts of declarations made by Bardesio. These declarations stated, among other things, the close collaboration of C.I.A. agents with Uruguayan police agents, military officers, and government officials.

No mention of this report was made in the government-controlled press. United States correspondents in Uruguay refused to report the event even though perhaps it was the biggest news event of the year in Latin America.

United States news commentators usually dismiss undocumented allegations by left-wing Latin American groups (or any left-wing organization anywhere, for that matter) that C.I.A. agents or other U.S. officials have knowledge of or collaborate with right-wing organizations. Such allegations are often parodied in the U.S. as being the unsubstantiated ravings of demagogues, extremists or mouth-foaming Marxists, at best.

However, here was a situation where such charges were clearly documented, giving proof that C.I.A. agents and U.S. officials did indeed have knowledge of right-wing organizations in Uruguay, and in fact were funding, training, and advising a Death Squad. One would expect, then, that when such charges are clearly documented with legal proof, and presented by a respected, elected Senator to his peer-officials via an official congressional record, widespread reporting and discussion would follow. Such was not the case.

However, this fact-hiding by the U.S. press came as no real surprise to Latin American guerrillas. Even such a bastion of the "liberal press" as the *New York Times* is guilty of fact-hiding. An example is the deliberate killing of a headline story in the *Times* which had documented preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion.*

Reporting or not, fact-hiding or not, this news could not be kept from the people of Uruguay, despite that country's government's best efforts to hide such facts. Collaboration and oppression cannot be hidden from a population; on the contrary, it can only be felt by that population.

In his confessions that were read into the congressional record, Bardesio named names. He also clearly described the roles of named U.S. AID operatives who were responsible for the creation, training, supplying, funding, and coordination of Uruguay's intelligence branches of the police department and the military, that same military which became so brutal in its investigations that in June, 1972, the Roman Catholic Bishops of Uruguay declared that the Army was guilty of killings, physical oppression, torture, and illegal imprisonment. The Bishops' charges were reported in the June 17, 1972, issue of *The Miami Herald.*

The next month the International Commission of Jurists issued a report in Geneva charging the Bordaberry administration, as the Commission had previously charged the administrations of Gestido and Areco, of setting aside all rules of law and justice in dealing with the Tupamaros. Mention of this High Commission's report was made in the July 28, 1972, issue of *The Christian Science Monitor.*

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*Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon, "The Press and the Bay of Pigs," *Columbia University Press Forum,* Fall, 1967.

There is very little doubt concerning the authenticity of Bardesio's statements charging that C.I.A. agents were using a position in AID as a cover. C.I.A. agent William Cantrell presented himself to Bardesio as an AID official. Such is far from new in most Latin American nations.

For just one of many examples, in November, 1970, staff members from the North American Center on Latin America conducted an exclusive interview with an ex-AID official who had served with that branch of the U.S. government in the Dominican Republic. He stated that six officials of the eighteen-man team working in the Office of Public Safety with AID were not in fact AID officials but were instead actually C.I.A. agents using AID as a cover for their intelligence activities in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated example, but more toward the general rule.

To what extent the C.I.A. was using the OPS program as a cover in Uruguay is not yet fully determined. But there are two known facts that indicate the C.I.A. operation in Uruguay through the OPS was intensive.

The first fact is the large amount of funding the OPS had at its disposal. In the last three years, Uruguay has been first of the top four recipients of OPS aid in Latin America, receiving over $1.3 million in the past three years. (Uruguay is followed by Guatemala, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic — all scenes of heavy C.I.A. activity.) Of course this is only an accounting of the known dollar amount; behind this amount are huge sums of "hidden funds", like the C.I.A. agent, William Cantrell's, private fund.

The second fact giving indications of how large the C.I.A. activity was inside the OPS is that of who the so-called OPS officials actually were. The OPS program, in fact, was administered in Uruguay by such men as: William Cantrell, Dan Mitrione, Richard Martinez, Richard Biava, Cesar Bernal, Adolphe Saenz, Juan Noriega, and a mysterious "Robert" whom Bardesio makes mention of in his declarations. The U.S. Embassy in Uruguay cannot declare a "shocked disbelief" or any other expression denoting a lack of knowledge that C.I.A. agents were using government positions as cover. Several C.I.A. agents mentioned by name in Bardesio's reports were employed in the U.S. Embassy's Political Section.

The OPS and U.S. Embassy personnel named as intelligence agents by Bardesio matches the U.S. State Department's "Biographic Register" and the "Foreign Service List," as personnel serving with those departments. The latter lists the names of all U.S. Foreign Service Officers by the country in which they are stationed.

Of the eight U.S. intelligence agents named by Bardesio, it is interesting to note that the majority, five of the eight, are Spanish-Americans. This is no accident. The American intelligence service purposely uses Spanish-Americans in Latin America for three basic but important reasons.

First, it aids in the disguise of the U.S. presence. Next, it decreases the language barrier. And last, it eases racial tensions in two ways: first, the prejudice that a white North American harbors for Latin Americans, and second, the problems that could arise when white North Americans give orders to Latin American police agents, military officers, or government officials.

It could be argued that Bardesio somehow managed to obtain a list of U.S. officials serving in Uruguay or a copy of the "Biographic Register" and the "Foreign Service List" themselves, and under pressure, gave these names to "buy" his release, while knowing well these were not C.I.A. agents. But this theory falls flat when several other facts are added.

First, Bardesio never, at any time, changed his statements. Second, some of these officials are known C.I.A. agents whom other people know from their activity in other Latin American countries. And third, the most positive proof, these agents were named by name by other intelligence agents in Uruguay who are in a position to know who the C.I.A. agents are. In fact, these other Uruguayan agents receive their orders from these same C.I.A. agents, and follow those orders, or lose their jobs if they refuse, as was the case with former Police Chief of Information and Intelligence, Alejandro Otero. In his statements to Rio de Janeiro's largest and most respected newspaper, *Jornal de Brasil,* Otero stated he was fired from his position as Police Chief when he refused to follow torture orders given by the C.I.A. agent Mitrione.

However, it is interesting to examine the background of the men named by Bardesio as being C.I.A. agents, and wonder how their background, as listed in the official State Department records, could in any manner qualify these men to function in the U.S. Embassy's Political Section or with AID.

The background of these men, according to official U.S. records, named by Bardesio are:

Caesar P. Bernal, Born: June 12, 1928, Texas. Education: Rice University, 1947-1949; Texas A. and M., 1959; San Antonio Police Academy, 1963. Occupations: City police departments, 1950-1965; U.S. AID, Panama, public safety advisor, May 9, 1965; U.S. AID, Montevideo, public safety advisor, September 12, 1965.

William A. Cantrell. Born: September 8, 1927, Oklahoma. Education: Oklahoma State University of Ag. and Ap. Sc., B.S., 1954. Occupations: U.S. Army, 1945-1947; U.S. Army, 1950-1953 (1st Lt.); U.S. AID, Monrovia, public safety advisor, April 30, 1961; U.S. AID, Montevideo, public safety advisor, July, 1966.

Juan P. Noriega, Born: March 1, 1933, New Jersey. Education: Columbia University, B.S., 1960; University of Florida, M.A., 1962. Occupations: U.S. Navy, 1955-1958; U.S. Navy, 1961-1962; Private experience? 1964-

1966; U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, political officer, June, 1966; Washington, D.C., Oct. 1969; Mexico D.F., political officer, Jan. 1971.

Richard R. Martinez. Born: February 12, 1933, Texas. Education: not listed. Occupations: Detective, 1956-1965; U.S. AID, Puerto la Cruz, public safety advisor, September 1965; U.S. AID, Caracas, public safety advisor, June 1969; U.S. AID, Montevideo, public safety advisor, November 1969. Awards: Superior Honor Award, 1971.

Adolphe B. Saenz. Born: May 22, 1929, New Mexico. Education: University of New Mexico, B.A. 1958. Occupations: U.S. Marine Corps, 1945-1947; U.S. Air Force, 1951-1953 (1st Lt.); City Policeman, 1955-1958; U.S. AID, San Salvador, police advisor, January, 1958; U.S. AID, San Salvador, public safety advisor, June, 1959; U.S. AID, Panama, occupation?, May, 1962; U.S. AID, Colon, occupation?, June, 1962; U.S. AID, Washington, D.C., occupation?, May, 1964; U.S. AID Montevideo, chief of public safety, January, 1965; U.S. AID Montevideo, public safety officer, August, 1968; U.S. AID, Panama, occupation?, December, 1969.

Richard D. Biava. Born: May 16, 1928, Ecuador. Education: University of California, B.A. 1958. Occupations: U.S. Army 1951-1953 (1st Lt.); City Police officer, 1954-1963; U.S. AID, Panama, public safety advisor, April, 1963; U.S. AID, Washington, D.C., staff specialist, February, 1967; U.S. AID, Washington, D.C., special staff assistant, January, 1968; U.S. AID, Montevideo, public safety advisor, April, 1970. Awards: Superior Honor Award, 1971.

Dan A. Mitrione. Born: August 4, 1920. Education: not listed. Occupations: U.S. Navy, 1942-1945; City juvenile officer, 1949-1952; City police captain, 1953-1955; City police chief, 1956-1960; U.S. AID (ICA), Belo Horizonte, public safety, July, 1960; U.S. AID (ICA), Washington, D.C. occupation?, November, 1961; U.S. AID (ICA), Rio de Janeiro, training advisor?, August, 1962; U.S. AID (ICA), Rio de Janeiro, public safety, June, 1967; U.S. AID (ICA), Montevideo, public safety, July, 1969.

Robert Loker III and Robert Andrews both are mentioned for one of them is most likely the mysterious "Robert" whom Bardesio mentions as being Cantrell's C.I.A. replacement.

Robert C. Loker III. Born: June 10, 1938, Maryland. Education: William and Mary College, B.A. 1960. Occupations: U.S. Army, 1960; U.S. Department of Army, economics analyst, 1961-1965; U.S. Embassy, Quito, economics officer, April, 1965; U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, political officer, September, 1969.

Robert W. Andrews. Born: April 18, 1926, New York. Education: not listed. Occupations: U.S. Navy, 1948-1949; U.S. Navy, 1950-1956; U.S. Department of Army, 1956-1959; U.S. Department of Army, 1960-1968; U.S. AID (ICA), Vientiane, occupation?, April, 1959; U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, political officer, May, 1968.

One of the confessions made by Bardesio and read into the official congressional record mentions these people, stating:

I, Nelson Bardesio, Uruguayan, married, 30 years old, employee of the Ministry of the Interior, declare before the People's Tribunal, my participation and all that I know about the penetration of foreign agents and organizations in the Uruguayan repressive forces.

I joined the Montevideo police force on August 15, 1963, after a training course. I went to the Departamento de Vigilancia de Investigaciones, Homicide Section. In the last months of 1964, I went to work in the Ayudantia de Investigaciones.

In 1966, after the elections in which General Oscar

Gestido was elected President, a friend of Atilio Galan Raiz, Jefatura, asked me to work with him to create a national office of police intelligence. Galan's mother was a good friend of Gestido's wife, and because of that connection he had been able to propose this to the new government.

As we prepared the project, Galan had new conversations with Gestido and with Colonel Raul Barloco, chief of police of Montevideo, and after some negotiations he put us in contact with Colonel Santiago Acuna, head of the Police Chiefs of Staff.

In March or April of 1964, Colonel Acuna put us in touch with William Cantrell, a North American advisor for the Office of Technical Assistance that was part of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). Although our project had not yet been completed, the North American advisors had already established their own ideas for the creation of the new agency. Galan and I were part of the original nucleus of the Direccion de Informacion e Inteligencia.

Galan was in charge of student activities, and I had the administrative responsibility for the intelligence office at 18th and Juan Paulier Street, working together with Cantrell. Through him we obtained the material necessary to set up the office: radio and photo laboratories. Once it was set up, I worked there.

I suppose that Cantrell was an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.). He moved with great independence, even in the Technological Office of AID, whose head at that time was Adolphe Saenz, a very meddlesome man, who nevertheless didn't interfere at all in what Cantrell did in the Direccion de Inteligencia. In addition, Cantrell had his own funds.

The Direccion de Informacion e Inteligencia was organized with funds from the Police Headquarters and the

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North American Embassy. If it was a question of repairing the building, masonry, pictures, or one of these things, the money was furnished by Headquarters. If it was for technical equipment, typewriters or something like that, Cantrell furnished the funds. These funds didn't come from AID, but directly from the Embassy, since AID does not give money, but rather finances acquisitions that must be repaid later.

Besides my work in the photo lab, I was Cantrell's chauffeur, in a jeep from Headquarters that was used by the Direccion de Inteligencia. I picked him up at his house in the morning and took him to the Office of Intelligence, or police headquarters, or the Embassy. If I took him to the Office of Intelligence, about noon I had to take him to the Embassy. In any case, at 5:30 or 6:00 in the afternoon I got him at the Embassy and took him home, keeping the car for the night. Once a week I took him to the Methodist Church on Calle Guavabos, where Cantrell was treasurer, leaving him there since he would go home later in his wife's car.

The organization of the Office of Information and Intelligence began between November and December of 1966. For my work at the photo lab, I depended on the sub-comisario Juan Carlos Lemos Silveira, who was at that time in charge of processing all the material that was collected and was also responsible for the recruitment and training of personnel. Copies of all this work were handed over, daily, to the North American Embassy, through Lemos. I don't know exactly when he began to send copies of the information to the Embassy, but this was already established before I entered the police force, and happened with full knowledge of the Chief of Police and the Minister of the Interior. Cantrell openly took care of the contacts with the higher-ups, visiting Inspector Conserva and Inspector Pirez Castagnet in their offices at the Office of Information and Intelligence.

After Cantrell left, Pirez and Conserva made contact with the Embassy in the Hotel Victoria Plaza, where they had lunch periodically with a North American official who was simply called Robert. These contacts were arranged by Inspector Castiglioni, who probably is the only one who offically knows the contact from the North American Embassy.

As I said, when I was working in the DII, Lemos maintained contact with the Embassy. In case of his dismissal or sickness, sub-comisario Raul Lapaz was the substitute. He is the one who most likely took charge of the intelligence files and the contact with the Embassy, after Lemos went to live with his family in Australia at the end of 1971, after the second attack on his house.

Lemos received money from Cantrell for some special work. This explains why he left a job he had in an office of commercial reports a few months after he was in the Office of Intelligence. I didn't receive extra pay from Cantrell, but on more than one occasion he offered me money as a loan, which I accepted when I had a problem with the petty cash fund I operated in the DII. Cantrell loaned me $11,000 for this.

The mail with the Embassy was and is taken care of by Sergeant Yetulio Walter Werner Chaparro, who uses a black jeep in which he travels daily between the DII and the Embassy from 10:30-12:00 noon, approximately, accompanied by a chauffeur and a guard. Copies were sent to the Embassy from all parts of the Office and the information processed by Headquarters; the Embassy periodically solicits copies of certain information for use in their own archives. The mail is sent in envelopes and packets which have tapes in them, probably from recordings of tapped telephones.

Besides Cantrell and Saenz, I knew other North American officials or advisors: Juan Noriega, funcionario of the

Embassy and Cantrell's friend, who disappeared immediately after the discovery of the Positos telephone exchange from where they intercepted telephone calls from the Soviet Embassy. The discovery of the exchange made the North Americans very uneasy; Cantrell himself interceded so that the Spanish couple who lived in the house on Ellauri Street where the tapping equipment was installed, would be allowed to go free.

Cesar Bernal was an advisor of the Technical Office of AID. Although this wasn't part of his job, I know that Bernal, at the request of Captain Mario Risso, chief of the Intelligence Service of the Navy, taught a course on marksmanship to various members of the Navy. As I have already declared before the People's Tribunal, Risso had formed a group of trusted subordinates to carry out attacks.

Richard Martinez was Bernal's substitute; he was in charge of administrative work at the Office of Technical Assistance and of organizing the regional courses for the police in the interior of the country. He was a North American of Mexican descent. He used the car from the Police Headquarters, a Maverick, and I saw him often talking with Colonel Martin, who was head of the Police Chiefs of Staff, and afterwards was named chief of police of Canelones.

Dan Anthony Mitrione was presented to me as Saenz's successor. I saw him very few times, since he did not visit the Headquarters as regularly as Saenz did. On those occasions we merely exchanged greetings or other unimportant comments.

As to the current advisors, I only know the name of a Mr. Biava, who I understand replaced Richard Martinez.

I also knew a North American Technician in photography whose name I don't remember, who taught me to load and unload a camera brought by the Embassy and installed in the airport of Carrasco to photograph the passports of passengers who enter the country. I understand that the mechanics of this machine are considered a military secret in the U.S. Even after I left the photo lab of the DII and went to the staff of Inspector Conserva, I continued going to Carrasco weekly to take out the film and reload the camera, because no one else knew how to do it.

In the middle of 1970, I went on to the Ministry of the Interior to participate in organizing an information group which would be dependent directly on the Ministry. I was assigned a group of five men who would be given training as a surveillance team. Those five funcionarios were Alberto Quinalbar Sosa Gonzalez, Herman Silvera Techera, Estanislao Lamenza Castro, selected from the Transit Authority, and Oscar Rodao and Nelson Benitez, selected from the Police Institute. After I finished giving them basic training, they were sent to Buenos Aires to receive an advanced finishing course.

At the beginning of 1971, complying with the instructions of sub-secretario Carlos Piran, I went to Buenos Aires, taking the personal background forms of the five officials, in order to arrange the details of their course. I met with Captain Nieto Moreno of the State Information Service (SIDE) of Argentina. He received the forms and handed me a package containing three sticks of gelignite to give to the Ministry of the Interior. Piran had told me that I would be given a package at SIDE, but he didn't tell me what it was. Nieto Moreno told me. I found out later that the gelignite was to be used in an attack against Mayor Pablo Vicente, an Argentine resident of Montevideo for the last few years, in exchange for which the SIDE would teach the course to the five Uruguayan officials.

The attack on Mayor Vicente didn't occur; I suppose because of the indecision of Piran. But the gelignite was later used against Dr. Artucio and Dr. Liberoff, about whom I have already testified before the People's Tribunal.

The course at the SIDE included photography, surveillance, telephone bugging, lockpicking and anti-terrorist activities. Colonel Vigorito took over for Piran. He dropped the idea of creating an information service, and the officials in my group, except for Benitez who asked to drop out, were sent home to await instructions. They later participated in crimes already recounted before the Tribunal.

I know about a high-level Brazilian who visited Montevideo and met with the chief of police Colonel Rivero, and with the Director of DII, Inspector Castiglioni, in order to strengthen relations between the Brazilian and Uruguayan police. The Brazilian diplomat offered to install equipment for direct radio communications between Brasilia and Montevideo. I don't know if this project was carried out.

When Armando Acosta y Lara was sub-secretario of the Ministry of the Interior, the sub-comisario Campos Hermida, chief of D5, was called to his office and received instructions to make contact with the Brazilian Embassy in Montevideo. This fact was revealed by Campos Hermida himself. As a result of those contacts, at least two officials of D4 travelled to Brazil, receive death squadron-type training. On their return, they brought back 10 Rossi 38 caliber revolvers that were delivered to the JUP* through the Ministry of the Interior. The two officials, whose names I don't remember, then went under orders of the Paraguayan Angel Pedro Crosas Cuevas, advisor and close friend of Acosta y Lara. At the orders of Crosas and together with sub-comisario Delega, the official inspector Pedro Fleitas, Captain of the Navy, Jorge Nelson Nader of the JUP, Miguel Sofia Abelenda and myself participated in the kidnapping and later assassination of Hector Castagnetto da Rosa.

I swear that all I've said is a true recounting of the acts

***JUP is Juventud Uruguaya de Pie, a right-wing group.**

and I admit my participation in and the accompanying responsibility for them. As proof, I sign my name."

(signed)
Nelson Bardesio

In his first confession before the People's Tribunal, Bardesio named other members of the police force that he participated with in the Death Squad attacks. Members of the military are also mentioned by name as being members or participants in Death Squad attacks.

Part of this confession states, "Through conversations in the Navy Club, I know that groups made up of military elements have carried out similar attacks. Army Captain Pedro Antonio Mato commanded one of these groups made up of people from the Servicio de Informacion de Defensa (SID). Their actions were commented on daily over lunch in the Navy Club.

"Navy Captain Mario Risso had also organized a terrorist group made up of his underlings. He himself commented that his group had carried out various actions without running into difficulties, for example, the firing on the home of Dr. Maria Ester Gilio."

(Captain Risso is now in Spain. He was chief of M2, Navy Intelligence. His terrorist group was probably inherited by Captain Barbe, who replaced him as Chief of Naval Intelligence.)

In another confession before the People's Tribunal, one concerning the murder of the revolutionary hero, Hector Castagnetto, Bardesio describes the horrors of a Death Squad murder. Names in this confession are being withheld for investigation by the MLN.

The confession states:

I, Nelson Badesio, Uruguayan, married, 30 years old, functionary of the Ministry of the Interior, declare before the People's Tribunal my participation in and the facts I know of in relation to the kidnapping and murder of Hector Castagnetto da Rosa.

I was in the offices of Statistics, Control and Diffusion of the Ministry of the Interior when Inspector X commanded me to participate in an operation. These offices were dircted by Inspector X and are used as a base and cover for the planning and execution of terrorist activities. Inspector X was secretary to Colonel X (in charge of the municipal register) and acted as a liaison officer between the Ministry of the Interior and the so-called "Command to Chase the Tupamaros" (CCT). According to Sub-official X of Department 5 of the Service for Intelligence and Information, the liaison officer asked for his participation and told him he would need me and my automobile (with the characteristics I gave before and with a false matriculation number) that belonged to the Central District of the Montevideo Police Department, and that I have been using since an earlier terrorist action I have already described.

Around noon I went to the Hotel Carrasco with Inspector X and we were supposed to meet Subofficial X. He arrived with two other functionaries from Department 4 (who had been sent to Brazil to be trained in Death Squad techniques) and one young man, Hector Castagnetto. These four people were in an auto that belonged to Official X from Department 4.

They told me that Castagnetto was arrested in the morning at the corner of Ave. Italia and Propios by the two functionaries from Department 4. I didn't have any information on Castagnetto. Subofficial X told me to drive him around all afternoon and that was why he had asked for my automobile.

Castagnetto was put into the automobile. The arrested man wore trousers and a jacket and had a bag of folk song records. He seemed rather nervous, but not frightened.

I told Subofficial X that the automobile wasn't in very good mechanical condition to drive all afternoon. He told me to drive outside the city and that something would happen. After he told me we would go to El Pinar and we would spend the afternoon in an abandoned house he knew there. He told me this place was an old Tupamaro house that was discovered and now abandoned.

We arrived at the house. It had a rather heavy architecture. It was located on a street that unites the Race Car track to Ave. Italia. After settling, I was sent to buy some food in a shop on Ave. Italia about two miles from there.

We spent all afternoon in El Pinar. Castagnetto, who was handcuffed, passed most of the time sitting in a corner on the floor. We didn't speak to him at all. Only X asked him some questions; if he was a member of the Tupamaros, he answered no; if he knew where the People's Prison was, he said no; why did he have the records, he told us he worked as an independent record seller.

We took turns watching him; meanwhile the others went out for a walk. I asked X what would happen to him. He said he didn't know either and that was X's affair. I asked this person and he told me our task was to pass the time until the two functionaries from Department 4 finished collecting Castagnetto's dossier to prepare the questions. He told me we were not to speak to Castagnetto and that the two functionaries were forming a new team.

At the end of the afternoon we left for Montevideo where X told me to drive by the seashore driveway. We arrived at a house on Araucana Street. There we met X who told us there were some people there we should not meet and told us to drive around for awhile until these people left.

I was acquainted with X through Colonel X, who is military advisor to X. He is Paraguayan and is called Doctor.

He worked with Acosta y Lara during the intervention in the secondary schools and had participated in JUP's organization when he was appointed as Subsecretary of the Interior. It was Acosta y Lara who had placed him in the ministry. When I was introduced to him, Colonel X told me he would perform some "special" operations by order of the Subsecretary himself and that I must collaborate completely with him whenever necessary. This same man proposed "violent psychological action" to cope with the Tupamaros in a meeting held in our offices. I told him at this time I was against this plan and in favor of organizing efficient information teams. He said this was dreaming.

When we returned to the house on Araucana St., we put Castagnetto on a sofa in the main hallway. The house was big and elegantly furnished. The $300 rent was paid by the Ministry of the Interior. I had already heard some gossip in the Ministry about this house and him because the functionaries said they hadn't even money to buy paper because the Ministry paid this fortune for rent. X told us to stay and watch over Castagnetto during the night; the functionaries from Department 4 would not arrive until morning. We divided the night watch into three parts, I took the middle one. I didn't speak to Castagnetto. He slept on the sofa.

The two functionaries arrived at dawn together with X, whom they called "José." He was introduced by X of the Ministry as his most important assistant. I knew through some gossip that José was a member of JUP and as X, he seemed to be an intimate of Acosta y Lara whom he visited frequently in his office. When they arrived, X and myself left and X stayed there. I took X home and after I went to the photo studio. This same evennig, at 7 P.M., X came to the studio to ask me to get in touch with any person in the Navy that could help them get someone out of Montevideo. He told me that it couldn't be Captain Motto because it would have to be an absolute secret and Motto drank heavily. I recalled the name of Captain X, whom I was introduced to by Captain X at the Navy Club as a person we could count upon in any circumstances. I called X and we agreed to meet two hours later at the corner of Rambla and Comercio. There X asked X's collaboration to get a "member of the Tupamaros out of Montevideo." X agreed and they agreed to meet at 1 A.M. at the corner of Hansen Passage and Propios. I was supposed to go there to establish contact. I took X to the offices of Department 5 and promised him to be at the house on Araucana St. 10 or 15 minutes before the appointment.

I arrived at the house just in time. I saw them put Castagnetto, who was blindfolded, in X's auto [here is the make and color], that had a broken windshield, and belonged to the Ministry of the Interior. Castagnetto and the two functionaries of Department 4 sat in the back, X drove with José beside him. It seems that X wasn't inside the house. X got into my auto and we went to meet X. There we transferred Castagnetto to X's auto together with the two functionaries. The three autos then went to the harbor, to the entrance beside the central railway station. I believe this is the entrance for the Rowing Club. X's auto turned in and we turned back. I took X to Department 5 and went to the house of a friendly couple on Canelones Street where I then lived. One hour later, around 2 A.M., X phoned me to tell me the house on Araucana St. was to be "cleaned out" because it would be searched by the police because of a neighbor's complaint and also if I might keep some parcels that they didn't have any place to keep. X came to take me with his auto and we went to the corner of Rambla and Araucana St. where we met a small lorry normally used by the two functionaries trained in Brazil [here are its characteristics]. In the lorry there were two people I didn't know and who were part of José's team. X told me to keep absolutely secret about them. They took me in the lorry to my studio where I put the two parcels and box taken from the house on Araucana Street. I do not know what the parcels contained. I later opened the two parcels and found machineguns, 45 caliber, without brands or numbers (they were filed clean) and some explosives. These were colored cubes with a place for a detonater in one of the extremities. They were enclosed with sheets of paper on which was written "CCT." I destroyed these sheets to avoid possibilities of tracing them. After I asked X about the danger of handling these cubes, he told me they were harmless without the detonators. I also told him what I had done with the papers and he approved of this.

One month and a half ago I took the parcels and the box to the Ministry to deliver them to SID, as directed by X. I gave them all to Captain X.

I understand that Castagnetto was interrogated and tortured in the house on Araucana Street and later murdered and thrown into the river. This final part of the operation was carried out by the two functionaries who went with him into the harbour.

With the information I have, I know that the "Command to Chase the Tupamaros" is composed of . . . [names]. These last two men were later transferred to Department 5.

I declare that everything I have said is a faithful description of the events and I admit my participation and my responsibility in them.

(signed:)
Nelson Bardesio.
March, 1972

On April 24, the President of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies responded favorably to the Tupamaro message.

On that day he consented to be "kidnapped" by the Tupamaros and was taken by them for face-to-face talks with Bardesio.

After meeting with Bardesio, the Chief Deputy reported that Bardesio was in excellent health and went on to state, "I spoke with Bardesio several times and have the impression he was telling the truth."

The local papers made no mention of this meeting between the Chief Deputy and Bardesio. Only a brief mention of the meeting occurred in any press, specifically in the April 26 issue of the *New York Times*.

The Tupamaros released Bardesio unharmed on May 16, after holding him captive for eighty-six days. Perhaps these eighty-six days of captivity afforded Bardesio the opportunity to reflect on his past actions and perhaps he underwent a political change of heart as a result of such reflection, for immediately after his release, Bardesio freely contacted two Uruguayan Senators.

The two Senators were greatly shocked and deeply saddened upon hearing Bardesio relate his past experiences with the Death Squad and of his working connections with the C.I.A. and other foreign agencies. Bardesio also furnished the two Senators with a name listing of very high-ranking Uruguayan government officials connected with the Death Squad and the C.I.A.

After the two Senators had obtained guarantees for his life from high-ranking military and government officials, both Senators accompanied Bardesio to a military installation where he surrendered himself to military authorities.

He was later turned over to police officials by military authorities and placed in "police protection." Since this transfer to "protection," he has not been heard from and his whereabouts remains a mystery.

It is best to end this chapter with two statements issued by the Tupamaros that sum up the fraud-elections, the

MLN response to those elections, and how the Tupamaros will deal with elected officials who resort to such measures as the creation of a Death Squad to cover their own crimes.

The first statement was issued via Geoffrey Jackson, British Ambassador to Uruguay, after he was released unharmed by the Tupamaros on September 8, 1971, after spending eight months and one day in the People's Jail. The statement read:

A year ago, we Tupamaros began a battle in behalf of political prisoners. We wanted the least painful battle that was possible. That is why we offered to exchange several personages with a record of shady activities and representatives of despotic regimes for our imprisoned comrades.

The government, while engaging in secret negotiations with us without reaching an agreement, assumed a hypocritically tough public attitude expressed in the words "I will never negotiate with criminals."

Thus the battle for political prisoners began a year ago with its consequent bloodshed and times of anguish for the nation.

Why?

Today, a year later, we can say with true satisfaction that we have won that battle in the field chosen by the Government.

Almarati regained his freedom and so did Bidegain. Then 38 women comrades and now 111 more social fighters and sons of the people have rejoined the most active ranks of the struggle.

Many were the sacrifices demanded by victory in this battle — hundreds, thousands of Tupamaros took part in one way or another.

The gauntlet the Government threw in our faces when it said it wouldn't negotiate was taken up in the only manner befitting an indomitable people. "There will be a homeland for all or there will not be a homeland for anybody" was our reply.

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We have lived up to that watchword which we inherited from our past: the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) is an organization of the people and the people of Uruguay cannot be kicked around.

Because of these circumstances, we decided to free Mr. Jackson. The battle having been won, there was no reason to hold him any longer in the People's Jail. We released him in an act of people's sovereignty notwithstanding the fact that we had begun negotiations aimed at his liberation — negotiations which had been prompted by the concern made public by Salvador Allende, the President of Chile, and which were highly advantageous to us.

We also want to point out — so there will remain no shadow of a doubt — that our decision ties in with other circumstances and reasons, to wit:

1. We won a battle in behalf of political prisoners, but we have not won the war. Many Uruguayans are still held in jails and garrisons. Our struggle will continue. As long as a single one remains in prison, we will fight for his freedom in all fields. We call on all people's organizations not to relent in this urgent and unshirkable fight.

2. With this position we are reaffirming our aim of avoiding fruitless sufferings. In this connection it is worth rememberirg that lately we have been made the direct or indirect victims of a series of attacks and lies:

We were blamed for the death of agent Kaulaskas, which was demonstrated to be a falsehood.

We were blamed for the death of two members of the Republican Guard at Pedro Visca Hospital, which is also false.

We are being accused of trying to prevent, through our action, the November elections, which is also false.

At the same time, Ramos Filippini, Nieto and Sposito were murdered in cold blood. Castagnetto and Ayala were kidnapped.

Attacks, threats and attempted assassinations are being committed against persons and places of the people.

As is well known, these acts are being committed by the JUP and police elements of the Information and Intelligence departments (headed by Lucas, Macchi, and Castiglioni) and the Metropolitan Guard, all instigated and financed by the Government.

The idea is to frighten the people and thus create a climate favorable for another swindle. Therefore, it is they who are responsible for the most cruel and wanton violence; it is they who want to prevent a more or less formal electoral process.

3. It is necessary for us to insist on our position with regard to the elections: we do not believe they will offer the solution to the nation's problems. Nonetheless, we believe the elections should be held, but with guarantees, which are nonexistent today. This is because an electoral process with political prisoners, press censorship, closed-down newspapers, systematic persecution of popular militants, without individual rights and guarantees, with rampant repression in the streets and right-wing violence instigated from above would be a monstrous swindle which is already being prepared.

The people, united in the anti-oligarchic coalition of the Broad Front, have taken up the banner of the fight for the re-establishment of rights and guarantees. The period of time over which this fight is to be waged is indefinite. Our support of the Broad Front includes a positive attitude regarding the elections. Consequently, we are not guilty of conspiring to vitiate or make void the elections. Those who maintain the state of siege, who hold that their voice and their reason are the only valid ones, who club, torture, kill, close down newspapers and organize repression squads are the only ones who are conspiring against the elections.

4. The oligarchy, using the repressive apparatus and

the press that was not closed down, organize the squads that kidnap the families of prisoners, murder students, torture and throw bombs against social militants and locals of the Broad Front.

We have abstained fom replying to these stupid provocations in an attempt to keep the climate of this period from worsening further.

But there is a limit to this. These murders cannot continue indefinitely. If this path is pursued, our answer, which they know we can give, will be a telling one. We will hit with the full power of the people against all those who are responsible and whose names and addresses we have; the oligarch who institutes this policy from the government post or behind the scenes, the hack writer who is collaborating in the campaign of slander and lies, the police bosses who organize and head repressive squads, the members of the DAN and the FLYs, new names for new squadrons made up of old police agents trained by Mitrione's successors. We are telling them in plain words: If they continue this path our reply will be implacable. They should bear this in mind. We never indulge in idle threats. For the freedom of all political prisoners.

There will be a homeland for all or there will not be a homeland for anybody.

We are sending this political statement via Mr. Jackson, who is being freed today by the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros).

Montevideo, September 8, 1971.

The second statement, "Proclamation of Paysandu," was issued by the Tupamaros announcing the end of the ceasefire initiated before the November 28th elections. The proclamation stated:

During the night of December 30, the column "Leandro Gomez" of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) simultaneously occupied the military airport of

Paysandu, disarming the guard and taking three M-2 rifles, ammunition, and three radio transmitters; a radio beacon located one and one-half miles from the airport, expropriating two radio transmitters; a limestone quarry located in the vicinity of the Uruguay river and its town, taking one hundred pounds of gelatine explosives of the "Delfo" type, eighty detonators and powder, after having disarmed the police guard from whom a battery operated radio transmitter was obtained, and the police station of Constancia located six miles from Paysandu in the vicinity of Las Cuchillas de Quebracho.

It's been one hundred years since other rebels have fought in this area. One hundred years ago, the same untamed Oriental [as the people living in the eastern part of Uruguay are called] rebels passed through these hills. Then it was Timoteo Aparicio and the legendary lieutenant of Rivera, Anacleto Medina, who united the creole armies of lancers to oppose the regular troops of the agents who didn't wish to integrate with imperial Brazil.

One hundred years have passed. For the poor of the country little has changed. In the worker compounds and ghettos (belts of misery) the cold passes through the walls and the children have to sleep huddled together with the dogs to protect themselves. Children die of diarrhoea in the filth of their homes and on the plantations. And those that survive the misery of childhood acquire rickets from lack of milk, sweets, and fruit. They thus become youths with bad teeth and frail health, eating bad food and with no medical care. Those who arrive at a hospital can't get beds or remedies and often they can't even get medical supplies. There is little work. Not in the city, not in the country, and what little there is almost always pays badly. But worse, when the worker, in rebellion, reclaims a bit more, the answer is a beating, torture, jail, or shooting.

It hasn't changed much for the rich of the country either.

They are the owners of the farms, cattle ranches, factories, banks; they have comfortable homes, the best doctors, villas on the beach; for them there's never a scarcity of meat. Their children grow up healthy and clean. They have good teachers, good doctors, and in their private hospitals there is always a bed and a remedy. They are the owners of the country. And they are ministers in the government, administering for themselves, so that everything remains the same, the rich rich and the poor poor.

There are exceptions. Pacheco became president, ascending from a modest second-rate journalist, and after a short time in office built his wife a ten million peso house.

It was these people who manipulated the elections so that their deputies would win. It was these who passionately supported Juan Maria Bordaberry. It was these who made more votes than voters appear in the ballot boxes, and nobody can be sure that in this election the dead didn't vote.

These are the ones who quoted the proverb: "The law is like a knife; it doesn't harm those who wield it." When a rich man robs, speculates, commits fraud, the law doesn't touch him. If the scandal becomes too big, he makes a trip to Europe and nothing happens here. But when a starving man from the ghetto robs to eat, something happens. First he is beaten and then thrown into jail. And if he remains very brave, they assassinate him as they assassinated "Cheuco" Maciel. A cattle baron can illegally send his herds to the Brazilian slaughter houses, leaving the population without meat, and the country without foreign exchange. He can become a minister at any moment. Or president. But a man of the people that steals a sheep in Vichadero [a small rural village] to feed his starving children gets three years in jail. This truth doesn't reach them; they are not offended by their own laws.

And when the people rebel against this injustice, repression follows: the metropolitan guard, the police departments, the JUP [Standing Uruguayan Youth, a fascist group], the squadron. And now the army has gone into the street. This army now uses torture, as in the 9th Horses, where they butted cigarettes on the chest of a 17-year-old student, walking over him, crushing his testicles. And demonstrating their lowness, in the same regiment, filthily handled a detained woman.

The people have been humbled by hunger, unemployment, with the fraudulent elections, with jail and exile, with torture and death.

But the offended and humiliated people are responding, as those that responded long ago by rising up in Las Cuchillas [a range of hills] against injustice. We are living days like those described by Aparicio Saravia in a letter from Caraguate: "This is the moment of action, that overcomes all sterile controversy and marches men to battle and sacrifice."

For these reasons we are today putting an end to the cease-fire that we unilaterally initiated before the elections. Once more we clearly state our disposition to exhaust all opportunities to bring peace to the country. We also clearly state that this method is reapplied because the government doesn't give or wish another.

And we clearly place on these men the responsibility for having unleashed this civil war.

And this war is arriving because the poor have nothing more to lose in this battle but their long hunger, and you, the rich always, will sleep restlessly, because we shall enter your mansions and your stores and your strong boxes. You have slapped the people on both cheeks. Now the humble rise up with arms; and be careful because we are many. We are many, we are all. And we wish to have a homeland.

There will be a homeland for all or there will not be a homeland for anybody.

National Liberation Movement
(Tupamaros)
Column "Leandro Gomez"

XII.

THIRTY QUESTIONS TO A TUPAMARO

One of the greatest powers enjoyed by a political body in power is that of control of the press. In reality, press control is a direct form of thought control. This practice of thought control cannot affect a guerrilla directly, for she or he has already broken these controls against free independent thought. Press censorship can affect the movement indirectly, however, by preventing the guerrillas from revealing "their side of the story" to the masses. When press censorship is in force, the best the masses can expect from government news accounts is a biased report or no report at all.

This places the movement in a position of disadvantage in telling "their side of the story." The only means available for them to do so is a sympathetic press which can be, and usually is, closed down, or in the form of direct communiques which often leave much unsaid, or need clarification. Obviously, the problem of delivering the message of the communiques from the guerrillas to the masses exists. Still another avenue open between the guerrillas and the masses is that of third-party accounts. Security makes direct interviews rare, so usually third-party accounts have problems of reliability as their input is mostly based on hearsay. The government is also quick to introduce agent provocateurs with completely false information said to be from guerrilla sources, so more often than not, third-party accounts may be somewhat, if not entirely, unreliable. Even after an intensive investigation, the most well-meaning, experienced, and neutral reporter may fall victim to the trap of basing reports from biased government information on the one hand or conclusive opinions based from sketchy reports on the other hand.

Seldom is the guerrilla movement afforded the opportunity of direct communication with the masses. The following are questions and answers taken directly from conversations with the Tupamaros.

What has been the fundamental principle upon which the activity of your organization has been based up to now?

The principle that revolutionary action in itself, the very act of taking up arms, of making preparations, of gathering munitions, of initiating activities which violate bourgeois legality, generates consciousness, organization and revolutionary conditions.

What is the fundamental difference between your organization and other organizations of the Left?

The majority of the latter appear to trust more in manifestos, in emissions of theories about revolution, to prepare militants and revolutionary conditions, without understanding that fundamentally it is revolutionary actions that precipitate revolutionary situations.

Can you give me an historical example illustrating how this principle — that revolutionary action generates consciousness, organization and revolutionary conditions — functions?

Cuba is an example. In place of a long process of formation of the Party of the masses, a guerrilla foco installs itself with a dozen or so men and this generates consciousness, organization and revolutionary conditions which culminate in a truly socialist revolution. In the face of a consummated revolutionary feat, all authentic revolutionaries are obliged to fall in behind.

Does this mean that once the revolutionary action has been launched, the famous unity of the Left can ensue in the struggle?

Yes. The forces which call themselves revolutionary must opt between supporting or disappearing. In Cuba, the Popular Socialist Party opted to support the struggle which it had neither initiated nor directed, and it survived. But Prio Socarras, who called himself the principal opposition to Batista, didn't support the struggle and he disappeared.

This is with respect to the Left. And with respect to the people in general?

For the people — there is a contradiction between them and the injustices of the system — the choice is much easier. The people want change and must choose between the improbable and remote change which some offer them through proclamations, manifestos or parliamentary action, and the direct road encarnated by the armed group and its revolutionary action.

Do you mean to say that armed struggle, at the same time that it is undermining the bourgeois power, can be creating the mass movement that an insurrectional organization needs in order to make the revolution?

Yes. Without taking into consideration the lost effort in building a party or mass movement before launching the armed struggle, one must recognize that armed struggle hastens and precipitates the mass movement. Cuba isn't the only example; in China, too, the Party of the masses was built in the course of the armed struggle. This means that the rigid formula of certain theoreticians "first create the Party, then launch the Revolution," historically has known more exceptions than applications. At this stage of history, no one can deny that an armed group, however small, has greater possibilities of success in converting itself into a great popular army than a group which limits itself to emitting "revolutionary positions."

Nevertheless, a revolutionary movement needs platforms, documents and such.

Of course. But the issue must not be confused. The revolution is not made only by polishing platforms and programs. The basic principles of a socialist revolution have been given and experienced in countries like Cuba, and that's that. It is sufficient to adhere to those principles, and through action, point out the road to insurrection in order to fulfill these principles.

Do you think that a revolutionary movement should prepare itself for armed struggle in any stage, even when the conditions for armed struggle are not given?

Yes, for at least two reasons. Because a revolutionary movement of the Left can be attacked at any level of its development and it must be prepared to defend its existence — remember Argentina and Brazil. And because if the mentality of the combatant isn't inculcated into each militant from the beginning, we will go along elaborating other things; just a movement which supports the revolution made by others, for example, but not a movement revolutionary in itself.

Could this be interpreted as looking down on all other activity, except that of preparing for combat?

No. The mass work of the people toward revolutionary positions is also important. But the militant — including the one involved in mass work — must be thoroughly aware that when the day comes that armed struggle breaks out, he can't sit at home waiting for the outcome. He should prepare himself accordingly, even though his present task as a militant is on another front. This, moreover, gives authority, authenticity, sincerity, and seriousness to his present revolutionary activities.

What are the concrete tasks, in relation to the mass movement, of a militant belonging to your organization?

If it is a militant in a labor union or a popular organization, he or she should try to create a unit, whether it is a small group or the whole union, which can organize support for the actions of the armed sector and prepare for entry into this sector. Theoretical formation and practice, recruitment — these are the principle concrete tasks in this area. Moreover, propaganda for armed struggle. And, whenever possible, to push the union towards more radical struggles and towards more definitive stages of the class struggle.

What are the fundamental objectives in general of the movement at this stage?

To have an armed group, as well prepared and equipped as possible, tested in action.

To have good relations with all popular movements who support the class struggle.

To create propaganda organs designed to radicalize the struggle and create consciousness.

To have an efficient apparatus for selection and screening of militants with possibilities for theoretical formation, and groups inside the mass movement which perform the above-mentioned functions.

The importance which the movement gives to preparation for armed struggle — does this imply that the combatant cannot depend on improvisation at the moment of combat?

Armed struggle is a technical activity which requires technical knowledge, training, practice, materials, and the psychology of a combatant. Improvisation in this terrain can be paid for very dearly in lives and in failures. The spontaneity favored by those who speak vaguely of "The Revolution which the people will make" or "the masses," is either a delay tactic, or is abandoning to improvisation the culminating stage of the class struggle. All vanguard movements, in order to preserve their vanguard character at the culmination of the struggle, must intervene and must have the technical know-how to channel the popular violence against the oppression in such a way that the objective is achieved with the minimum sacrifices possible.

Do you think that the parties of the Left can accomplish this preparation for armed struggle by maintaining a small shock force or self-defense group?

No party can fulfill the revolutionary principles it enunciates without seriously facing up to this preparation at all levels of the party. There is no other way to achieve the maximum possible efficiency for confronting the reaction at each stage. The lack of this efficiency can result in fatal negligence (remember Brazil and Argentina) or the loss of a revolutionary opportunity.

If they fail to focus on their specific objectives, the small armed party groups can wind up transformed into a sad morass of political intrigue and manipulation. A miserable example to be remembered in this sense are the events of the demonstration on the last first of May: armed groups reduced to the task of protecting the distribution of a manifesto against the attacks of other leftist groups, and armed groups reduced to impeding the repartition of manifestos by other groups.

What do you see as the things which the militants of armed groups attached to a party should be able to demand from their respective leaderships?

That their action be directed only against the class enemy, against the bougeois system and its agents. No armed unit can fulfill its specific aim if its direction does not fulfill at least these minimum requirements:

1. To be consistent and to demonstrate in action its unfaltering adhesion to the principle of armed struggle, giving it the importance and the material means necessary for its preparation.
2. To offer the necessary conditions of security and discretion for those militants who carry out illegal tasks.
3. By its correct line and breadth of approach, to have the possibility — as immediate as possible — of moving into the leadership of the proletarian masses.

Don't you think that an armed group should be tied to a political party?

I think that any armed group should form part of a mass political movement or organization at a certain stage of the revolutionary process, and if such a movement or organization does not exist, should contribute to its creation. This does not mean, given the present panorama of the Left, that such a group must link itself to one of the existing political organizations, or that it should start a new one. That would just be perpetuating the mosaic or adding to it. We must combat the petty idea, currently in vogue, of The Party — that identified with a head office, meetings, a newspaper, and positions on everything around it. We must combat the absurdity of hoping that somehow all the other parties of the Left will be buried under the avalanche of their own verbal outpourings, and that their bases of support and the people in general will one day flock to one's own party. This is what we've had for sixty years in Uruguay, and the results are plain to see. It must be recognized that there are genuine revolutionaries in all the parties of the Left, and many more who are not organized. A task for the Left in general is to take these elements and groups wherever they are to be found and unite them, so that one day sectarianism will be a thing of the past. This is something which does not depend on us. But the Revolution can't be detained while it waits for this to happen. Each revolutionary and each revolutionary group has one sole task: to prepare themselves to make the Revolution. As Fidel said in one of his last speeches, ". . . with or without a Party. The Revolution can't wait."

Can you give me the details of the strategy for seizing power in Uruguay?

No, I can't give you a detailed strategy. On the other hand, I can give you some outline of the general strategy, which would be subject to modifications according to changes in the situation. That is to say, a general strategical outline, valid for the day, month and year when it is enunciated.

Why can't you give me a detailed definitive strategy?

Because a strategy is developed on the basis of real happenings and the reality changes, independent of our will. To illustrate with an example — a strategy based on the reality of a strong and well-organized trade union movement is not the same thing as a strategy based on the reality that this movement has been dissipated.

On what concrete realities does your organization base its general strategical lines at this time?

To cite only a few of the most important:

The conviction that the crisis, far from resolving itself, is growing more profound day by day. The country is falling to pieces and a capitalist plan of development to increase production of exportable goods, assuming it were possible to implement, would only achieve minimal improvement and that only after some years' time. This means that for a number of years still the people will have to continue to tighten their belts. And with foreign debts totalling $500,000,000, it is not likely that any great quantity of foreign credit will be extended to make it possible for the sectors which have lost their median standard of living to regain it. This is a basic concrete fact: There will be economic hard times and popular discontent in the years ahead.

A second fact basic to a strategy is the high level of trade unionism of Uruguayan workers. Even if not all unions have a high degree of militancy — whether due to their composition or to their leadership — the sole fact that nearly all the fundamental services of the state, banking, industry and commerce are organized, in itself constitutes a very positive factor, something without comparison in the rest of America. The possibility of paralyzing the services of the state has created and can create very interesting opportunities from the point of view of insurrection because, to give an example, it is not the same to attack a state which is in full command of all its forces, as it is to attack a state semi-paralyzed by strikes.

Another factor to take into account — this one negative — is the geographical factor. We do not have impregnable zones within our territory suitable for installing a guerrilla foco which could endure a long while, although we do have some places in the country which present difficult access. On the other hand, we have a large city with more than 300 square kilometers of buildings, which permits the development of urban struggle. This means that we cannot copy the strategy of those countries which, due to their geographic conditions, can install a guerrilla foco in the mountains, sierras or jungles with possibilities of becoming stable. On the contrary, we must elaborate an indigenous strategy, which meets the needs of a reality different from that of most American countries.

Moreover, in any strategical study, we must always take into account the forces of repression. Our armed forces, consisting of 12,000 men rather precariously armed and trained, constitutes one of the weakest repressive forces in America.

Another important strategic factor is that of our powerful neighbors and the United States, always potentially disposed to intervene against any revolution on the continent.

And, finally, a fundamental strategical factor is the degree of preparation of the armed revolutionary group.

In what way are the factors of crisis and popular discontent taken into account in the determination of strategy?

In the objective and subjective conditions for the revolution. It is fundamental that the majority of the population, although perhaps not ready to launch the insurrection, is neither ready, on the other hand, to kill for a regime which oppresses it. This, among other things, reduces the strategical calculations of the enemy's strength down to practically no more than the organized Armed Forces, and makes possible a favorable climate for the first measures of a revolutionary government.

And with respect to the repressive forces?

They should be evaluated, taking into account their degree of preparation throughout the country. In the interior there is a military unit (composed of 200 men) approximately every 10,000 square kilometers, and a police post approximately every 1,100 square kilometers. The Armed Forces are supposed to cover all objectives which might be attacked by an insurrectional movement 12,000 men in the Armed Forces and 22,000 police, of which half of the former and 6,000 of the latter are concentrated in the capital. Within the police force itself, only about 1,000 have been trained and armed for actual military combat.

Could the possibility of foreign intervention be reason enough to postpone all armed struggle in Uruguay?

If that was the case, Cuba would never have made its revolution 90 miles from the United States, nor would there be guerrillas in Bolivia, a country sharing borders with Brazil and Argentina, like us. Foreign intervention could constitute an immediate military reverse, but a political advance which would, in time, develop into a military advance. Imagine the city of Montevideo occupied by foreign troops, with all the consequent insult to the national sentiment, inconvenience to the population, and on the other hand, facing this situation, an armed revolutionary group with good bases in the city. You get a fairly complete picture of the political and military significance of the dreaded foreign intervention.

Moreover, in any case, our strategy is part of a continental strategy to "create many Vietnams," and those who intervene will have a big job handling such varied and diffuse fronts.

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How does the high level of trade unionism figure in the determination of a revolutionary strategy?

The unions, though without the present limitations, have involved and can involve the majority of the worker population in a frontal battle against the government, which has often resulted in the government calling out the Armed Forces. With the existence of an armed revolutionary group capable of carrying the class struggle to higher levels, we can wage a struggle under better conditions — with the support of a large part of the population, and against a state whose fundamental services are in a state of deterioration.

Is our geography completely adverse to struggle in the countryside?

Not strictly so. We do not have impregnable areas like other countries, but there do exist certain occasional natural retreats which could provide transitory refuge to an armed group. The latifundio is a great ally. In the latifundio zones, in other words, in two-thirds of the area of the country, the population density drops to 0.6 inhabitants per square kilometer and this facilitates the clandestine displacement of an armed contingent. Compare this with the general average in Cuba where there were more than 20 inhabitants per square kilometer, and compare it with the farming region in our country, around Canelones and south of San José, where the density is about like Cuba.

At the same time, the cattle latifundio resolves the difficult problem of food which in other places requires a chain of supplies which can only be achieved with a large measure of complicity on the part of the population.

On the other hand, the shocking living conditions of the rural workers, some of whom are already organized into unions, has created a spontaneously rebel sector which can be very useful in the rural struggle. If our countryside does not serve to install a permanent foco, at least it can serve as a means to disperse the repressive forces.

And for urban struggle, are the conditions suitable?

Montevideo is a city sufficiently large and polarized by social struggle to provide cover to a vast commando contingent. It presents a much larger framework to work within than other revolutionary movements have had for urban struggle. Of course, any organization which hopes to endure in urban struggle should patiently construct its material bases and the wide support movement and cover which an armed contingent needs to operate and survive in the city.

How would you weigh the existence of a well-prepared armed group in an overall strategical plan?

If there is no fairly well prepared group, then revolutionary opportunities are simply not taken advantage of or capitalized upon for the Revolution. Then we get things like the "bogotazo."

The armed group lends efficiency and cohesion to the struggle, and guides it toward its goal. Moreover, the armed group can contribute to the creation of a revolutionary opportunity — or, in the words of Raul Castro, it can be the small motor which starts up the big motor of the Revolution. The armed group creates or helps create the subjective conditions for the revolution, from the very moment that it begins to prepare itself, but above all, from the moment it begins to act.

What are the general lines of the strategy at the present time?

To create an armed forces as quickly as possible which is capable of taking advantage of whatever favorable opportunity may arise from the crisis or other factors. To make the population aware, through armed actions and other means, that without revolution there will be no change. To strengthen the unions and radicalize their struggles, and tie them to the revolutionary movement.

To lay the material bases for developing the urban struggle and the rural struggle.

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To make ties with other revolutionary movements in Latin America for the sake of the struggle at the continental level.

This is the plan for your organization exclusively?

No. It is for all genuinely revolutionary organizations and for all individuals who really aspire to be revolutionary.

Do you think that all these tasks are equally revolutionary?

Yes. Some people think that only when we are in training for combat or when we enter into action are we performing a revolutionary task, but in reality all tasks which contribute to a strategical plan are equally revolutionary.

Can you give me an example illustrating this?

The person who gets hold of necessary materials for a base of operations, the one who raises funds, loans his car or his house, is risking himself just as much and sometimes more than a militant of the armed group. It should be recognized that the majority of revolutionaries have spent the greater part of their time in these small practical activities without which there would be no revolution.

Does this mean that our daily efforts open the way to new strategical possibilities?

Yes. A strategy for a revolution depends partly on conditions which we can create by orienting our efforts towards a plan for the seizure of power, while not losing sight of the conditions laid down by the existing reality.

XIII.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TUPAMAROS

In these conversations the MLN points out the path of development in Uruguay of an indestructible revolutionary force at war for the creation of a realistic alternative of power capable of disputing the power of the oligarchy. That alternative will be the return of power to the ones that it was stolen from: the people.

This conversation also includes a detailed analysis of the tactical lines of the Tupamaros during the past year, which were fundamentally the implantation of a "parallel power" through the "People's Jail," the exercising of revolutionary justice and other methods for the benefit of the people.

What is the analysis of the National Liberation Movement of the electoral process which took place last November and the assumption of presidential power by Juan Maria Bordaberry?

We think that an important majority were disappointed by the elections. And we think like that because, first of all, this majority massively voted against Pacheco Areco's policy and the continuation which Bordaberry represents. They voted for a change in the country.

There are many reasons why the people voted this way, why they voted against that policy and for a change. The people who voted like this were the more liberal sectors of the "Colorado Party" (a small group because a very clear polarization took place within the party), the overwhelming majority of the "National Party" and the "Broad Front."

Due to the election laws, a paradoxical situation occurred: although he had a clear majority, Wilson Ferreira Aldunate was not elected president, and Bordaberry, who scarcely obtained 20 per cent of the votes, was. We should add that this candidate took the presidency amidst a very doubtful electoral process in which some methods were used that gave guarantees to the traditional opposition, both during the pre-electoral campaign and during the scrutinizing of the votes.

Before the final results were in, it was apparent that Bordaberry represented to the people just those things repudiated by the majority. Although he didn't commit himself to the "Pachequismo" line and although it was obvious that he attempted to start a new line from the political group which had supported him, the fundamental patterns of his policy were very similar to the preceding ones. The economic trends (confirmed by the first governmental measures) didn't contain relevant differences in relationship to the former economic trends in the country: to guarantee before the International Monetary Fund the payment of the external debt under the former conditions, i.e., on the basis of not attacking the causes of the crisis and unloading the results of this crisis on the more economically deprived sectors. The government looked on the Brazilian regime as a possible model of economic development and, as a consequence, defined the main areas of interest of its policies by attacks on the school system and the church, pointing out their so-called "sedition" as the main enemy.

Is it because of this situation that the Tupamaros decided to once again start armed actions?

On December 30, after taking over four areas around Paysandu, we published the "Paysandu Proclamation." We realized first of all that the oligarchy was not so easily defeated and that, in the electoral field, they could still play freely. Nevertheless, many interesting things were going on. For the first time in many years an election process, regarded as a means of expressing the people's will, was being questioned.

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We saw the presence of Ferreira Aldunate as an important political fact: the appearance of a leader within the National Party who represented a resurgence of an old nationalist and anti-imperialist trend along with a fairly radical youth movement. It had been a long time since we had heard a "blanco" speaking about the problems of the Uruguayan people, stating that rebellion was not the outcome of any strange influence but the consequence of economic, political, and social factors. Although those statements didn't mean any commitment, there was, however, a commitment in the sense of choosing a political way out for that party.

The internal contradictions within the National Party also appeared: at the first sign of Bordaberry's collaborationist policy, there was a resurgence of the minority sector within the party, while the majority sector — thinking over the long term — defined an opposition to Bordaberry that we clearly saw in the general assembly of the Legislature on March 9, when they asked for the lifting of the security measures.

So we could see that an important majority of the people voted for a change and were disappointd. Facing this, our organization has the duty of enhancing the armed struggle as the only way out for the problems of the country.

Would you recall what 1971 meant for the movement?

Perhaps we should start a little further back, in August, 1970. This is necessary to explain our tactical outlines for the last year. As you know, at that time a large group of comrades was captured. This was for the government a tactical victory, but it turned out to be a strategical defeat because they thought that by having in jail comrades who had high positions of responsibility, they had swept us away. But they soon realized that our organization recovered and, a few months later, had achieved an operational capacity similar to the former one. Deeds which pointed this out at that time were, for instance, the expropriation at the loan bank where the organization showed a high technical level and the kidnapping of the English Ambassador Jackson, where the organization showed a high military level. After this, the "People's Jail" started to act as a central political element. By then, the People's Jail was as important as it was in 1967 in keeping our underground comrades free. That is to say, after the setbacks of August, 1970, the fundamental political policy of the organization to defend the organization was the keeping of prisoners; this was the element of main contradiction, that fundamentally implied, from a political point of view, a power equal to the regime.

At this time, a new trend in the methods of repression began to start. For a long time there were, in the repressive system, two different levels of influence, two trends of interpretation of our organization. One of them upheld the idea of repression by means of the traditional mechanisms, the other one thought that our organization had overcome the initial steps of every guerrilla organization and that it was an indestructible force on the purely military level. This last trend seems to dominate today; it strives for the political isolation of the organization so as to prevent it from growing and developing.

Then, with the massive escapes from the women's jail and Punta Carretas particularly on International Women's Day, the oligarchy was forced to use a strategical reserve which was always waved as a threatening flag: the Armed Forces.

The use of the Army as a part of the repression modifies the conditions of struggle because it doesn't have the same effect that the repression by the police has.

How do you face this new enemy, the Armed Forces?

We think that the best way to confront this new enemy is by disputing the fundamental task of the Army: the control of the national territory. Many actions were carried out, largely unknown because of the information blockade. After the actions in Paysandu (where an airport, a broadcasting station, a quarry, and a police garrison were occupied), many expropriations of weapons were carried out throughout the country and another broadcasting station was taken over in Minas.

The features of this stage are the occupation of territory and the spreading of our forces throughout the country.

And what is the reaction of the government?

The government is trying to create political movements against us in order to isolate us; it uses the Death Squadron, increases the information blockade about our activities and resorts to tortures, chiefly in the countryside.

We see a very particular political game: on the one hand, the repressive forces, the government and the more reactionary political sectors attempt to identify the Broad Front with our organization; and on the other hand, the attempt to isolate us by slogans such as "freedom for everyone but the unmentionables," along with the most rigid repressive measures. Actually this is just fictitious because behind the repressive plans like the "National Security Law," there is the aim of repressing all types of opposition in the country.

The informational blockade also aims at isolating us. The official releases of the "Combined Forces" that control all the information on behalf of the executive power, often lie, or just successfully hide actions by our organization.

This is not surprising because during the first three months of 1972, w carried out over 60 actions, on some days two or three simultaneously, but nothing was reported about these actions. So they try to create the false idea that their struggle is successful. According to their releases, all actions are victories for them and defeats for us.

Lastly, the tortures appear again. Torture is an old acquaintance of the organization. It is a classical, traditional method for obtaining information and is a fundamental element used in combatting us.

Governmental agents have tortured to some extent in Montevideo, but a great deal in the countryside. This is not only because of a geographical situation but also because the government has a favorable political and military situation in the countryside.

We are going to attempt to neutralize the use of torture or to reduce it to a minimum because it is very difficult to suppress it. And we think that things will reach a very sharp point at which they will try the systematic use of torture, even if this means facing political discredit. These are the risks which revolutionaries undertake.

How do they use the Death Squadron?

The Death Squadron is an instrument of a fundamentally political nature: it places the government of the state beyond good and evil, allowing the struggle to appear as a war between "extremists" of the right and left. The Death Squadron tries to prove that a given methodology can be used with impunity and attempts to frighten the left. Hence, the attacks against the Broad Front are aimed at preventing its members from acting in a concrete militant way.

Concerning our organization, we think that the Death Squadron's actions are aimed at provoking an answer from our organization that will allow them to justify a counteranswer. This is to try and drag us into a small war, thereby disregarding the big war that is to be waged. They introduced, by means of the Death Squadron, a dirty element. For us the war was always a frank confrontation. They took advantage of the experience of other countries like Guatemala and Brazil.

Our tactics are to dodge this trap. We place the blame for every crime committed by the Death Squadron, not just on the executers, but also on those who order them: the oligarchy of the country.

Going back a bit, although you already talked about it, I would like you to review the main tactical lines of 1971 and how they were carried into practice.

There were three or four working lines for the 1971 action plan. The fundamental one was the setting up of a parallel power, by the use of revolutionary justice, whose highest expression was the People's Jail. We acted, on the other hand, not to be detached from the popular stream as represented by the Broad Front. We regarded this as very important. Lastly, on the military level, there were two major goals: a policy of systematic reprisals against the atrocities of the Metropolitan Guard and the massive escapes which had a very important military importance.

How do the Tupamaros understand the concept of "Parallel Power"?

Every revolution fulfills various stages. The first one is the building of the revolutionary organization; in the second stage, the organization gets stronger and prepares itself to operate in a rather systematic way; in the third stage, the organization should develop as a power inside another power. After that, it must be an actual alternative of power and lastly, it should take over as the main source of power. This is the outline.

There was a time at which we could regard the first steps as fulfilled. First we had set up an armed focus; afterwards, we were recognized as a political power (we were not the plain criminals the right wing press spoke about). In February, 1969, we could tell a Uruguayan magazine that we were indestructible. And this was because we had a solid basis of social support and a higher inflow of militants than casualties because we had attained a suitable degree of technical and organizational development.

After that we tried to promote the consciousness that we were a revolutionary and political organization challenging the regime. We thought that the most immediate way for setting up this idea in the popular consciousness was the building of a double power. The first step toward this goal was to look for a type of military action that showed that we were a force able to take power and to administer justice. This was the origin of the People's Jail.

What is the Tupamaro concept of the People's Jail?

It is a jail for the oligarchic forces, the enemies of the people. We tried to make clear to most people what this double power meant in the simplest way. Every time a son of the people complains, he gets thrown in jail. When a rich man robs the country, he can spend his stolen money abroad. The bourgeoisie jail and justice are not used against the rich but against poor people. This form of "justice" is no more than a form of government control over poor people.

To counter this, a People's Jail was set up. Here the people enforce their own justice by means of a revolutionary organization. This simple, but politically profound, idea lies at the basis of the institution of the People's Jail; one of the clearest expressions of parallel power in the country.

In February, 1971, you arrested Homero Farina and held him for 18 days in the People's Jail. What were the motives for that?

Our aim was to warn a certain class of newspapers that it was a part of the repressive apparatus. They encouraged the crimes of the Death Squadron by false reporting and we pointed out to them that they were as liable as were those within the semi-legal apparatus.

When we arrested Homero Farina, the editor of the ultra-right paper *Accion,* we wanted to make clear the role played by the media at that time, namely, the role of being part of the repressive forces. These repressive forces were made up of the fascists, the Death Squadron, the police, the Army, and also several organs of the mass media.

The information monopoly of the government permitted all types of lies and distortions of the ethical image of the Tupamaros. As you well know, the only releases which are allowed to be published in Uruguay are those from the government.

Of course we don't hope for the support from this kind of press, but we do ask them not to tell too many lies; we understand we cannot ask them not to lie at all because the lie is essential to bourgeois journalism.

But after Homero Farina was arrested, the press advanced to a new stage, and now it is not just part of the repressive apparatus, but also tries to prepare the conditions for a more sinister thing, the dirty actions of the Death Squadron. In *Accion,* an article was published urging these criminal actions. A few days later the Death Squadron tortured and murdered a young militant, Ibero Gutierrez Gonzales.

We warned Homero Farina three days before it occurred that a new crime was being prepared with the help of the press; we made him read the article that was published in his newspaper. When we released him, we stressed the following: we will not allow new lies about us to be published in the press, we will make the press liable for the crimes committed by the Death Squadron or any other semi-legal terrorist organization that results from or with the aid of the press.

As a mater of fact, the governmental releases shifted their character after the kidnapping of Farina. Do you believe that this was the result of your action?

It may be. But this is also because of a general change in the national political situation.

What is the role of the kidnappings in the organization's

tactics? Afterwards I would like to ask you for some specific cases.

In our struggle, kidnapping had different roles at each stage. The first ones were mostly propagandistic actions. The first arrest of Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, director of the state phone company, and that of the banker Pellegrini Giampietro were linked with the conflicts within the trade unions.

In the second stage, the arrest of foreign officers, like Brazilian consul Dias Gomide, the American technologist, Fly, the C.I.A. agent Dan Mitrione, and the English Ambassador Jackson, were done in order to obtain, by exchanges, the release of our captured comrades.

By arresting national officials, the former minister, Frick Davie, the prosecutor, Berro Oribe, the factory owners, Ferres and Berrembaum, the second arrest of Pereira Reverbel, the institution of the People's Jail develops as an expression of revolutionary justice within the main tactical lines drawn by our organization from 1971.

Why was Pereiro Reverbel arrested for the second time?

He was arrested and was in the People's Jail for over a year because of being one of the strongest representatives of the oligarchy and of the repressive and anti-popular line imposed by this oligarchy on the country since 1968.

He was jailed to pay for his specific crime, for his role as a direct repressive agent against the workers of the state phone enterprise and for his general crimes as an advisor to Pacheco Areco. He may be regarded as sharing, with Pacheco Areco, the crimes of suffering and misery that our people live with.

And what about Frick Davie, who was also in jail?

Frick Davie, a former minister to Pacheco Areco, was jailed to pay for a crime which wasn't prosecuted by bourgeois justice and which is being carried out by revolutionary justice. He was in the People's Jail mainly for his part in

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a swindle against the country by the "Financiera Monty" and the "Banco de Credito." This swindle was made apparent as a consequence of another action of our organization.

What was the reason for the arrest of the factory owner Ricardo Ferres?

He was jailed because he represents a social class that can be blamed for what is wrong in the country; a factory owner who, moreover, was not chosen at random, but because he belonged to an economic group which is in turn liable for one of the biggest swindles that the country suffered in the last 20 to 30 years.

The massive escapes were important elements of the actions of the organization in 1971. Why were they carried out and what did they mean?

There exists an unwritten law, never discussed among the Tupamaros: that the organization never forgets the people in jail. When one is on the streets he doesn't forget the comrades who are in jail and when one is in jail, he knows that the comrades outside haven't forgotten him.

The massive escapes, "Operation Start," the escape of 38 women from the women's jail in July, 1971, and "Operation El Abuso," the evasion of over 100 comrades in September, 1971, meant two or three things: an objective triumph; perhaps one of the most important, the return to the struggle of a large number of comrades with a rich experience and of having passed the test of being in jail; and also it was the highest expression of solidarity by the organization towards its militants.

The organization has carried out many actions but from an internal point of view, as well as from the propagandist one, not many actions overshadow the escapes. Whenever they are carried out, they are most welcome.

1971 was an election year for Uruguay. For a political-military organization it is not a small challenge to face an *electoral process which, like it or not, gathered the popular forces. How did the Tupamaros solve this dilemma and within the framework of what solution did they declare a unilateral truce during elections?*

Elections were an objective fact to be analyzed in a realistic way. We decided to give our critical support to the Broad Front and declare a unilateral truce. There were several reasons for this. The fundamental one was that the organization, by means of the series of arrests, the growing strength of the People's Jail, the massive escapes, the creation of a parallel power, had some influence in the political field. This happened for the first time in the organization's history.

The tactical shift was singled out by the release of British Ambassador Jackson. We won the battle through the escape of our jailed comrades, so we decided to release one of the diplomats.

The secondary element was that our organization didn't have the need or possibilities of opposing the popular interest in the elections. The truce was declared so as not to have a policy that would be against the popular will at the time. Nevertheless, we held that we didn't trust in the electionary process to solve our people's problems.

These tactics of our organization were also influenced by the very existence of the Broad Front, a trend which, at the legal level, was a method of expression for the people's dissatisfaction.

What is the fundamental tactical line proposed by the organization for 1972 and beyond?

It is difficult to give concrete details as these are to be developed but we have established the guidelines toward the objectives we have. We are departing from an evaluation of the process of deterioration which the country is suffering (economically, politically, and socially), and from the more active traits the organization is achieving as a dynamizing element in the process. This is so to such an extent that we cannot just act for today but also for tomorrow as we are pushed forward by the social sectors who expect concrete things from us.

What we are analyzing is the best way of using our resources, departing from the assumption that the tactically valid resources for one period are not necessarily valid or efficient for another. For instance, if we make armed propaganda for an aim, a point is reached at which we should conquer this goal. We cannot continue with the same propaganda because we would assume the risk of becoming propagandists. This danger exists with armed propaganda and with all types of tactical lines, an assimilation by the regime of our actions.

We cannot forget the following point of view: the basic element which makes the people conscious is not the declarations or sympathetic actions. The basic element is the objective questioning of the regime made at each stage of the struggle. At this time, the tactical development of 1971 is practically unsuitable as a basic line for our organization. Of course there are lines which will continue to be held: armed propaganda, revolutionary justice, and the People's Jail; but they will not be the basic lines of 1972, only complementary ones to the new methods of action.

For the last 10 years, but especially since 1968, we have waged a struggle in order to win wider and wider sectors of the population and, to a large extent, we have that support; including important social groups.

We now have to rise above this political level, we have to transcend the goal of parallel power and develop in the country the undoubtable existence of a revolutionary force at war. We must seriously challenge the domination of the oligarchy.

The people that we now have to try and politicize are the people who need to be clearly conscious of the fact that victory is possible, that our way is workable and that we build a powerful force which can propose revolution in realistic terms.

We will establish ourselves as an alternative to the power structure.

XIV.

1972 AND BEYOND, A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION

This chapter was prepared by the Executive Secretariat of the Tupamaros as an analysis of the political situation in Uruguay. It is to serve as a basis for discussion within the movement. (One of its copies was seized by government agents who later authorized its reproduction in several government controlled newspapers.)

TOPIC 1: NEW OR SIGNIFICANT FACTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

1. a. It's clear, and doubtless to all, that Brazil has acquired the profile of a "sub-imperialistic" power in charge of protecting U.S. interests in this part of the world.
   b. It has a "development" process within the capitalist framework, employing the most severe dictatorship.
   c. The apparent total destruction of the most important revolutionary forces in Brazil is one of its objectives.
2. These facts may have many consequences for us.
   a. It generates contradictions among different countries, especially Argentina; this can be helpful to us.
   b. It is an example that the "oligarches" will try to copy.
   c. Because of its role as the gendarme, Brazil is partially intervening in our internal affairs and we must consider the possibility of a total and direct intervention if we become too dangerous.
3. We must assume an attitude of expectation towards

the political process that has begun in Argentina and that would lead to elections in the next year. It seems that the Argentine government tends toward a "nationalist" position, looking for an agreement with Peron and with other governments, because of the Brazilian position and of its own internal problems.

4. The great development reached by the Argentine revolutionary movements.

5. These last two facts raise new questions:
   a. Will there be a nationalist goverment at our borders after March, 1973?
   b. What will the Argentine revolutionary movements do to meet the development of this process?
   c. Will this apparently positive process fail? What will be the grade of convulsion to expect from such failure?

6. The positive experiences (in a general way) of Chile, Peru, and, it seems, Ecuador continue.

7. This last fact, added to the Argentina situation, reinforces one strong force at this time: nationalism. And this may encourage similar positions here in politicians as, for example, Wilson.

8. All the previous facts, plus internal (Uruguayan) reasons, lead us to the necessity of elaborating a political position about the nationalist tendencies here and abroad and to pay attention to the elaboration of our own nationalistic conception.

9. The results of the elections reinforced the "Pacheco tendency" at the popular level. On the short term, they are strengthened and this forces us to take some actions to wear away the new government at the political and social levels.

10. On the national level, at the level of the Broad Front, our positions were strengthened by the electoral

process. We now have a good deal of influence at this level. We can say that we have been reinforced in this process.

11. The new government's situation in the Parliament is a difficult one. Today's tendencies of the different groups put it in a minority position. This can be a source of conflict between the Executive and the Parliament if President Bordaberry intends to maintain Pacheco's hard line. We can see where the dissolution of Parliament may be the result.

12. This new Parliament is stronger than the old one and the popular positions that have been won in it are important. We are obliged to have a parliamentary line in order to obtain positive results for ourselves.

13. From the political process of the last three years emerge two powerful "caudillo" figures: Pacheco and Wilson. They replace "caudillo" figures that existed before within the traditional parties and that have disappeared. This fact gives new dynamics to these parties and we must pay attention to it, especially in the Wilson case.

14. The oligarchy has skillfully used nationalism against the people with results that prove its efficiency.

15. Political backwardness in the hinterland in comparison to Montevideo is a very serious thing for us.

16. All the different sectors use the "pacification" banner. It is a very important political issue and we can make intelligent use of it.

17. On the economic level we will have growing difficulties: inflation is acute and this will provoke popular discontent.

18. If the government carries on its plans for education, it will create conditions for enormous popular mobilizations.

19. Finally, two new facts:
   a. Fascism.

b. The utilization of the Armed Forces directly in the fight against us.

20. On the organizational level, the work of political direction and to utilize all the people who are within our our growth, and the different plans and struggles we have. We must avoid confusion through the making of global concrete plans that must be orientative and organizative at the same time.

21. There is a deficit in our capacity to give political direction and to utilize all the people who are within our sphere of influence.

22. The advancement reached on the political level obliges us to perfect our politics of alliances.

23. One fact of great importance for the future is that today we have serious possibilities of mass mobilizations. One example: operation Tero.

TOPIC 2. THE DANGERS AHEAD FOR US.

1. Our military action has had a highly dynamic effect. Today it becomes more and more important to create new types of situations; of making more dynamic the political process and of accelerating its definition. Today, some actions that were highly efficient pass without notice. We must note that the principal cause of this phenomenon isn't imposed by the repressive forces.

2. The principal cause of this, and its consequences, are very serious for the future: the regime, the people, the oligarchy. The entire society is getting used to our presence. This fact has different connotations: from the development of better means to fight us, to the very fact of admitting that we are an irreversible phenomenon and trying to coexist with us in the best possible way; from the passage of special repressive laws against us, along with the creation of "death squads," and the people's indifference towards our actions, that are repetitive and monotonous in their political and propaganda aims.

3. We can explain this "accustomization" in a graphic way: the movement and its action has functioned as a vaccine that has been slowly introduced into the social body of our society. In the beginning it caused convulsions, but afterward, the body has generated defenses that permit its coexistence with us; it may well become permanently immunized.

4. It wouldn't be the first time that this sort of thing has happened to a guerrilla group; we have the examples of Colombia and Venezuela. For example, in the Venezuelan situation, in an article published in a recent Marcha, T. Petkoff writes: "At the same time the armed struggle was carried on heroically the Venezuelian bourgeoisie and capitalism remained calm; the struggle didn't worry them at all." Some political leaders we've contacted lately have the same reactions.

5. These facts may have dangerous consequences at the level of the people's comprehension. Initially, our best actions caused enormous impact; but, as they are repeated, the people begin to question: until when? and if we don't give a clear answer to this question, the comprehension of our actions will be difficult. In a certain way we are now working for people with a more sophisticated level of political comprehension: the initiated.

6. It is time to put this same question to ourselves. We are 10 years old now and in this period we succeed to put into action the armed struggle as the most important methodology in this country, at the military level. During these years we've built an efficient organization, surrounded by a "territorial sea," we've checkmated the government several times, we've denounced and unmasked the real nature of the regime in various ways; in the last instance, we've awakened the people to the fight and we've succeeded in doing all of this in these years. But now, how much longer?

7. Our most important method of military action has been correct up to now, but we must be on guard against

being tied to the past: this could change a dynamic virtue into a paralyzing schema. As a product of the past, there may be danger of being so well-adjusted to certain circumstances that today we may be unable to adapt to different ones.

8. If we don't again give our military action its dynamic, polarizing virtue, if we don't create new methods, we'll sterilize ourselves; we'll permit that new deceitful doors will be opened to the people. We can't risk our avant-garde position in this movement, neither can we abandon our position as one of the poles of the country. We must clearly point out to everyone that our aim is the revolution. We can't bear anymore that each of our actions begets a false argumentation against it: when we arrest a newsman, even when we sentence a torturer to death or when we injure a policeman. Yesterday this was inevitable; today it harms the movement. We must insure that our victories and our defeats are discussed.

As Mario Heber said on March 14: "Maybe tomorrow another prisoner will ask the Hague Court to intervene, as Raul Sendic did and we'll even have the International Red Cross acting as a mediator between the Tupamaros and the government. I'd put this problem differently: I'd call the guerrilla actions seditious and not revolutionary. I don't think that the Tupamaros are more than a seditious force, certainly not a revolutionary force."

As we can see, the question is the level of the armed struggle. Even the oligarchy awaits our moves.

9. We can't maintain a "dialogue" with the government through our armed actions: to each governmental initiative, an action; to each torture, a response; to each lying editorial, a "chancho." But by only responding we can only lose. Yesterday this was our most important method; but today it doesn't work and, even worse, we are creating a special vocabulary that is impossible for the majority of

the people to understand. The time for this "dialogue" is over. It has laid the conditions for "another thing." It is time for this "another thing."

TOPIC 3.: ANTECEDENTS AND A LINE TO FOLLOW

1. According to the military thesis in Document No. 5, we define our next jump as a higher and more effective level of armed struggle, a more profound generalization of the war; to commit hostilities against and to destroy the living forces of the enemy, arrive at an augumentation of polarization, to a greater radicalization of the process and to a greater utilization of the available people and arms.

2. We've been looking for the conditions and the possibilities of "jumping" since 1970.

During 1971 we halted this advance because of the electoral process and other political circumstances; but it has always been placed within our strategic perspective.

3. Many concrete (action) plans have been made within this perspective (some to be soon applied). These plans may bcome dangerous or lose their value if we try to utilize them out of the historic and military context in which they were conceived.

4. Our aim is to commit hostilities systematically and directly against the repressive forces: this is our most important method of action, militarily and politically. We propose this perspective not as a theoretical viewpoint but as the immediate task.

We define our immediate line as follows: *We must harass directly and systematically the repressive forces as our most important method of action. We must have a concrete plan for this task.*

5. Our aims are:

Minimum: Put the country in a doubtful state of revolutionary war; to polarize the country between the movement and the oligarchy; to dynamize the process; to search

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for defining situations; to attain a jump in quality in our functioning.

Intermediate: To arrive at the stage of negotiating an immediate platform of minimal revindications. To create the National Liberation Front around the Organization. To "institutionalize" it through the Movement's negotiations.

Maximum: To cause the collapse of the government and its substitution with an indirect participation of the Organization. To obtain the reconnaissance of the Organization (amnesty) and the dissolution of the most notorious repressive organs. To put into action some measures to fulfill part of our program. To look for a situation where our struggle will affect events.

6. As we see, we must put into practice not only a military line, but also a political one to avoid being isolated or left without an exit.

7. It's indispensable to elaborate a concrete working plan, to foresee all the battlefronts and to coordinate them and to escalate, in time, the different actions. We must choose a date for our offensive.

This plan must be divided into 3 stages: Preparation, Opportunity, and Action.

8. We must abandon all the passive attitudes towards the problem of creating favorable occasions to act. Generally speaking, the objective conditions are favorable and it is our exclusive responsibility to sharpen the favorable aspects of these conditions with our actions and to create the internal conditions to permit this. This is a typical vanguard task. For example, on mass mobilizations and their radicalization: before, we could wait for their spontaneous eruption or allow direction by other political forces. But today, we must ask the question: What other political force is in a better condition than us to do this? If we don't try, who else will?

9. We can't tie down the beginning of this new stage to

the fact of having or not having more political support. Obviously the direction will be in charge of choosing the best moment to launch our offensive. We think we have already won all the support we can expect within our present line. To advance toward winning the masses it is necessary to raise the level of our actions in quality and in quantity. Before this it will be impossible to win over more people.

For us to become a real force and therefore capable of reaching and dynamizing new sectors, we must profoundly question the regime and weaken its main supporters. We must give to the people assurance of the possibilities of victory, the feasibility of our way and the only way to do this is to have serious military victories. We must not forget that there will always be a great part of the population that will be vacillating and without a clear definition.

TOPIC 4. THE CONCRETE PLAN

1. At this level we have several roads open: one of them is to advance strictly in the military area, progressivly until the jump.

Virtues: We get acquainted with the reality every day and this prepares us.

Defects: It prepares the enemy and reveals our plans.

Another way is to maintain our present line while we prepare the new offensive silently and then hit hard, with surprise and simultaneous actions.

Virtues: The advantages of surprise and of the coordination of all the available forces.

Defects: We risk the creation of a theoretical apparatus that may not respond at the right moment.

At first we were inclined to choose the second solution because the risks we assume don't compromise the development and the destiny of the struggle and it is one particular way of measuring ourselves against reality. That is, if the worst arrives (that we were not sufficiently prepared) we need only to begin again. But this is a theme for study. We must think about it and discuss it thoroughly.

2. From this perspective we have some tasks:
To elaborate a permanent and specific propaganda line for the armed forces.
To encourage the actions in the hinterland.
To elaborate an immediate platform.
To encourage relations with the Argentina revolutionaries.
To elaborate an international line according to this plan.
To elaborate a concrete plan of action on all the fronts and to actualize it constantly.
To create new mechanisms at the services level to resolve the logistic problems of this new type of struggle.
To elaborate an adequate parliamentary line.
To develop the National Liberation Front policy to avoid being isolated, even in the worst circumstances.
To elaborate profoundly our nationalistic conception and to encourage propaganda around it.
To put into action military and political plans that will become indispensable.

3. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the Organization it is necessary to elaborate a plan with meticulous military care that covers all the battlefronts and all the aspects of the struggle, that measures the tasks and its necessities at each step. All the directive organizations of all the fronts will participate in this task. We cannot work without plans anymore. This plan will be the vertebral column of our work and a reference point to unify and to coordinate the different battlefronts. We may be obliged to modify it during its application, but let it be the result of the practical struggle and not of our lack of foresight. Obviously this plan will promote an important organizative task.

4. In summation, to commence hostilities directly and

systematically must become the immediate concrete task to which we must concentrate all our energies. This must be calculated with military precision.

WE MUST HAVE OUR "D" DAY

Executive Secretariat
March, 1972

TUPAMARO WORK IN RELATION TO THE ARMY

These points were prepared by the Information Service of the Armed Forces (ISAF) of the Tupamaros for discussion. The current analysis made by the Movement is based in part on the following ISAF report.

1. Slowly and progressively we feel a kind of coexistence is being created among the different political tendencies (CTN, the Broad Front, the traditional parties) and ourselves.

2. At this stage we have mobilized the maximum number of people possible.

3. The people are becoming used to our actions; we don't create a great impact any more.

4. Considering all these factors and also considering the internal situation, the organization proposes to make a change in the quality of its action, to create a dynamizing effect.

5. This change in quality of our activities involves the perspective of taking, or sharing, power and therefore we must develop our actions.

6. To succeed we must defeat the Armed Forces. We propose a systematic and selective attack on them.

7. With the information that it has, ISAF can propose to the Organization politically interesting objectives for military action to destroy the moral and material forces of the enemy.

8. Following the line outlined above, we consider as concrete objectives the following:

    a. The death squad.

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b. Torture and tortures.

c. To sharpen the contradictions between the Armed Forces and the people, between officers and soldiers, between the different branches of the armed forces, between the different repressive forces (Armed Forces, police), between different political tendencies within the Armed Forces.

d. To create new elements for the development of psychological warfare.

e. To destroy the specialized forces of the enemy, e.g., intelligence service, communications, transport.

f. To attack the sources of supply.

g. To supply ourselves at the Armed Forces expense.

h. To attack military installations.

i. To study the influence of the international intelligence services (CIA, FBI) within the Armed Forces.

j. To study the tactics of the enemy.

ISAF
March, 1972

As can be seen, the Tupamaros plan well: from top to bottom, from bottom to top and from side to side. No element is overlooked. This has always been their method and from these long years of planning, their organization has reached a stage of perfection that can withstand and overcome any new set of problems. The government has instituted new methods of oppression, but in the end these new methods to stop the Tupamaros shall become no more than temporary obstacles.

XV.

CONCLUSION

The battle of the Tupamaros has just begun, after progressing from so very far back. Its history is short but the accomplishments are many: the MLN is a nightmare to the Uruguayan oligarchy, their masters, and to the foreign imperialists. The MLN shall become much more than a mere nightmare to this ruling class and much sooner than that ruling class would like to believe possible.

Some believe that the Tupamaros will be defeated; that time is a two-way street, and it is only a matter of time until the last guerrilla will fall. These same people have been mistaken before. I believe it is only a matter of time until the Tupamaros win the full-scale Revolution. But it is correct to point out that I have also been mistaken in the past.

One fact, in victory or defeat, is certain however: "Tupamarism" has been born and this phenomenon will never be defeated. Again, time is the factor; Tupamarism has already appeared in several nations independent of direct or indirect MLN supervision, and it is only a matter of time before this revolutionary phenomenon appears elsewhere.

South America has awakened from the sleep of colonialism; it has begun the fight for a new independence. The battle will not be an easy one to win; it will be fought against professional armies, trained and armed by the greatest military power that humanity has ever known. It is also realized that this battle will be a long one and preparations for a long battle will have to be made with all the suffering and hardships that accompany such a long battle.

But the Revolution is also cognizant of the fact that time and history are in its favor. History has proven that the exploiters have never prevailed for long over the exploited. In the end, the cause of the people, the cause of justice, has always been the victor, no matter how well-equipped, how well-trained, how professional or how many the number of the enemy.

Any method that is employed to gain justice for the people is a correct method regardless of its individual style; from the coup d'etat employed by the Army in Peru, to the electoral battle used in Chile, to the rural guerrilla tactics of Cuba. In Uruguay, the method being proven correct is Tupamarism.

The ending of this book is by no means the end of the struggle for the Tupamaros; the struggle has just begun. The combined pages of this book are also by no means the entire history of the Tupamaros; at best it is just another chapter in the history of a people struggling to break the chains of imperialism.

What has been presented, however, is a small insight into the reasons behind the justified struggle of an oppressed people and glance at some of their methods employed in this fight for justice.

Now that my tedious assignment is completed, the writing of this book, I can set down my typewriter, pick up my gun, and join the Tupamaros in the quest for people's justice.

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